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At least four criterions/methods to measure mechanical effects of electoral systems can be distinguished: measuring disproportionality, the reduction in number of parties, the party advantages & the threshold percentages. In this manuscript we focus on the thresholds. We first concentrate on a description of legal, theoretical, & empirical thresholds as measures of mechanical effects. Further, we analyse the relationship between (the natural logarithm) of district magnitude & the empirical threshold & between the empirical threshold & the effective number of parties. As starting point we take districts in Spain, Portugal & Hungary as the level of analysis. We clearly show that there is a negative causal connection between district magnitude & the threshold percentage & between threshold percentage & the number of parties. Tables, Figures. Adapted from the source document.

In the literature on the impact of gender quota party magnitude appears as one of the most critical explanatory variables. A high party magnitude has long been argued to be a necessary condition for quota to be effective. However, recently a number of studies have shown that gender quota can be equally effective in the case of low party magnitude. An analysis of the Belgian regional elections for the years 1999, 2004 and 2009 shows that for quota to be effective it is crucial that they are tailored to the electoral system in which they are applied. Quota prove to be particularly effective when party magnitude is high while a placement mandate is effective when it covers a substantial part of the eligible list positions. We therefore conclude that effective quota can be designed for both high and low party magnitude. Adapted from the source document.

Downs (1957) has proposed that new political parties may be formed in order to change the policy positions of established parties. Rather than seeking to implement their own manifestos directly from government office, some new parties may seek to influence the manifestos of established parties in order to see their policy goals realized. While the notion is old, it has not been studied extensively. This paper seeks to find out under what conditions established parties take over policy positions specific to new parties. It looks at two points in time when an established party can do so: in anticipation, ie, before a new party enters parliament, & in reaction, ie, after a new party has entered parliament. To this end, the paper will study the anticipatory behavior & reactions of all established parties to all new parties entering the Dutch political system since 1946. Adapted from the source document.

The Christian Democrat/Socialist government Martens IV resigned at the end of Mar 1981, because the socialist party could not agree with an urgency plan to reorganize the public finances. Mark Eyskens, Minister of Finance in that cabinet, put together a new government in Apr & succeeded as Prime Minister. Robert Vandeputte, an extraparlementarian & honorary governor of the Central Bank, became the new Minister of Finance. Like preceding governments, the Eyskens cabinet was strongly hampered by deep mistrust between the coalition partners, opposing views between the two communities of Belgium, & disagreements about resolving the socioeconomic crisis. The Eyskens cabinet was particularly confronted with the organization of a restructured steel mill, increasing unemployment benefits, & the collapse of fiscal revenues. By mid-Sept, the government fell. Parliamentary elections were advanced to Nov. The Christian Democrats lost a considerable number of seats. A Christian-Democrat/liberal cabinet, again headed by Wilfried Martens, emerged by mid-Dec. It adopted a neoliberal policy, & Mark Eyskens became the Minister of Economic Affairs in the new government. Adapted from the source document.