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A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties' established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform.

"Tina Landis is an organizer in the environmental and social justice movements. She works in air quality regulation and climate protection, and holds a certificate in Sustainable Management from the University of California, Berkeley. She is a member of the Party for Socialism and Liberation and writes for Liberation News."--Publisher's description

First Published in 1926, Towards Socialism or Capitalism? considers how the socialised economy of Soviet Russia, isolated in a capitalist world after Lenin's death, faced acute dangers. Trotsky and the Left Opposition alone fought the Stalinist degeneration of the state and party apparatus which threatened to open the door to capitalist restoration. The three articles in this book, written between 1925 and 1932, discuss the fundamental problems of the Soviet economy from the New Economic Policy to forced collectivization. Published here in one volume, they are indispensable steps i.

A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties' established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform. © 2006 Sage Publications.

Rezension von: Bremmer, Ian: The end of free market : who wins the war between states and corporations? - New York/N.Y. : Portfolio, 2010. - 240 S

This paper investigates the political determinants of corporatist and pluralist employers' associations and reflects on the origins of the varieties of capitalism in the early decades of the 20th century. We hypothesize that proportional, multiparty systems tend to enable employers' associations to develop into social corporatist organizations, whereas nonproportional, two-party systems are conducive to the formation of pluralist associations. Moreover, we suggest that federalism tends to reinforce incentives for pluralist organization. We assess our hypotheses through quantitative analysis of data from 1900 to the 1930s from 16 nations and case studies of the origins of peak employers' associations in Denmark and the United States. Our statistical analysis suggests that proportional, multiparty systems foster, and federalism works against, social corporatist business organization; employers' organization is also greater where the mobilization of labor, traditions of coordination, and economic development are higher. These factors also largely explain pre-World War II patterns of national coordination of capitalism. Case histories of the origins of employers' associations in Denmark and the United States further confirm the causal importance of political factors. Although Danish and American employers had similar interests in creating cooperative national industrial policies, trajectories of associational development were constrained by the structure of party competition, as well as by preindustrial traditions for coordination.