We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule 'imitate the best.' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behaviour (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is a new governance method applied in the European Union to policy fields where the main competences still rest with the member states. The OMC should help to foster mutual learning about successful policies and promote policy transfer by identifying best practices and recommending them. By confronting this approach with the economic concept of laboratory federalism its potential for the innovation and diffusion of policies in a multi-level governance system is analysed. Both concepts use the basic idea of decentralised experimentation and mutual learning from experiences with implemented policies. Whereas the OMC organizes this learning process to a greater extent 'top-down', laboratory federalism is much more a 'bottom-up' concept. Their advantages and shortcomings in evaluating, finding and transferring best policies are discussed and the underlying insufficiencies in setting adequate incentives for adopting better policies are analysed. It is shown that under certain conditions both concepts can supplement each other.
One of the most radical assertions made by the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann was that of late modern society's lack of self-control (Luhmann, 1990). Indeed, from the perspective of systems theory governing modern society is at once expected and impossible. The history of the political system must be understood as a series of attempts to achieve a task that cannot be achieved: that of actually governing or controlling modern society. The constitutional Nation State and the separation between legislative, executive and judicial powers has been the most conventional modern attempt by the political system to control society. In late modernity, the political system added yet another attempt to control modernity's own lack of control: that of "governance" instruments, sometimes alluded to under the terms "governing without government" (Rhodes, 1996). Several authors have linked this type of ambiguity to the "Governance Turn" (Armstrong, 2016; Kjaer, 2010), the "Comparative Turn" (Grek, 2009, 2010) or the "Knowledge Turn" (Fenwick et al., 2014; Freeman & Mangez, 2013; Normand & Derouet, 2016). The main topic of interest of this paper is the involvement of the European Union in the sector of education through the Open Method of Coordination. The attempt of the EU to govern education is fostered and legitimised by the observation of society's future as full of risks and uncertainties exceeding by far national territories – unemployment, terrorism, transformation of the labour market, etc. These observations, apparent in the "Lisbon Dramaturgy" (Laffan & Shaw, 2005), far from acting as an obstacle to the European involvement in education, operate instead as resources legitimating further political action at EU level. This involvement, however, does not take the conventional form of government. Instead, at a transnational level, the political system partly takes the form of governance processes, such as the OMC. The OMC is often defined by its informality (Alexiadou, 2007, 2014; Kjaer, 2010; Trubek & Trubek, 2005; Wallace et al., 2006) compared to traditional political mechanisms such as the Ordinary-Legislative-Procedure. Attempts to characterise these informal mechanisms range from the "lack of pre-given sets of rules" (Hajer, 2006) to "a greater inclusion of non-governmental actors in policy processes" (Peters, 2007). Inspired by but not limiting ourselves to these definitions, we intend to complete the analysis of informal governance mechanisms with the example of the Education and Training 2020 Working Groups, constitutive of the OMC in education. Informality, we suggest, is by no means a lack of form but rather a redefinition of political processes in a context of relative lack of formal power. Informal governance redefines the ways politics attempt to steer society, not by the deliberation, voting and implementation of legislative rules, but rather by facilitating learning processes, sharing of best practices and the tentative construction of shared cognitive frameworks at European level. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to provide a description and an analysis of the ET2020 Working Groups as novel ways through which the political system attempts to govern education. Research questions - How do the WG attempt to reach a consensus through the production of a coherent output, given the diversity of backgrounds and expectations among the WG members? - What is the influence of their initial mandate in the production of their output? How do the WG achieve to fulfil their two-fold mission, on one side to complete the objectives pre-defined by the mandates, and on the other side to foster the feeling of agreement and ownership of the WG members towards the output?
One of the most radical assertions made by the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann was that of late modern society's lack of self-control (Luhmann, 1990). Indeed, from the perspective of systems theory governing modern society is at once expected and impossible. The history of the political system must be understood as a series of attempts to achieve a task that cannot be achieved: that of actually governing or controlling modern society. The constitutional Nation State and the separation between legislative, executive and judicial powers has been the most conventional modern attempt by the political system to control society. In late modernity, the political system added yet another attempt to control modernity's own lack of control: that of "governance" instruments, sometimes alluded to under the terms "governing without government" (Rhodes, 1996). Several authors have linked this type of ambiguity to the "Governance Turn" (Armstrong, 2016; Kjaer, 2010), the "Comparative Turn" (Grek, 2009, 2010) or the "Knowledge Turn" (Fenwick et al., 2014; Freeman & Mangez, 2013; Normand & Derouet, 2016). The main topic of interest of this paper is the involvement of the European Union in the sector of education through the Open Method of Coordination. The attempt of the EU to govern education is fostered and legitimised by the observation of society's future as full of risks and uncertainties exceeding by far national territories – unemployment, terrorism, transformation of the labour market, etc. These observations, apparent in the "Lisbon Dramaturgy" (Laffan & Shaw, 2005), far from acting as an obstacle to the European involvement in education, operate instead as resources legitimating further political action at EU level. This involvement, however, does not take the conventional form of government. Instead, at a transnational level, the political system partly takes the form of governance processes, such as the OMC. The OMC is often defined by its informality (Alexiadou, 2007, 2014; Kjaer, 2010; Trubek & Trubek, 2005; Wallace et al., 2006) compared to traditional political mechanisms such as the Ordinary-Legislative-Procedure. Attempts to characterise these informal mechanisms range from the "lack of pre-given sets of rules" (Hajer, 2006) to "a greater inclusion of non-governmental actors in policy processes" (Peters, 2007). Inspired by but not limiting ourselves to these definitions, we intend to complete the analysis of informal governance mechanisms with the example of the Education and Training 2020 Working Groups, constitutive of the OMC in education. Informality, we suggest, is by no means a lack of form but rather a redefinition of political processes in a context of relative lack of formal power. Informal governance redefines the ways politics attempt to steer society, not by the deliberation, voting and implementation of legislative rules, but rather by facilitating learning processes, sharing of best practices and the tentative construction of shared cognitive frameworks at European level. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to provide a description and an analysis of the ET2020 Working Groups as novel ways through which the political system attempts to govern education. Research questions - How do the WG attempt to reach a consensus through the production of a coherent output, given the diversity of backgrounds and expectations among the WG members? - What is the influence of their initial mandate in the production of their output? How do the WG achieve to fulfil their two-fold mission, on one side to complete the objectives pre-defined by the mandates, and on the other side to foster the feeling of agreement and ownership of the WG members towards the output?
Eight years ago, the Open Method of Coordination was codified as a mode of governance to implement the Lisbon strategy of the European Union which aims to turn the European economy into the most competitive and most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. Since then, the OMC has often been highlighted as a "third way" in European governance – an alternative to intergovernmental negotiations and the Classical Community Method. Hopes that the OMC could develop into a "third way" would be destroyed if the OMC had considerable potential to promote institutional- spillover and this way to encourage the European Commission's competence creep. In that case, the OMC could be seen as having a bridging function between the two traditional methods used to govern the EU. Based on the supranationalism as put forward by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998), this paper analyses the OMC's potential to promote institutional-spillover in European education policy. With institutional-spillover I mean an increase of the decisional autonomy or capacity of the European Commission. The analysis reveals that the OMC's potential to promote institutional-spillover in education is very small as it neither increases participation of transnational society in the policy-making process nor sufficiently increases the autonomy of joint organisations such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice.
This article displays the importance of career guidance in Europe and beyond. The authors provide insight into the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), where mutual peer learning and development is of high importance. This paper highlights some of the elements of OMC in career guidance, discussing the terms "benchmarking", "peer learning" and "qualitative goals". Evidently, the OMC is seen as an instrument of governance, albeit a "soft" one in relation to career guidance. The article points out the advantages of this soft steering model, e.g. mutual peer learning. However, it also talks about the criticism this particular approach earns, as being just another tool for policy convergence in areas that are outside democratic political control. The authors further discuss the focus of OMC to develop common frameworks for quality assurance across Europe. These frameworks put perspective on career management skills in developing quality assurance approaches and on establishing national career guidance coordination. Policies and practices, however, aren't interchangeable across national borders to create convergence, as structures, policies, resources, and cultures differ. There is plenty to be learnt from each other, and plenty of silos to be broken down. Practically, the vehicle for applying the OMC approach has been the European Lifelong Guidance Policy Network (ELGPN). (DIPF/Orig.) ; Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt die Bedeutung der Bildungs- und Berufsberatung innerhalb und außerhalb Europas auf. Die Autoren gewähren Einblick in die Offene Methode der Koordinierung (OMK), bei der das gegenseitige Lernen von KollegInnen (Peer Learning) und ihre Entwicklung einen hohen Stellenwert einnehmen. Im Beitrag werden einige Elemente der OMK in Hinblick auf die Bildungs- und Berufsberatung beleuchtet und näher auf die Begriffe "Benchmarking", "Peer Learning" und "qualitative Ziele" eingegangen. Die OMK gilt offensichtlich als Steuerungsinstrument – wenn auch als ein "sanftes" in Zusammenhang mit der Bildungs- und Berufsberatung. Der Beitrag zeigt die Vorteile dieses sanften Steuerungsinstruments auf, wie z.B. das gegenseitige Peer Learning, beschäftigt sich jedoch auch mit der Kritik an diesem besonderen Ansatz: So handle es sich nur um ein weiteres Instrument der Konvergenzpolitik in Bereichen, die sich außerhalb der demokratischen politischen Kontrolle befinden. Die Autoren beschäftigen sich außerdem mit der Schwerpunktlegung der OMK auf die Entwicklung von gemeinsamen Rahmenbedingungen zur Qualitätssicherung innerhalb Europas. Diese Rahmenbedingungen legen das Hauptaugenmerk auf Kompetenzen zur Laufbahngestaltung und zwar durch die Entwicklung von Qualitätssicherungsansätzen und die Einführung einer nationalen Koordinierung der Bildungs- und Berufsberatung. Die Strategien und Praktiken lassen sich zum Zweck der Annäherung jedoch nicht einfach über Ländergrenzen hinweg austauschen, da es sich um unterschiedliche Strukturen, Richtlinien, Ressourcen und Kulturen handelt. Es gibt viel voneinander zu lernen und viele Barrieren müssen abgebaut werden. In der Praxis steht das European Lifelong Guidance Policy Network (ELGPN) als treibende Kraft hinter der Anwendung der OMK. (DIPF/Orig.)
This article examines the reception of the education Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in the UK as an aspect of Europeanization of national administrations. It addresses relationships between political and administrative actors in the process of responding to the education OMC. We argue that despite progress with institutionalization of the education OMC at the EU level, there is limited institutionalization of the education OMC at the national level. Against the backdrop of UK skepticism about engaging with the EU integration project, the interesting finding is the administrative strategies employed for deflecting EU influence on the national education space.
The paper examines the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in the European Union via National Action Plans (NAPs). We argue that some of the procedural and substantive shortcomings currently observed in the implementation process could effectively be addressed through the Open Method of Coordination – a governance instrument that the EU has already successfully used in other policy domains such as employment, social protection and education. Section two sketches out the polycentric global governance approach envisaged by the UNGPs and discusses the institutional and policy background of their implementation in the European Union. Section three provides an assessment of EU Member State National Action Plans on business and human rights, as benchmarked against international NAP guidance. Section four relates experiences with the existing NAP process to the policy background and rationale of the Open Method of Coordination and discusses the conditions for employing the OMC in the business and human rights domain. Against this background, section five make some more concrete proposals for developing an Open Method of Coordination on Business and Human Rights.
Since 2000, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has become a policy approach increasingly used in the European policy making process. By focusing on research policy, this study examines the ways in which the OMC and the mutual learning initiatives have influenced the wider policy discourse in the European Union. The paper argues that it is important to think about the contributions of the OMC in research policy in more broad and fundamental ways. This theory-guided study takes an empirical approach to the OMC, providing significant evidence on mutual learning effects analyzed in terms of developing an authentic dialogue, shaping policy discourse, shaping policy networks and facilitating collaborative learning. The analysis reveals that the OMC changes the ways in which the representatives from the Member States and the European Commission contribute to research policy, leading to a promising foundation for further policy enhancement.
Since 2000, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has become a policy approach increasingly used in the European policy making process. By focusing on research policy, this study examines the ways in which the OMC and the mutual learning initiatives have influenced the wider policy discourse in the European Union. The paper argues that it is important to think about the contributions of the OMC in research policy in more broad and fundamental ways. This theory-guided study takes an empirical approach to the OMC, providing significant evidence on mutual learning effects analyzed in terms of developing an authentic dialogue, shaping policy discourse, shaping policy networks and facilitating collaborative learning. The analysis reveals that the OMC changes the ways in which the representatives from the Member States and the European Commission contribute to research policy, leading to a promising foundation for further policy enhancement. Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v7i2.218
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has received much attention in the recent EU-literature. The predominant view claims that the OMC is not only a new but also an effective policy-making instrument. This paper raises doubts about both claims by offering a comparison of soft law policy coordination in three international organizations. More specifically, this paper compares the European Employment Strategy - which was the first use of the OMC - to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the EU, the OECD Economic Surveys, and the IMF Article IV Consultations. Based on expert interviews, it seeks to demonstrate that these procedures are forms of multilateral surveillance that do not differ in kind. Such a comparative analysis of the OMC refutes claims to its novelty. Having compared the four procedures, a more general model of multilateral surveillance consisting of six elements is generated that facilitates further comparisons. This paper concludes that governments select voluntarist procedures mainly to secure their own competencies rather than to realize common goals. Effective problem-solving is therefore not necessarily the dominant objective of soft law. ; Die EU-Literatur der letzten Jahre hat der Offenen Methode der Koordinierung (OMC) viel Aufmerksamkeit zukommen lassen. Die vorherrschende Sichtweise behauptet, dass die OMC nicht nur ein neues, sondern auch ein effektives Instrument der Politikgestaltung sei. Dieser Aufsatz stellt beide Aussagen infrage, indem es einen Vergleich verschiedener soft law-Verfahren von drei internationalen Organisationen vorlegt. Im Einzelnen vergleicht dieses Papier die Europäische Beschäftigungsstrategie - mit der die OMC zuerst entstanden ist - mit den Grundzügen der Wirtschaftspolitik der EU, den Länderberichten der OECD sowie den Artikel-IV-Konsultationen des Internationalen Währungsfonds. Auf der Grundlage von Experteninterviews wird gezeigt, dass alle vier Verfahren multilateraler Überwachung zugeordnet werden können und kein kategorischer Unterschied zwischen ihnen besteht. Eine solche vergleichende Analyse widerlegt die angenommene Neuheit der OMC. Aufbauend auf dem Vergleich der vier Verfahren wird dann ein allgemeines Modell multilateraler Überwachung entwickelt, welches aus sechs Elementen besteht und zukünftige Studien erleichtern wird. Dieser Aufsatz schließt mit der Beobachtung, dass Regierungen voluntaristische Verfahren eher deshalb wählen, um ihre eigenen Kompetenzen zu verteidigen als gemeinsame Ziele zu verwirklichen. Effektive Problemlösungsfähigkeit erscheint nicht als vorrangiges Anliegen von soft law.
In: Flear , M 2009 , ' The Open Method of Coordination on Health Care After the Lisbon Strategy II: Towards a Neoliberal Framing? ' , European Integration Online Papers , vol. 13 , no. 1 , 12 , pp. 1-16 . https://doi.org/10.1695/2009012
This paper undertakes a content analysis of the discourse on the Open Method of Coordination on Health Care (OMC/HC) in order to show how equity and solidarity are increasingly linked to optimisation and, as such, how neoliberalism increasingly frames health care. Some of the side-effects of this reframing for politics are highlighted: legitimating and extending EU governance, reducing the space for oppositional formations and limited citizenship. The analysis begins by interrogating the broader context of the Lisbon Strategy II, after which the techniques of the OMC/HC and its substantive outputs are analysed.
The construction of European education policy builds on a widely shared goal of transparency in qualifications, upheld by the popular narrative of mobile students endowed with scholarships from the EU Erasmus programme, which allow them to transfer credit points between universities and across national borders. EU education policy is increasingly inscribed in National Qualification Frameworks (NQF). Their European umbrella is coined the European Qualification Framework (EQF), which is linked to a discourse on or even shift to Learning Outcomes; functioning as a tool for the displacement of input to output categories in education systems with a view to make qualifications more transparent. This form of governance situates Learning Outcomes as a tool for policy reform that intentionally should affect all educational and administrative levels of European education. The article shows that the multitude of governance instruments used to promote a shift to Learning Outcomes are so varied that EU education policy has no apparent need of new instruments for this purpose. The fact that Learning Outcomes are linked to EU policy instruments of the Open Method of policy-Coordination and destined for several sectors of education, increases the likelihood that they will be translated into modified learning practices. Yet, there is a danger that governance of Learning Outcomes succumbs to a pitfall of declaratorily placing Learning Outcomes in the middle of learning practices in all subsectors of education, without sufficiently proving their real novelty and regulatory functions.