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To what extent do presidents select appointees based upon campaign experience and connections? The answer to this question has important implications for our understanding of presidential management and political leadership. This article presents a theory explaining where presidents place different types of appointees and why, focusing on differences in ideology, competence, and non‐policy patronage benefits among potential appointees. We develop a formal model and test its implications with new data on 1,307 persons appointed in the first six months of the Obama administration. The empirical results broadly support the theory, suggesting that President Obama was more likely to place appointees selected for non‐policy patronage reasons in agencies off his agenda, in agencies that shared his policy views, and where appointees are least able to affect agency performance. We conclude that patronage continues to play an important role in American politics, with important consequences for campaigns, presidential politics, and governance.

State and municipal patronage in architecture has been a disaster. Brian Waters, a leading architect with a substantial practice, analyses how private patronage can commission buildings of real quality. Forward the speculative developer!

Frontmatter -- PREFACE -- CONTENTS -- CHAPTER ONE. Introduction: Selection for Public Office -- CHAPTER TWO. Government by Patronage -- CHAPTER THREE. Civil Service Reform -- CHAPTER FOUR. Political Appointments -- CHAPTER FIVE. Administrative Boards -- CHAPTER SIX. Advisory Bodies -- CHAPTER SEVEN. Judicial Appointments -- CHAPTER EIGHT. Administrative Tribunals -- CHAPTER NINE. The Selection of Justices of the Peace -- CHAPTER TEN. Honours -- CHAPTER ELEVEN. Life Peerages -- CHAPTER TWELVE. Church Appointments -- CHAPTER THIRTEEN. The Influence of Patronage -- APPENDIX -- INDEX