Open Method of Coordination
In: EU Administrative Law, S. 191-233
In: EU Administrative Law, S. 191-233
In: University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 45/2016
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Working paper
In: Tools for Policy Learning and Policy Transfer. Supporting Regional Lifelong Learning Policies., S. 9-15
In: Tools for policy learning and policy transfer: supporting regional lifelong learning policies, S. 9-15
In: The journal of legislative studies, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 62-77
ISSN: 1743-9337
In: Policy & politics, Band 36, Heft 1, S. 21-37
ISSN: 1470-8442
One of the most discussed issues surrounding the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is the way in which it influences national social policies. This article argues that the question of influence is incorrectly posed. Instead, the OMC has to be understood as a 'two-level game' in which member state governments and non-governmental actors try to have an impact on the definition of the OMC objectives and, subsequently, strategically and selectively use the OMC in national policy-making processes. This, however, entails problems in terms of the transparency of policy-making processes and the accountability of national governments.
In: Policy & politics: advancing knowledge in public and social policy, Band 36, Heft 1, S. 21-37
ISSN: 0305-5736
One of the most discussed issues surrounding the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is the way in which it influences national social policies. This article argues that the question of influence is incorrectly posed. Instead, the OMC has to be understood as a 'two-level game' in which member state governments and non-governmental actors try to have an impact on the definition of the OMC objectives and, subsequently, strategically and selectively use the OMC in national policy-making processes. This, however, entails problems in terms of the transparency of policy-making processes and the accountability of national governments. Adapted from the source document.
In: International journal of media & cultural politics, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 229-248
ISSN: 2040-0918
Abstract
The article focuses on the use of the open method of coordination (OMC) in the field of culture. Its aim is to explore the adequacy of the cultural OMC in achieving its specific goals. The article examines the configuration and functioning of the cultural OMC through two distinct cycles (2008−10 and 2011−14), investigating the capacity of the process to structure Member States' cultural cooperation, to foster exchanges of best practice and to feed national and European Union (EU) cultural policies through the formulation of policy recommendations. The analysis draws on desk research and interviews carried out with the European institutions, Member States' cultural authorities and OMC participants in the cultural field. The article demonstrates that overall the cultural OMC is well-equipped to fulfil its mission and suggests that targeted changes to its format and operation could further strengthen its potential to do so.
In: European Law Review, Band 34, Heft 1
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In: Policy & politics: advancing knowledge in public and social policy, Band 36, Heft 1, S. 21-38
ISSN: 0305-5736
In: East West Review of Labor Law & Social Policy, Band 12, Heft 2007, S. 1
SSRN
In: O. De Schutter and S. Deakin, Social Rights and Market Forces. Is the open coordination of employment and social policies the future of Social Europe?, Bruylant: Bruxelles, 2005, p. 279-343
SSRN
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.
BASE
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule 'imitate the best.' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.
BASE