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AbstractChina is currently the third largest country in terms of outward direct investment (ODI), with the investors mainly being state‐owned enterprises. This presents a question: What inhibits private enterprises from increasing ODI? Using a firm‐level panel data set for Zhejiang Province in China, we examine the impact of firm heterogeneity on private firm ODI. We have three main findings: first, a higher productivity level contributes to better access to ODI, and increases ODI value as well; second, lowering a firm's financial constraint level can increase both the probability and volume of ODI; third, productivity cannot offset the negative effect of financial constraint on private firm ODI.

peer-reviewed ; This article investigates the effects of China's outward direct investment (ODI) on the institutional quality of the Belt and Road (B&R) countries. Based on a panel data set of 63 B&R countries during the period 2003 to 2016, we find that China's ODI improves the institutional quality of B&R countries not only in the short run but also in the long run. Further, although China's ODI exerts no differential impacts on host country institutional dimensions of "control of corruption," "government effectiveness," and "political stability" in countries with different natural resource endowments, it improves their institutional dimensions of "regulatory quality" and "rule of law," implying that China's ODI may help the host B&R countries minimize the "resource curse". As one of the most important strategies for China's opening-up development in the current era, the B&R initiative serves as means to promote sustainable development of B&R countries. The article therefore contributes to existing scholarship on the institutional effects of China's ODI and sheds light on the mechanisms that drive sustainable development.

This article investigates the effects of China&rsquo ; s outward direct investment (ODI) on the institutional quality of the Belt and Road (B& ; R) countries. Based on a panel data set of 63 B& ; R countries during the period 2003 to 2016, we find that China&rsquo ; s ODI improves the institutional quality of B& ; R countries not only in the short run but also in the long run. Further, although China&rsquo ; s ODI exerts no differential impacts on host country institutional dimensions of &ldquo ; control of corruption,&rdquo ; &ldquo ; government effectiveness,&rdquo ; and &ldquo ; political stability&rdquo ; in countries with different natural resource endowments, it improves their institutional dimensions of &ldquo ; regulatory quality&rdquo ; and &ldquo ; rule of law,&rdquo ; implying that China&rsquo ; s ODI may help the host B& ; R countries minimize the &ldquo ; resource curse&rdquo ; . As one of the most important strategies for China&rsquo ; s opening-up development in the current era, the B& ; R initiative serves as means to promote sustainable development of B& ; R countries. The article therefore contributes to existing scholarship on the institutional effects of China&rsquo ; s ODI and sheds light on the mechanisms that drive sustainable development.

As recently as 2002, Southeast Asian politicians and business leaders fretted publicly about losing foreign direct investment (FDI) originally earmarked for the region to China. They are more sanguine these days. Chinese companies not only look to Southeast Asia to supply raw materials to feed China's industrialization; they are increasingly investing there. Analysts understandably focus on China sucking in over US Dollar 50 billion of inward FDI per year - some of which was indeed previously earmarked for Southeast Asia - but in doing so they rarely notice that the flipside of Chinese investment is the rising wave of mainland outward direct investment (ODI), particulary into neighbouring countries. This paper notes the trend by way of a preliminary investigation into two broad issues: what sort of mainland companies are moving into ASEAN and how much are they investing; and what are the potential effects of that investment? Initial data suggest that most mainland investment comes via state-owned interprise (SOEs). And although in is impossible to know how much mainland money flows into Southeast Asia, it is certainly more than the US Dollar 2 billion for 2002 cited in official Chinese statistics. Growing Chinese investment in ASEAN has important implications, two of which are briefly canvassed: the effect of increasing Chinese investment on sanctions regimes designed to improve human rights (with specific reference to Burma), and whether pressure can be maintained on foreign investors to comply with international labour standards in the face of Chinese investment. (Pac Rev/DÜI)