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International audience ; This article intends to demonstrate that the concept of self-ownership does not necessarily imply a justification of inequalities of condition and a vindication of capitalism, which is traditionally the case. We present the reasons of such an association, and then we specify that the concept of self-ownership as a tool in political philosophy can be used for condemning the capitalist exploitation.

International audience ; This article intends to demonstrate that the concept of self-ownership does not necessarily imply a justification of inequalities of condition and a vindication of capitalism, which is traditionally the case. We present the reasons of such an association, and then we specify that the concept of self-ownership as a tool in political philosophy can be used for condemning the capitalist exploitation.

Prior work on political effects of personal asset ownership in the United Kingdom has found a causal link between home and share ownership and conservative political preferences and voting. These estimates appear to confirm the "ownership society" thesis tying privatization and asset ownership to improved prospects for conservative parties. This paper proposes a new identification strategy for testing this causal connection that improves on earlier research designs. I exploit temporal variability in panel data to better specify the definition of home ownership and control for unobserved confounders associated with ownership. Under this design, home ownership is found to have no or very weak effects on voting in the 1997 and 2001 General Elections. Where weakly significant results are found, they suggest a mixed effect on partisan outcomes at the ballot box. Finally, while extending this strategy to financial assets does support the "ownership society" hypothesis, doing so illuminates a very different set of identification problems, which point to underlying flaws in the "ownership society" argument itself. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Size varies. ; Daniels, W.M., cl. of 1888. ; At head of title: Reprinted from the Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, for the year 1906. ; Caption title. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Copy 2, unbound.

This paper focuses on the interaction between public and private land ownership as a backdrop to future tenure research. It challenges various myths about land ownership in both sectors and emphasizes the problems in expanding tenure terms of reference to include the socalled "new property." It concludes with an examination of macro‐sociological forces influencing the changing distribution of public and private ownership in the United States.

Philosophers and lawyers are apt to view property law from different perspectives. At the risk of gross overgeneralization, philosophers who discuss property rights tend to focus on the abstract principles that underlie ownership claims, while lawyers are more likely to focus on the practical problems of adjudicating concrete disputes within the constraints of a functioning legal system. Lawyers, for example, are likely to be more sensitive than philosophers to the real-world problems of proof that often accompany legal claims of ownership. For a lawyer, the key question is not whether any given theory of property rights is true in some metaphysical sense, but whether, given the theory of property rights employed by a particular legal system, a litigant within that system can prove an ownership claim to the satisfaction of an officially constituted tribunal.

AbstractThis article reviews the existing literature about the most prevalent form of corporate ownership around the world: ownership by individuals—particularly founders—and families. We summarize the existing evidence about the prevalence and persistence of family ownership around the world, along with its impact on performance—both financial and non-financial—relative to other types of corporate ownership. We discuss how and why these empirical facts and findings come about—why owners in general, and family owners in particular, are critical drivers of firm behaviour and performance, and how they are able to exercise their influence over corporations in which other shareholders, such as institutional investors, and other stakeholders can also play an important role.

Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized insiders and the disorganized taxpayers. I investigate how insiders`lobby activities distorts resource allocation in a state owned enterprise. Then I show that efficiency in labor allocation is improved when cash flow is rights affects efficiency in resource allocation when there are restrictions on side payments between the interest groups.