Description based on: [2nd] (Nov. 15-17, 1919). ; Vol. for 1919 issued as the League's Bulletin no. 14. ; "For the public ownership, efficient management and democratic control of public utilities and natural resources." ; None held in 1918. ; Mode of access: Internet.
International audience ; This article intends to demonstrate that the concept of self-ownership does not necessarily imply a justification of inequalities of condition and a vindication of capitalism, which is traditionally the case. We present the reasons of such an association, and then we specify that the concept of self-ownership as a tool in political philosophy can be used for condemning the capitalist exploitation.
International audience ; This article intends to demonstrate that the concept of self-ownership does not necessarily imply a justification of inequalities of condition and a vindication of capitalism, which is traditionally the case. We present the reasons of such an association, and then we specify that the concept of self-ownership as a tool in political philosophy can be used for condemning the capitalist exploitation.
Size varies. ; Daniels, W.M., cl. of 1888. ; At head of title: Reprinted from the Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, for the year 1906. ; Caption title. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Copy 2, unbound.
Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized insiders and the disorganized taxpayers. I investigate how insiders`lobby activities distorts resource allocation in a state owned enterprise. Then I show that efficiency in labor allocation is improved when cash flow is rights affects efficiency in resource allocation when there are restrictions on side payments between the interest groups.
The rapid expansion of the data economy raises serious questions about who "owns" data and what data "ownership" entails. In most jurisdictions, data that are kept confidential can be protected as confidential information. However, such data are vulnerable to exposure through hacking or leaking by third parties. In many instances, significant stores of data cannot be kept confidential, and protection must be sought elsewhere. Copyright law has long treated facts as being in the public domain, but will provide protection for compilations of facts that meet the threshold for "originality." Such protection is considered to be "thin," as it does not extend to the underlying facts, applying only to their original selection or arrangement. In the European Union, database rights offer a more robust protection for compilations of data, but they also fall short when it comes to protecting the facts that make up such compilations.
This item is part of the Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements (PRISM) digital collection, a collaborative initiative between Florida Atlantic University and University of Central Florida in the Publication of Archival, Library & Museum Materials (PALMM).
This article suggests how state enterprises can be incorporated into the theoretical and empirical growth literature. Specifically, it shows that if state enterprises are less efficient than private firms, invest less, employ less skilled labor, and are less eager to adopt new technology, then a large state enterprise sector tends to be associated with slow economic growth, all else remaining the same. The empirical evidence for 1978-92 indicates that, through a mixture of these channels, an increase in the share of state enterprises in employment by one standard deviation could reduce per capita growth by one to two percentage points a year from one country to another.
In: Seeberg , H B 2020 , ' Issue ownership attack: how a political party can counteract a rival's issue ownership ' , West European Politics , vol. 43 , no. 4 , pp. 772-794 . https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2019.1625242
A central part of representative democracy is that voters evaluate political parties based on how competently they handle issues, so-called 'issue ownership'. Since issue ownership is a central ingredient in the vote choice, rival parties often try to influence how voters evaluate a competing party. This is an issue ownership attack. However, despite intense scholarly interest in issue ownership, the understanding of how parties shape issue ownership is very limited. Therefore a new theoretical model is tested here to understand issue ownership attack. Using several survey experiments, the analysis shows that a mainstream party can counteract another mainstream party's issue ownership by reframing the issue and by blaming the party for its performance, but not by changing its own position on the issue. Hence, the study not only advances the understanding of issue ownership stability and change but also brings important insights on how parties influence voters.
We test two interesting results that can be obtained from a simplified version of the theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) that studies bargaining between politicians and managers of state-owned firms. The model suggests that firms with more state ownership tend to pay less in bribes but not have a different experience of costly obstacles imposed on them by politicians. In our full sample, the results suggest that a one percent increase in state ownership is associated with a $125 reduction in the total annual informal payment of the firm and with a 0.5% decrease in the probability that a firm will consider corruption to be an obstacle to their current operations. We refine these average relationships by splitting the sample by global region. Only in our Europe and Central Asia sample do we find strong evidence in support of the first result and again we find a significant effect of state ownership on obstacles.
The Scottish Government has pledged to reform inshore fisheries by 2020, while the UK Government is in the process of reforming fisheries legislation with the Fisheries Bill, brought forward in anticipation of the departure of the UK from the EU. . As the necessary starting point for any regulatory reform is an understanding of the existing rights subject to regulation, this article investigates the nature of the existing rights to fish in inshore Scottish waters and assesses whether reform of the ownership of Scotland's fishery needs to be assessed at the same time as its regulation. The article considers the theory behind Scotland's fishing rights, the extent of the right to fish, the Crown's right to alienation and the statutory impacts on the right to fish, before finally placing these findings in the context of contemporary developments of Scottish property and land reform law
Signed and dated: Toronto, Ont. E.B. Biggar. ; Caption title. ; "Reprinted for private circulation from the Journal of Political Economy, Vol. XXV, No. 2, February, 1917." ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44
In: Liu , Y , Brahma , S & Boateng , A 2019 , ' Impact of ownership structure and ownership concentration on credit risk of Chinese commercial banks ' , International Journal of Managerial Finance , vol. 16 , no. 2 , pp. 253-272 . https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMF-03-2019-0094
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of bank ownership structure and ownership concentration on credit risk. Design/methodology/approach: Using panel data on a sample of 88 Chinese commercial banks, with 826 observations over a period of 2003–2018, this study has applied system generalised method of moments regression to examine the impact of bank ownership structure and ownership concentration on credit risk. This study has used two measures of credit risk, which are non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) and loan loss provision ratio (LLPR). Findings: The results show that ownership type (both government and private ownership) exerts a positive and significant impact on credit risk. Measuring ownership concentration using Herfindahl–Hirchmann Index, the results indicate that concentration of ownership in the hands of government has a negative and significant effect on credit risk, whereas private ownership concentration positively impacts credit risk. Overall, the findings suggest that concentration of ownership in government hands reduces risk; however, private ownership concentration exacerbates credit risks. The results are invariant to both measures of credit risk, before and after the financial crisis. Practical implications: The findings provide useful insight to guide policy decisions in Chinese banks' lending policies and bank ownership. Originality/value: Using two ex post measures of credit risk, NPLR and LLPR, and one ownership concentration measure, HHI, this study deepens our understanding on the effectiveness of Chinese banks' corporate governance reforms on managing credit risks.