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In: EU Administrative Law, S. 191-233
In: Tools for Policy Learning and Policy Transfer. Supporting Regional Lifelong Learning Policies., S. 9-15
In: Tools for policy learning and policy transfer: supporting regional lifelong learning policies, S. 9-15
In: University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 45/2016
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Working paper
In: East West Review of Labor Law & Social Policy, Band 12, Heft 2007, S. 1
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In: Towards an Effective European Single Market, S. 127-141
In: The journal of legislative studies, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 62-77
ISSN: 1743-9337
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule 'imitate the best.' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.
BASE
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.
BASE
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behaviour (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.
BASE
In: European Law Journal, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 505-522
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In: Radaelli, Claudio M. and Susana Borras (2014) Open method of coordination for demoi-cracy? Standards and purposes, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 21.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2601
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In: Palgrave studies in European Union politics
The author analyses the goals and instruments of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), discusses approaches which theorise its functioning, examines its policy content and develops a framework for its evaluation