Suchergebnisse

Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Peace accords in Angola: Contesting the meaning of success -- 2 Peace and peace agreements in Burundi: When the right time comes -- 3 Deliberate coexistence of war and peace in Chad: The case of the Tripoli Accord -- 4 The long road to peace in Côte d'Ivoire: From civil war over power sharing to international intervention -- 5 Analysing the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo: From war to uncertain peace -- 6 Somali peace processes and agreements: From Djibouti I (1991) to Djibouti IV (2008-09)

The chapter examines the afterlife of peace agreements aimed at ending civil wars in thepost-Cold War era. Assessing the 'success' or otherwise of these agreements is not possiblewithout an appreciation of the context – historical, political, cultural and normative – withinwhich they have been negotiated, concluded and implemented. While context is thus allimportant, the history and fate of peace accords have also been shaped by the content ofindividual agreements, as well as by the manner of their implementation. The record showst hat poorly designed and inadequately supported peace agreements can entrench pre-war patterns of conflict, exacerbate intra-elite competition, and accentuate socio-economic and political grievances within war-torn societies. By contrast, agreements that are properly designed, adequately resourced, and underpinned by constructive political support from parties, regional actors and international sponsors, can strengthen the political forces and dynamics favoring long-term stability and societal transformation towards self-sustaining peace. Peace agreements after civil wars are often best approached as living documents whose flexible and politically informed interpretation can help parties and mediators chart political avenues out of protracted violence.

In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently great, it could be that the "poor" country can stop the war by transfering part of its resources to the "rich" country.

In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of its money to the "poor" country. But when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently high the "poor" country stops the war by transferring part of its resources to the "rich" country. War cannot be avoided by transfers when inequality of resources is very large or the cost of war is sufficiently low. ; Publicado