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In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit‐based epistemic injustices can be framed around the intellectual character virtue of open‐mindedness. In particular, these injustices occur because the people who commit them are closed‐minded in some respect; the injustices can therefore be remedied through the cultivation of the virtue of open‐mindedness. Describing epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory benefits: it yields a more parsimonious account of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice and it provides the underpinning of a virtue‐theoretical structure by which to explain what it is that perpetrators are culpable for and how virtues can have normative explanatory power.

The U.S., like much of the world, has been in the throes of political instability. Our aim is to attempt to account for the differences in beliefs that may be responsible for such impasses through a correlational study. Using the Open-Minded Cognition scale as a measure of open-mindedness, syllogistic reasoning problems to determine Belief-Bias effects, and diverse measures of political beliefs and attitudes, we were able to yield preliminary correlations of the Belief Bias items with P-OMC ( r = .144, p < .05), Openness and Intellect ( r = .150, p < .05), and the Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale ( r = -.144, p < .001). However, these data are pending further review due to participants' accuracy rates on Belief Bias syllogisms.

Bringing together a diverse group of leading psychologists, political scientists, sociologists, and communication scholars who investigate dogmatism and open-mindedness within social and political contexts, this resource covers a wide range of topics including key definitions of dogmatism and open-mindedness, the emergence of affective polarisation, how open-mindedness relates to attitude formation and change, the correspondence between intellectual humility and open-mindedness, and how social norms and situations shape open-minded cognition.

It is clear from the literature that in situations where organizations and their members face changing environments, it is necessary that mechanisms (learning) exist to capture the new knowledge which enables the firms to address those changes. This article examines the relative importance and significance of the existence of an `open-mindedness context' to the existence and nature of `organizational learning'. We include time as a variable in the analysis and focus on the need to unlearn at a moment (T) in order to learn more efficiently at a moment after (T+1). These relationships are examined through an empirical investigation of 107 Spanish small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) within the telecommunications industry. The results indicate that the effects of exploration and exploitation of knowledge at moment T+1 is conditioned by the existence of an `open-mindedness culture' at moment T.

The research on naïve realism suggests that people have a tendency of impugning opponents' cognitive biases and interacting with them in conflict-escalating approaches. Taking this to be a basic intrapersonal process in interpersonal deliberation, an experiment was conducted to examine potential rectifying effects of the epistemic motive of the need for openness on such perceptions of bias so as to improve individuals' deliberation preparedness. Results show that the tendency of imputing greater bias to others based upon self-other opinion incongruence is mitigated by the induced need for openness. This study also finds that participants are better prepared to partake in a group discussion with another person whose opinion is congruent rather than incongruent with theirs, and this relationship is through perceptions of bias in the opinion incongruent other. But this indirect path is weakened when participants are induced to have an elevated epistemic motive of the need for openness.