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ABSTRACTDifferent strategies have been used by the Rwandan government to promote capitalist accumulation. In some sectors, party and military owned enterprises are predominant. In others, the government has chosen to embrace market-led reforms. Ultimately, the vulnerability experienced by ruling elites contributes to the choice of how capital accumulation is promoted in different sectors. Ruling elites use party and military enterprises to centralise rents and establish control over the direction of economic policy. However, centralising rents is a political choice and excludes individuals from developing access to rents. The pyrethrum sector shows that the use of such groups has resulted in unequal outcomes despite increases in productivity. Reduced international prices have stunted further productivity. Conversely, the mining sector shows evidence of the pursuit of market-led reforms. These reforms have been accompanied by rapid growth in domestic production and exports. Foreign investment was necessary in order to bring capital and expertise to the sector. However, the government has struggled to retain the capacity to enforce legislation and discipline foreign investors in line with national priorities. Both sectors show evidence that ruling elites have been prompted by vulnerability to commit to economic development. Constraints that have accompanied strategies pursued in these sectors have forced the government to work 'reactively' to achieve strategic targets.

China's economic model, commonly described as "state capitalist," is now better characterized as party-state capitalism, in which the political survival of the Communist Party trumps developmental goals. Its tools for managing the economy include not only state ownership and market interventions, but increasing use of party-state power to discipline private capital. China's entrepreneurs are now expected to adhere to the party line, as are foreign corporations operating in the country. The shift is fueling a backlash from foreign governments that view the fusion of state and private interests in China as a threat to their own national security.

"In this book, I present an alternative view of party development in America's first century. During the Gilded Age, "electoral capitalism" became constitutive of the party system, a process that I explore through an investigation of New York and its role in national politics. Political commodification fueled individual ambitions, factional negotiation, and partisan combat. To be sure, a host of burning issues was paramount in the public's eye. Generations of historians have admirably documented how everything from Reconstruction, nativism, and the tariff to labor relations and monetary policy reflected deep social divisions that cleaved parties. My own concern is less about any particular issue like the "bloody shirt" or epochal ideology like Jeffersonianism. Instead, I seek to reevaluate the systemwide elements of political behavior that made this period distinctive"--

Machine generated contents note: 1.State, market, and the Party in Chinese capitalism -- 2.Ancient markets, modern capitalism: China and the problem of Eurocentrism -- 3.CCP authority and the two faces of uncertainty -- 4.From Tiananmen onwards: constructing capitalism in the 1990s -- 5.Entering the world: consolidating capitalism in the 2000s -- 6.Post-crisis challenges: confronting capitalism in the 2010s -- 7.Chinese finance and the future of authoritarian capitalism.

Public Lecture: Jamie Peck, 'On the frontier of party-state capitalism: Hong Kong, Guangdong & the making of the Greater Bay Area'
The post Jamie Peck, Public Lecture: On the frontier of party-state capitalism appeared first on Progress in Political Economy (PPE).

The paper combines a broad theoretical framework of comparable capitalism with the insights from new economic sociology and new institutional economics to understand and assess mechanisms of China's evolution. During the last three decades China's economic system has undergone a great transformation from communism to some form of state-led capitalism. The evolutionary approach that balanced the interests of economic and political actors led to the gradual introduction of a capitalist institutional framework, but also preserved the immense role of the Communist Party. In the course of the reforms, former direct control over the economy has been replaced by more discretionary measures like corporate governance (which conserved the extensive patronage system), and Party affiliation (which allowed for political penetration of the private sector). Supplying examples of mounting economic waste, I argue that China's present variety of capitalism is hardly an optimal solution, and the further development will strictly depend on state and Party withdrawal from economic contorl.