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The article provides a systematic test of the consequences of electoral rules for the format of party systems and the frequency of single-party majority cabinets. The test is based on Lijphart's 1994 dataset (extended to 1 November 2002), but excludes some of his cases and introduces an additional indicator of number of parties. Thanks to these changes in research design, the variance explained by multivariate regression is much higher than Lijphart's results, especially in respect of elective parties. However, the post-1990 data reflect a decline in the predictive power of the main independent variable (`effective' threshold). In explaining this decline, the author argues that account should be taken of a previously neglected factor, i.e. the growing destructuration of Western parties and party systems since the late 1980s. Indeed, entering an indicator of such a process into regressions (total net volatility) compensates for all the threshold's lost explanatory power, thus suggesting that structural consolidation is a crucial condition for the operation of electoral systems.

Distributing "raw" data among types or classes is a necessary and illuminating part of the process of research and discovery in any science, particularly in the early stages of the latter's development. But it produces fruitful results only if the types or classes make sense, which they will just to the extent that, inter alia, the variables we fix upon in defining them are the significant ones (for the purpose in view, of course), and that the classes (a) exhaust the phenomena under consideration, and (b) do not overlap.One of the most elementary procedures used in dealing with the raw data of political conflict is that which, taking its departure from the notion of "party systems," seeks to assign each observed instance to one or another of three types: the "one-party system," the "two-party system," and the "multiple-party system." All party systems, it is assumed, belong as a matter of course to one of the three, so that one of the researcher's first tasks in studying the phenomena of party conflict in a given political situation is to find out with which one of the three types he is dealing. Until he has done this—so runs the tacit premise—he does not have his problem in manageable shape.

Examined are equilibria in multi- & two-party political systems. Drawing on the work of Anthony Downs (An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper & Row, 1957), a rational-choice model of governmental decision making is presented that has a one-dimensional policy space for the positions of parties & voters, & assumes an arbitrary continuous density of voters, voters for the nearest party, & parties that try to maximize the number of votes. Sufficient & necessary conditions for equilibria are given, from which it is deduced that for systems with a large number of parties, equilibria are rare unless the density of voters is uniform. 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.