[The monitoring of the implementation of the Havana Agreements by regional organizations: the OAS and the OEI] At the end of 2016, the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP managed to sign a Peace Agreement to end the longest armed conflict in Latin America, known as the Havana Agreements. However, the implementation phase of the Agreements is extremely fragile and the institutionalized international community plays a key role in the success of this procedure. The Peace Agreement assigned the regional organizations very specific functions in terms of monitoring the implementation of each of the six points agreed upon. This investigation analyzes the results obtained through the monitoring and accompaniment work of the Organization of American States –OAS- and the Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture –OEI- reflected in the official reports published in this regard.
Casamance, Southern region of Senegal, has been suffering a conflict of "low intensity" since 1982, when the separatist Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) started an armed struggle for independence. After a period of fragile calmness, following the peace agreements in 2004, the region has been caught in an alternate state between war and peace, hostage of a new escalation of violence. Separatism in Casamance is not just a spot of bother of the Government but also an important geopolitical card played in other and more important issues: from the exploitation of offshore oil and fish resources along the border with Guinea-Bissau to its role of "democratic power" passing through the internal political struggles. After the landslide defeat of President Wadès coalition "Soopi" at the last regional election in 2009, the Casamance dossier could play again a major role in the struggle for power in the upcoming presidential election in 2013. ; Casamance, Southern region of Senegal, has been suffering a conflict of "low intensity" since 1982, when the separatist Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) started an armed struggle for independence. After a period of fragile calmness, following the peace agreements in 2004, the region has been caught in an alternate state between war and peace, hostage of a new escalation of violence. Separatism in Casamance is not just a spot of bother of the Government but also an important geopolitical card played in other and more important issues: from the exploitation of offshore oil and fish resources along the border with Guinea-Bissau to its role of "democratic power" passing through the internal political struggles. After the landslide defeat of President Wadès coalition "Soopi" at the last regional election in 2009, the Casamance dossier could play again a major role in the struggle for power in the upcoming presidential election in 2013.
La Bosnia Erzegovina è uno degli Stati plurinazionali più atipici nel mondo attuale. È divisa in due entità che emersero alla fine del conflitto tra il 1992 e il 1995. E' composta da tre differenti popolazioni: Bosniaci, Croati e Serbi. Dato che nessun gruppo nazionale è maggioritario a livello statale, si è stabilita una dominanza ristretta a livello territoriale. La Costituzione della Bosnia Erzegovina, prevista come quarto allegato agli accordi di pace di Dayton del 1995, stabilisce un generale divieto di discriminazione, senza fare riferimenti a diritti da riservarsi a particolari gruppi. Anche la forma di governo è atipica. Il fattore più rilevante concernente l'organizzazione dei poteri nella Costituzione è la tendenza a realizzare, nella struttura degli organi e nella loro attività, la parità dei diritti dei tre popoli costituenti: bosniacchi, croati e serbi. Questo articolo considera il principio di nazionalità e i diritti di cittadinanza, sia nel regime Jugoslavo, anteriore al conflitto, sia nel sistema istituzionale attuale. Esamina la Costituzione dello Stato Bosniaco e le Costituzioni delle due entità, occupandosi anche della sentenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo nel caso Finci Sejdic contro Bosnia Erzegovina del 2009, e delle sue possibili conseguenze. L'articolo analizza gli ultimi eventi accaduti sulla scena politica della Bosnia Erzegovina e descrive la situazione di stallo realizzatasi negli ultimi venti anni in tale ambito territoriale. ; Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the most atypical plurinational states in the world nowadays. It is divided into two entities which arose at the end of the conflict between 1992 and 1995. It is composed of three different populations, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, with "others", none of which reaches the majority within the State. The Constitution, which was attached to the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, establishes fair representation rights and the power of veto over some fundamental issues. These principles though result in the Bosnian government stalemate. The article explains the nationality principle and citizenship rights both in the Yugoslavian regime before the conflict and in the current institutional system. It examines the Bosnian State Constitution and the Constitutions of the two entities dealing also with the Human Rights European Court's sentence, the Finci Sejdic case against Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2009, and its possible consequences. The article analyzes the latest events in the Bosnia- Herzegovina political scene and it describes some of the stalled situations Bosnia- Herzegovinahas experienced for almost twenty years.
Eine Bilanz, fünf Jahre nach Abschluß des Friedensvertrages von Camp David: der Vertrag wurde in wichtigen Punkten wie Beendigung der Kriegshandlungen, Truppenrückzug, Rückgabe des Sinai an Ägypten, Grenzsicherung durch Friedenstruppe, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (besonders Öllieferungen) eingehalten, einige Punkte wie Austausch von Diplomaten oder Kulturbeziehungen wurden nicht oder halbherzig erfüllt; bei Fragen jedoch, die über den Camp-David-Vertrag hinausgehen, etwa, wie weit die Autonomie der Palästinenser in den besetzten Gebieten gehen und welchen Status Jerusalem erhalten soll, ist die Haltung Israels und Ägyptens absolut konträr. (DÜI- Hlr)
The globalization process of the last twenty years has changed the world through international flows of people, policies and practices. International cooperation to development is a part of that process and brought International Organizations (IOs) and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from the West to the rest of the world. In my thesis I analyze the Italian NGOs that worked in Bosnia Herzegovina (BH) to understand which development projects they realized and how they faced the ethnic issue that characterized BH. I consider the relation shaped between Italian NGOs and Bosnian civil society as an object of ethnic interests. In BH, once part of former Yugoslavia, the transition from the communist regime to a democratic country has not been completed. BH's social conditions are characterized by strong ethnic divisions. The legacy of the early 1990s crisis was a phenomenon of ethnic identities created before the war and that still endure today. The Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995 granted the peace and reinforced the inter-ethnic hate between the newly recognized three principal ethnicities: Serbs, Croats and Bosniak. Through the new constitution, the institutions were characterized by division at every level, from the top to the bottom of society. Besides it was the first constitution ever written and signed outside the own country; that was the root of the state of exception that characterized BH. Thus ethnic identities culture survived through the international political involvement. At the same time ethnic groups that dominated the political debate clashed with the international organization's democratic purpose to build a multicultural and democratic state. Ethnic and also religious differences were the instruments for a national statement that might cause the transition and development projects failure. Fifteen years later social fragmentation was still present and it established an atmosphere of daily cultural violence. Civil society suffered this condition and attended to recreate the ethnic fragmentation in every day life. Some cities became physically divided and other cities don't tolerated the minority presence. In rural areas, the division was more explicit, from village to village, without integration. In my speech, the anthropology for development – the derivative study from applied anthropology – constitutes the point of view that I used to understand how ethnic identities still influenced the development process in BH. I done ethnographic research about the Italian cooperation for development projects that were working there in 2007. The target of research were the Italian NGOs that created a relation with Bosnian civil society; they were almost twenty divided in four main field of competences: institutional building, education, agriculture and democratization. I assumed that NGOs work needed a deep study because the bottom of society is the place where people could really change their representation and behavior. Italian NGOs operated in BH with the aim of creating sustainable development. They found cultural barricade that both institutions and civil society erected when development projects have been applied. Ethnic and religious differences were stressed to maintain boundaries and fragmented power. Thus NGOs tried to negotiate development projects by social integration. I found that NGOs worked among ethnic groups by pursuing a new integration. They often gained success among people; civil society was ready to accept development projects and overcome differences. On the other hand NGOs have been limited by political level that sustained the ethnic talk and by their representation of Bosnian issue. Thus development policies have been impeded by ethnic issue and by cooperation practices established on a top down perspective. Paradoxically, since international community has approved the political ethnic division within DPA, then the willing of development followed by funding NGOs cooperation projects was not completely successful.
Il saggio ricostruisce, dopo una necessaria premessa per descrivere le principali vicende storiche, la politica educativa attuata in Bosnia Erzegovina dopo gli accordi di Dayton del 1995 che segnarono la fine delle guerre nei Balcani. Il progetto «due scuole sotto un tetto» rappresentò un passaggio che fu definito come temporaneo, ma che è tuttora in atto e che ha prodotto scuole con una netta separazione su base etnica. In questo contesto, Srebrenica, la città della Bosnia in cui nel 1995 ebbe luogo il genocidio di più di 8000 persone, diventa esempio di rinascita: il progetto Srebrenica city of hope messo in atto da Irvin Mujcic che fu profugo in Italia e che lasciò la sua città d'origine a 5 anni, per farvi ritorno ormai adulto dopo la guerra, definisce la necessità di costruire percorsi di pace, tanto nell'ambito delle politiche educative nazionali, quanto nel contesto sociale all'esterno della scuola. The essay analyzes the educational policy implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton agreements (1995) which marked the end of the Balkans wars. The national project «Two schools under one roof» represented a step which was defined as temporary, but which is still ongoing and which has produced schools with a clear separation on an ethnic basis. In this context, Srebrenica, the bosnian city where the genocide of more than 8000 people took place in july 1995, becomes an example of rebirth: the project «Srebrenica city of hope» implemented by Irvin Mujcic who was a refugee in Italy during the war, defines the need to build paths of peace both in the context of national educational policies and in the social context outside the school.
After World War II, political and diplomatic relations between Italy and Yugoslavia were characterized by misunderstandings, polemics and hostility, due mainly (though not exclusively) to the Trieste question, which was a long standing territorial dispute that divided the two Adriatic countries for decades. The article, which is based mainly on primary sources (such as Tito's Archive in Belgrade and Aldo Moro's Archive in Rome) as well as on relevant literature, argues that Italian-Yugoslav rapprochement, which led to the settlement of the Trieste question in 1975, became possible only due to the crucial domestic changes, which occurred in Italian politics during the Sixties. As the article also argues, it was Aldo Moro, a Christian-Democrat leader, several times Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister between 1963 and 1976, who played the crucial role in getting Italy and Yugoslavia closer. According to Moro, it was necessary to present the agreement with Yugoslavia not as an Italian renounce to zone B, because it was not possible to relinquish something that had not belonged to the country since the end of the War and the Peace Treaty, but to present it as a fi nal acquisition of benefi ts both territorial (zone A with Trieste which the Peace Treaty of 1947 had left outside of the national borders) as well as political and economic, through revival of friendship between Italy and Yugoslavia.
In June 1945, the Anglo-American Allies and the Jugoslav Government agreed upon establishing a bi-zonal occupational regime in the Julian March. One of the main points of the agreement was the so-called Morgan line, the provisional boundary which was to divide the British/American and the Yugoslav zones. During the first two years of occupation, the relations between the two neighbours remained rather tense, with many incidents (some of which serious) occurring along the line. Even after the ratification of the Italian Peace Treaty, in September 1947, the situation did not improve significantly. The military détente along the border of the Free Territory of Trieste came only after the Tito-Stalin split and the subsequent, gradual rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the West. Using original archival sources (mainly British), this essay provides the reader with an extensive overview on the frontier incidents which took place in the Julian March and the Free Territory of Trieste from mid-1945 until 1949 (when the last clashes involving Allied troops occurred).
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate and understand the role of the Shah of Iran, and his close relationships with the United States, in the development of the Iranian nuclear program before the Revolution of 1979. The period covered goes from the assignment of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi as Shah of Iran in 1946 to the 1979 when finally Iran and United States found an agreement about mutual nuclear cooperation. The first part of this study examines the situation when Mohammed Reza Pahlavi became Shah of Iran and then during the '50 when the role of the Shah was consolidated and the United States gradually gave greater support to the Iranian regime. The first step to develop nuclear energy is traced back to 1957, in connection with the increasing military and economic assistance to Iran from the Eisenhower's Administration. In the same year, the two countries announced an agreement for cooperation and research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This first agreement came under the auspices of the Atoms for Peace program launched by Eisenhower. Two years after the agreement Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ordered the establishment of an institute at Teheran University, the Teheran Nuclear Research Center, and negotiated with the United States the supply of a five-megawatt reactor. Despite this important steps the Iran was not prepared to develop such an important technology and during the '60 the United States provided nuclear fuel and equipment that Iran used to start its research up. The second part of the dissertation examines the development of the program during the '70 and the relation between Teheran and the Gerald Ford's Administration. In March 1974, the Shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and announced plans to get 23,000 megawatts of electricity from nuclear power stations. By the mid-1970s Iran had signed contracts with several Western Countries, including France and Germany, for the construction of nuclear plants and supply of nuclear fuel. At the same time the Ford's administration began to suspect about the real intentions of the Shah and worked out several solutions to try to control the developments of Iran's nuclear program. The mutual suspicions led to various deadlocks in the negotiations between the two countries. In this situation the United States tried to adopt some solutions that would have allowed control of the program like for example the "multinational reprocessing plant" or the "buy back solution". The third part examines the development of the program during the Carter's administration. President Jimmy Carter, agreed to accommodate the Shah's requests, but still only to the extent that U.S. proliferation concerns were met. Under Carter, finally, the Shah was willing to make all the concessions that proved he was not trying to build a bomb such as forgoing plans for plutonium processing plants and the President permitted U.S. companies to sell reactors to Iran in 1978. In 1979 the revolution was imminent and the nuclear program had to be abandoned.
After the beginning of the experience of the center-left government in the early sixties, Italy proposes an independent and original foreign policy, consistent with its position in the Mediterranean, across the border between East and West. The preferred partner within the Warsaw Pact is Romania, considered the vanguard of a political process of internal liberalization and of political emancipation of Eastern Europe from Soviet-communism. So far, the limited historiography on the Italo-Romanian relationships has taken into account almost exclusively the economic and trade agreements. This paper, on the basis of largely unpublished documentation at the Senato della Repubblica and at the Central State's Archive in Italy, analyzes instead the main international issues of the meetings between Bucharest and Rome, namely the Détente, the Sino-Soviet conflict, the peace building in the South-East Asia, the Middle-East, the CSCE. The unpublished diary of statesman Amintore Fanfani, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1965 to 1968, reveals how the Italian ruling class has a substantial confidence in Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Corneliu Mănescu and high expectations around an alleged non-alignment of Romania. On the other hand, the correspondence from the Italian Embassy in Bucharest for Aldo Moro (Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1969 to 1972 and from 1973 to 1974), describes the violent and authoritarian temper of the regime established by Ceauşescu in his country. In any case the Italian strategy seems then to reappraise the special partnership with Romania, in favor of a multilateral approach to the problem of Détente within the continental conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Nel presente lavoro viene trattato il delicato tema dell'autotutela collettiva, nell'intersezione tra ipotesi di revisione nazionale e prospettive europee. Dapprima viene ricostruita l'evoluzione della valutazione del conflitto collettivo nell'ordinamento giuridico italiano ed effettuata una ricognizione delle diverse manifestazioni del conflitto collettivo ivi riscontrabili. Il tentativo è quello di superare i limiti di una trattazione ristretta allo sciopero e di verificare la perdurante validità della tradizionale nozione di sciopero, intesa esclusivamente come astensione collettiva dalle prestazioni di lavoro. In un secondo capitolo vengono esaminati i disegni di legge di riforma in materia di conflitto collettivo, presentati nel corso della XVI legislatura e le clausole, incidenti sulla medesima materia, rinvenibili nell'Accordo interconfederale del 28 giugno 2011 e negli accordi FIAT del 2010, relativi agli stabilimenti di Pomigliano D'Arco e Mirafiori. Alla luce di tali materiali, si riesaminano le tematiche della titolarità individuale del diritto di sciopero, delle clausole di tregua e delle procedure arbitrali e conciliative. Successivamente, viene esaminata la produzione legislativa e giurisprudenziale comunitaria in tema di conflitto collettivo. Il confronto con l'ordinamento nazionale consente di mettere criticamente in luce il diverso rapporto tra mercato e diritti d'azione collettiva e di rilevare che nell'ordinamento comunitario la giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia abbia introdotto limiti eccessivi al dispiegarsi dei diritti sociali in esame. Da ultimo, vengono formulate alcune considerazioni conclusive. Criticamente viene rilevato come, in tempi di globalizzazione, non viene prestata sufficiente attenzione alla valorizzazione del conflitto collettivo, come motore dell'emancipazione e del progresso sociale. ; This work aims to describe the issue of industrial actions within both, the National and European frameworks. First, this paper analyses the evolution in the assessment of industrial conflicts in the Italian system and it describes some of the most significant types of industrial actions according to the case-law of the Italian Supreme Court. The analysis it not limited only to the right to strike. The aim is considering whether the traditional notion of "strike" as "a collective abstention from work organised by several employees" is still current and meaningful The second chapter of the work is dedicated to the reform proposals regarding the right to strike recently drawn in Italy. After a brief description of the Law no. 146/1990, amended by Law no. 83/2000 and Law no. 135/2012, I focus on the Intersectoral Agreement signed on the 28th June 2011. Furthermore, I analyse two Agreements, signed at Fiat's Pomigliano and Mirafiori plants respectively in June and December 2010. In the light of the mentioned legal sources, I examine the issues related to the entitlement to exercise the right to strike, rule of peace obligation and recent promotion of conciliation and arbitration procedures as an alternative to conflictive industrial actions. The last part of this work focus on the European legal sources and the recent Viking and Laval cases. According to these judgments, which are going to strongly impact on the future of Trade Unions' rights, at the European level the promotion of the economic freedoms seems to prevail on the protection of industrial actions. In conclusion, in these times of globalisation, both the National and European system, do not seem to give adequate attention to the issues related with the protection of industrial actions. On the contrary, they should be understood as a tool of emancipation and social progress.
Parte I. Il barone Capitolo I. Il mestiere della armi tra Napoli e Milano (1418-1455) Nella prima parte del capitolo si analizza il contesto famigliare del Sanseverino. Il padre Leonetto apparteneva alla famiglia dei Sanseverino di Caiazzo, un ramo cadetto di incerta legittimità della grande casata baronale. La madre Elisa era figlia di Muzio Attendolo e sorella di Francesco Sforza. Il giovane Roberto, a seguito della conquista del regno di Napoli da parte di Alfonso il Magnanimo, perse tutte le terre che aveva ereditato dal padre e fu costretto a seguire lo Sforza, arruolandosi nella sua compagnia. I suoi parenti Sanseverino, desiderosi di incamerare le sue terre, gli furono ostili. Nella seconda parte del capitolo si ripercorrono le vicende del Sanseverino al servizio dello zio materno, dalla guerra della Marca fino alla conquista del ducato di Milano da parte dello Sforza. Questo evento si rivelerà fondamentale per la carriera del Sanseverino, il quale, alla metà degli anni Cinquanta si trovava ad essere il nipote di uno dei principi più potenti d'Italia. I suoi servigi gli valsero anche l'investitura dei feudi di Colorno e Pontecurone, un matrimonio prestigioso con una da Correggio e una condotta indipendente. Capitolo II. Il recupero dell'eredità paterna nel regno di Napoli (1455-1464) Il capitolo analizza le mosse messe in atto dal Sanseverino per recuperare l'eredità del padre nel Mezzogiorno. Nella prima parte ricostruiamo la missione diplomatica del Sanseverino presso Alfonso il Magnanimo, il quale gli restituì la maggior parte delle sue terre, in omaggio alla nuova intesa fra lui e lo Sforza a seguito del distendersi dei rapporti fra Napoli e Milano dopo la pace di Lodi. La seconda parte, invece, segue le vicende del Sanseverino durante la guerra di successione al regno di Napoli, che lo portarono a recuperare Caiazzo, ottenuta insieme al titolo comitale. Si è cercato, parimenti, di analizzare le strategie messe in atto dal condottiero per creare il contesto politico necessario affinché le terre riconquistate non potessero venire alienate in futuro: da un lato coltivò buoni rapporti con re Ferrante d'Aragona, dall'altro strinse solide intese con gli altri Sanseverino. Capitolo III. Prime delusioni (1465-1466) Il capitolo analizza il tentativo del Sanseverino di ottenere una condotta condivisa da Milano e Napoli, naturale conseguenza della sua doppia natura di condottiero sforzesco e barone meridionale. Il contesto politico ed economico della seconda metà degli anni Sessanta, però lo sfavorì: la riforma dell'esercito demaniale napoletano e la crisi economica milanese lo costrinsero ad andare a servire Firenze, all'epoca alleata del regno e del ducato. Parte II. Il condottiero deluso Capitolo IV. Firenze e il condottiero (1467-1470) In questo capitolo si analizza il difficile rapporto fra il Sanseverino e Firenze. Le importanti richieste del condottiero e la diffidenza della repubblica nel trattare con i mercenari crearono forti tensioni, mitigate solo in parte dalla mediazione dei Medici, del duca di Milano e del re di Napoli. Sullo sfondo di questa vicenda, si è osservato anche il tentativo del Sanseverino di stringere rapporti ancora più forti con il Mezzogiorno, concretizzato dal matrimonio della figlia con un Carafa di Maddaloni. Con il passare del tempo, sempre più sfiduciato dai continui contrasti con Firenze, il condottiero incominciò anche a diffidare dello Sforza e di Ferrante, i quali gli avevano fatto molte promesse, ma ne avevano mantenute ben poche. Capitolo V. L'illusone sforzesca (1470-1476) La prima parte del capitolo analizza la rottura (comunque non traumatica) del Sanseverino con Ferrante d'Aragona e il ritorno al servizio diretto dello Sforza. Il condottiero investì così tutti i suoi sforzi nei suoi interessi nel Nord Italia, conservando però le sue terre nel Mezzogiorno. La seconda parte del capitolo ricostruisce la sua permanenza a Bologna come condottiero sforzesco più importante della Romagna, i suoi rapporti con la città e il suo contributo diplomatico e militare nella regione. Parimenti si osserva la crescita del suo status personale, dovuto alla sua esperienza, un nuovo matrimonio prestigioso con una Malavolti di Siena e il cementarsi dell'amicizia con Lorenzo il Magnifico. La parte finale del capitolo analizza invece il declinare dei buoni rapporti del Sanseverino con lo Sforza, che, dal concedergli nuovi feudi prestigiosi e stipendi regolari, passò a trattarlo con poco rispetto: una nuova crisi economica del ducato rese infatti il soldo sempre meno regolare. Il Sanseverino, inoltre, era stanco della sua inattività bolognese e fece suoi primi tentativi di ottenere un principato indipendente. Il clima di tensione fra il duca e il cugino venne risolto solo dall'assassinio del primo il 26 dicembre 1476. Parte III. Il ribelle Capitolo VI. Uno sforzesco ribelle Il capitolo analizza le mosse del Sanseverino a seguito dell'assassinio di Galeazzo Maria Sforza. Il condottiero, prendendo le parti dei fratelli del duca defunto, scelse la via della ribellione contro la reggenza legittima del giovane Gian Galeazzo Maria Sforza, guidata da Bona di Savoia e da Cicco Simonetta: sperava così di poter sfruttare il momento di confusione politica per accrescere ulteriormente il suo status. Si seguono così tutte le sue vicissitudini in questi anni convulsi: prima, attraverso le carte del processo intentato contro di lui a Milano, le sue trame contro la reggenza; in seguito la sua fuga in Francia presso Luigi XI; poi la sua permanenza ad Asti al servizio del re di Francia prima e del re di Napoli poi. Una volta entrato al servizio di re Ferrante, il Sanseverino aiutò la ribelle repubblica di Genova a respingere l'assalto di un imponete esercito sforzesco. L'ultima parte del capitolo narra invece di come Ludovico Maria Sforza e il Sanseverino riuscirono a rientrare a Milano grazie all'appoggio del re di Napoli e all'abilità militare del condottiero. Capitolo VII. Roberto Sanseverino e Ludovico il Moro (1479-1484) Le imprese analizzate nel capitolo precedente, crearono nel Sanseverino la consapevolezza di essere una figura di primo piano della politica italiana, illudendolo però di poter trattare da pari con Ludovico il Moro: il condottiero si illuse così di poter aspirare al dominio diretto del ducato di Milano. Se però in passato la parentela sforzesca lo aveva aiutato ad ottenere i suoi scopi, in questo caso, lo tradì: il condottiero aveva infatti sopravvalutato la sua posizione all'interno della gerarchia di potere in seno alla famiglia Sforza. Un iniziale accordo di suddivisione dei compiti con il Moro ci fu, ma questi era in posizione di superiorità sul Sanseverino, sia dal punto di vista della legittimità, che da quello dell'abilità politica: l'intesa sarebbe durata finché lo Sforza l'avesse voluto. Ben presto il Sanseverino venne emarginato e fu costretto alla seconda clamorosa fuga dal ducato. Passò al servizio di Venezia, un'opzione di carriera sempre paventata nei carteggi dell'epoca, ma mai concretizzatasi per la volontà del capitano di non rompere con Napoli e Milano. Con la brillante condotta tenuta durante la guerra di Ferrara, il Sanseverino raggiunse l'apice della sua carriera personale, riuscendo a farsi eleggere capitano generale d'Italia con la pace di Bagnolo dell'agosto del 1484. Capitolo VIII. Il nemico della pace d'Italia (1485-1487) Il capitolo analizza l'ultima parte della vita del Sanseverino. In seguito alla pace di Bagnolo, il condottiero si sentì abbastanza potente da tentare di conquistarsi un principato indipendente con le sue sole forze. Dopo aver tentato inutilmente di prendere Siena, però si accorse che senza un rivolgimento generale in Italia, non poteva sperare di ottenere un vero successo e, così, nell'agosto del 1485 decise di appoggiare la ribellione dei baroni del Mezzogiorno, assoldato dal pontefice Innocenzo VIII come gonfaloniere della Chiesa. La guerra che ne seguì si rivelò per lui un disastro e ben presto venne abbandonato dal papa stesso, il quale lo escluse dall'accordo di pace stretto con il re di Napoli nell'agosto del 1486. Senza uno stato che lo appoggiasse, il Sanseverino era estremamente vulnerabile. Ferrante d'Aragona e il Moro non persero quindi l'occasione per eliminarlo: il duca di Calabria lo inseguì, implacabile, dal Lazio fino alla Romagna, dove lo costrinse a sciogliere la compagnia e riparare con pochi uomini in Veneto. Qui gli venne offerto un sussidio mensile, ma non gli venne dato alcun incarico militare. A 68 anni era un uomo finito, senza la sua compagnia e odiato da tutte le potenze italiane. Morì combattendo in Trentino conto gli Austriaci l'anno seguente. ; Part I. The baron Chapter I. The military career between Naples and Milan (1418-1455) The first part of the chapter analyses the family context of Sanseverino. The father Leonetto belonged to the Sanseverino family of Caiazzo, a cadet branch of uncertain legitimacy of the great baronial family. His mother Elisa was the daughter of Muzio Attendolo and sister of Francesco Sforza. Following the conquest of the kingdom of Naples by Alfonso the Magnanimous, the young Roberto lost all the land he had inherited from his father and was forced to follow Sforza, enlisting in his military company. His relatives from the Sanseverino side of the family, eager to obtain his land, were hostile to him. In the second part of the chapter, the story of the Sanseverino goes back to the service of the maternal uncle, from the Marca war to the Sforza conquest of the Duchy of Milan. This event will prove to be fundamental for the career of Sanseverino, who, towards the mid of the fifteenth century, was the grandson of one of the most powerful Italian princes. His services also earned him the investiture of the fiefs of Colorno and Pontecurone, a prestigious marriage with a member of the family of Correggio and an independent condotta. Chapter II. The recovery of the paternal inheritance in the kingdom of Naples (1455-1464) The chapter analyses the strategies made by Sanseverino to recover the legacy of his father in the South of Italy. The first part of the chapter covers the diplomatic mission of Sanseverino to Alfonso the Magnanimous, who returned him most of his land, as a consequence of the new agreement between the king and Sforza - due to the improvement of the relations between Naples and Milan following the peace of Lodi. The second part of the chapter follows the events of Sanseverino during the war of succession to the kingdom of Naples, which led him to recover Caiazzo, obtained together with the title of count. The chapter also tries to analyse the strategies implemented by the condottiero to create a favorable political context to secure the conquered lands avoiding any possible future losses: on the one hand he cultivated good relations with King Ferrante of Aragon, on the other he held firm agreements with the other Sanseverinos. Chapter III. First disappointments (1465-1466) The chapter focuses on Sanseverino's attempt to obtain a joint military company co-financed by Milan and Naples, a natural consequence of his dual nature of Sforzesco condottiero and southern baron. The political and economic context of the second half of the sixties, however, were not favourable to him: the reform of the Neapolitan state army and the Milanese economic crisis forced him to go to Florence, which at that time was allied with both the Naples kingdom and the Milan duchy. Part II. The disappointed condottiero Chapter IV. Florence and the condottiero (1467-1470) This chapter discusses the difficult relationship between Sanseverino and Florence. The demanding attitude of the condottiero and the distrust of the republic in dealing with the mercenaries created strong tensions, mitigated only in part by the mediation of the Medici, the Duke of Milan and the king of Naples. On the background of this affair, Sanseverino attempted to forge even stronger relationships with the South, which resulted in his daughter's marriage to a member of the Carafa di Maddaloni family. Over the time, more and more discouraged by the continuous contrasts with Florence, the condottiero also began to distrust both Sforza and Ferrante, who did not keep their promises. Chapter V. Sforzesco illuson (1470-1476) The first part of the chapter analyses the break (however not traumatic) of the Sanseverino with Ferrante d'Aragona and the return to the direct service of the Sforza. Following this, the condottiero invested all his efforts in his interests in Northern Italy, but kept his lands in the South. The second part of the chapter covers his service in Bologna as the most important Sforzesco condottiero in Romagna, his relations with the city and his diplomatic and military contribution in the region. The chapter also discusses the growth of his personal status, due to his experience, a new prestigious marriage with a Malavolti from Siena and the cementing of his friendship with Lorenzo the Magnificent. The final part of the chapter analyses instead the decline of the good relations of Sanseverino with Francesco Sforza, who, from granting him prestigious new fiefs and regular salaries, went to treat him disrespectfully due to a new economic crisis of the duchy that made the pay less and less regular. Furthermore Sanseverino, tired of his inactivity in Bologna, made his first attempt to obtain an independent principality. The climate of tension between the duke of Milan and his cousin Sanseverino was solved only by the assassination of the first on 26 December 1476. Part III. The rebel Chapter VI. A rebellious sforzesco The chapter analyses the actions of the Sanseverino following the assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza. The condottiero, taking the parts of the deceased duke's brothers, chose the way of rebellion against the legitimate regency of the young Gian Galeazzo Maria Sforza, led by Bona di Savoia and Cicco Simonetta: he hoped to exploit the moment of political confusion to increase his status further. His vicissitudes in these convulsed years include: first, his plots against the regency, emerging from the papers of the trial brought against him in Milan; his escape to France under Louis XI; his stay in Asti first at the service of the king of France first and later at the service of the king of Naples. Finally, once at the service of King Ferrante, Sanseverino helped the rebel republic of Genoa to reject the assault of Sforza's remarkable army. The last part of the chapter explains how Ludovico Maria Sforza and Sanseverino managed to return to Milan thanks to the support of the king of Naples and the military ability of the condottiero. Chapter VII. Roberto Sanseverino and Ludovico the Moro (1479-1484) The undertakings analysed in the previous chapter, created in Sanseverino the awareness of being a leading figure of the Italian politics, but gave him the misperception to be able to deal with Ludovico il Moro: the condottiero thus started aspiring to the direct domination of the Duchy of Milan. However, if in the paste his ties with the Sforza family had helped him to achieve his goals, in this case, they undermined his plans: the condottiero had in fact overestimated his position in the hierarchy of power within the Sforza family. Even from the initial agreement to subdivide the tasks with the Moro, Sanseverino appeared to be in an inferior position, both from the point of view of legitimacy and of political ability: the agreement would have lasted until the Sforza had wanted it. Soon Sanseverino was marginalized and forced to a second and sensational escape from the duchy. He then switched to the service of Venice and, thanks to his brilliant conduct held during the war in Ferrara, Sanseverino reached the peak of his personal career, managing to be elected captain general of Italy with the peace of Bagnolo in August 1484. Chapter VIII. The enemy of the peace of Italy (1485-1487) The chapter is devoted to the last part of Sanseverino's life. Following the peace of Bagnolo, the condottiero felt powerful enough to try to conquer an independent principality with his own strength. However, after trying unsuccessfully to take Siena, he realized that a general upheaval in Italy was the only hope for him to get a real success: in August 1485 he decided to support the rebellion of the barons of the South, and was appointed Gonfalonier of the Church by the Pope Innocent VIII. The war that followed turned out to be a disaster for him and soon he was abandoned by the Pope himself, who excluded him from the peace agreement with the King of Naples in August 1486. Without a state that supported him, Sanseverino was extremely vulnerable. Ferrante d'Aragona and the Moro did not miss this opportunity to eliminate him: the Duke of Calabria pursued him, implacable, from Lazio to Romagna, where he forced him to dissolve his military company and escape with a few men in Veneto. Here he was offered a monthly allowance, but he was not given any military duty. At the age of 68 he was a finished man, without his military company and hated by all the Italian powers. He died fighting the Austrians in Trentino the following year.
Il progetto si è proposto di dimostrare l'evoluzione della valenza strategica nella relazione bilaterale tra Stati Uniti ed Egitto durante le presidenze di Anwar al-Sadat e Hosni Mubarak. Sebbene si sia a lungo contraddistinta per un marcato rapporto di reciprocità e di stabilità locale e trans-regionale, da alcuni decenni a questa parte la relazione vive un particolare momento di riconsiderazione a causa della compresenza di più fattori che ne hanno limitato il valore complessivo, necessitando quindi di nuovi fondamenti e obiettivi per essere rivitalizzata. Riprova di ciò sono proprio gli accordi di Camp David, cuore pulsante delle strategie comuni di Stati Uniti ed Egitto, nonché centro nevralgico delle dinamiche di cooperazione, per lo più di sicurezza, tra statunitensi, egiziani e israeliani. Analizzando gli elementi caratterizzanti la politica estera egiziana in relazione, anche e non soltanto, alle interazioni con Stati Uniti e Israele, prendendo come riferimento una prospettiva storico-diacronica che tenesse conto delle evoluzioni politiche dentro e fuori il Paese arabo, all'interno di un più ampio panorama geopolitico e strategico regionale e internazionale, il presente lavoro ha pertanto puntato a far emergere il carattere tattico del rapporto stesso, il quale è stato fortemente influenzato dal perseguimento di un interesse nazionale da entrambe le parti. ; The thesis analyses the evolution and impact of U.S.-Egypt relations under the Sadat and Mubarak's tenure in terms of geopolitical and strategic attitudes through a historical-diachronic perspective. Although it has been characterized for decades by a marked reciprocity in terms of local and (trans-)regional dynamics, for about twenty years this link has been experiencing a particular moment of reconsideration due to the presence of several factors that have limited its overall significance. The bilateral relationship needs new foundations and objectives. In fact, the thesis argues that the Camp David agreements, the beating heart of the common strategies of the United States and Egypt, as well as the political core of several dynamics (mostly in security dimension) between the Americans, Egyptians and Israelis, it is the key element to understand the interconnection between Egyptian domestic state and its regional state autonomy. In this respect, the thesis highlights these factors characterizing the Egyptian foreign policy in connection, even and not only, with United States and Israel, as enabling factors both in the national political developments and the evolution in the Arab stage, within a wider geo-political and strategic regional and international panorama. In conclusion, this work aim to bring out the tactical nature of the bilateral relationship between Egypt and the United States, which was heavily influenced by the pursuit of a different perception of national interest. Therefore, the biggest challenge between Washington and Cairo consists in managing a much less special and complex relationship than in the recent past, which essentially sees the overcoming of Camp David, while maintaining the stability of the region as a cornerstone on both sides.
During the first half of the 20th century in Italy, the theme of national belonging was at the center of the political and cultural debate: the post-unitary discussions on national identity, the patriotism of interventionists, post-World War I, and later fascist, nationalism. Among the Italian intellectuals of the time, many shared double origins: their families were Italian, and yet they were born and raised abroad. Their belonging to the homeland was not automatic. I have looked at the way in which their need for an identity relates to the tensions that were shaking the country, their involvement in the political events of those years, and wondered whether it is possible to isolate any similarities between them that might be connected to their multicultural origins.In November 1927, an interview to Alberto Savinio was published in the Parisian journal "Comœdia." In it, he criticized Italian art and claimed that he lived in Paris because the mental openness of the French favored artistic development. At the height of Fascism, these declarations bothered a number of Italian intellectuals, who accused him of not loving his homeland. He was therefore excluded from national cultural life for a few years. Giuseppe Ungaretti stood up for him, despite both having declared his Fascism and not sharing a particularly close relationship with Savinio. They had met in Paris in the early 1910s, when they both gravitated around Soffici and his group, especially Apollinaire, who was a fundamental reference: he was their artistic guide, but also someone who shared their uprootedness, since he was French by adoption. His enrollment in the French army was therefore particularly significant for them. Savinio and Ungaretti kept in touch throughout the decade and collaborated to the projects of journals such as "La Vraie Italie" and "Commerce," whose goal was to make Italian art better known in France. Starting in 1925, their relationship became strained, also due to a general climate of mistrust, but the "Comœdia" affair shows us that their supernational conception of culture surpasses personal issues. Nevertheless, they often seemed to contradict this idea, repeatedly emphasizing Italy's superiority compared to other countries and displaying growing nationalism, which reached its apex when they adhered to Fascism. They took part in World War I as a way of claiming their belonging to the Italian nation, but it was starting from the following years that they began to show their patriotism by exalting the fighters, criticizing peace agreements that proved unfavorable to Italy, and affirming the idea of Italy's intellectual primacy. Their support of Fascism was the natural consequence. During the "Ventennio," Savinio and Ungaretti wrote several articles in journals that were supportive of Mussolini, where they employed many of the rhetorical topoi of those years. This is the extreme point in their search for Italianness: the affirmation of their identity went beyond the individual and found its place within the collective dimension of the "State." World War II, which they considered madness, brought about a change of heart regarding the regime. Ungaretti and Savinio shared the idea that Fascism had betrayed its principles. Italy's greatness needed to play within a universal context, rather than an enclosed one. They thought that in order to achieve a collective renaissance, it was necessary to surpass national egotism and come back to Europe's Christian spirit. Therefore, the need for an Italian identity faded into the background compared to the necessity of a European identity. ; Dans l'Italie de la première moitié du XXème siècle, le thème du sentiment d'appartenance nationale est central dans le débat politique et culturel : on passe des discussions post-unitaires au sujet de l'identité nationale, au patriotisme des interventionnistes, au nationalisme de l'après Ière guerre mondiale, à celui des fascistes. Parmi les intellectuels italiens de cette époque-là, beaucoup ont une double origine : leur famille est italienne et pourtant ils sont nés et ils ont grandi à l'étranger. Leur appartenance à la patrie n'est pas automatique. On s'est demandé dans quelle manière leur besoin d'identité se met en relation avec les tensions qui traversent le Pays, à quel niveau ils sont impliqués dans les événements politiques de ces années-là et s'il est possible de retrouver chez eux des analogies liées à leurs origines multiculturelles. En novembre 1927 on publique une interview d'Alberto Savinio dans le journal parisien « Comœdia ». Il critique l'art italienne et affirme être à Paris parce que l'ouverture mentale du peuple français favorise le développement artistique. En plein fascisme ces déclarations heurtent beaucoup d'intellectuels italiens, qui l'accusent de ne pas aimer sa patrie. On lui interdit de participer à la vie culturelle nationale pendant quelques années. Giuseppe Ungaretti prend sa défense, tout en ayant déclaré son fascisme et bien que ses relations avec Savinio ne soient pas très intimes. Ils se connaissent à Paris au début des années 1910, étant tous les deux en contact avec Soffici et son entourage, et surtout avec Apollinaire, qui est un point de repère fondamental : il est leur guide artistique, mais aussi quelqu'un qui partage leur statut de déracinés, en tant que français d'adoption. Son enrôlement dans l'armée française est donc très significatif à leurs yeux. Les contacts entre Savinio et Ungaretti se poursuivent tout au long du décennie, et ils collaborent aux projets des revues « La Vraie Italie » et « Commerce », dont l'objectif est de mieux faire connaître la réalité artistique italienne en France. À partir de 1925, les rapports entre les deux se tendent, aussi à cause d'un climat de méfiance général, mais l'affaire « Comœdia » nous montre que chez eux la conception supranationale de culture surmonte les problèmes personnels. Toutefois ils semblent souvent contredire cette idée, en soulignant à maintes reprises la supériorité de l'Italie par rapport aux autres Pays et en manifestant un nationalisme croissant, qui atteint le sommet par l'adhésion au fascisme. Ils participent à la Ière guerre mondiale afin d'affirmer leur appartenance à la nation italienne, mais c'est surtout à partir des années suivantes qu'ils manifestent leur patriotisme, en exaltant les combattants, en critiquant les accords de paix défavorables pour l'Italie, en affirmant l'idée d'une primauté intellectuelle de l'Italie. L'appui au fascisme en est la conséquence. Pendant le « Ventennio » Savinio et Ungaretti écrivent plusieurs articles dans des revues solidaires de Mussolini, où ils utilisent les topoi rhétoriques de ces années-là. C'est le point extrême de leur quête d'italianité : l'affirmation identitaire dépasse l'individualité et se situe dans la dimension collective de l'« État ». La IIème guerre mondiale, étant considérée une folie, détermine un changement d'avis à propos du régime. Ungaretti et Savinio partagent l'idée que le fascisme ait trahi ses principes. La grandeur de l'Italie devait agir dans un horizon universel et non pas enfermé. Ils pensent que pour une renaissance collective il faut se dépasser des égotismes nationaux et revenir à l'esprit chrétien de l'Europe. Le besoin d'une identité italienne passe donc au deuxième plan par rapport à la nécessité d'une identité européenne.
How did bilateral relations between Italy and Ethiopia-Eritrea evolved after the colonial period? What was the impact of the Italian economic presence on the economy of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the post-colonial period? Why since the end of the World War II has been existing in Ethiopia a widespread pro-Italian judgment despite the colonial past? The purpose of this research is to answer to such questions. Description of the research Chapter 1 is dedicated to the evolution of the bilateral relations between Italy and Ethiopia between 1947 and 1955. The Treaty of Peace, signed in Paris on February 10, 1947, imposed to Italy, among the other provisions, the recognition of the independence of Ethiopia, the renouncement of claims to colonies including Eritrea and the payment of war reparations to Ethiopia. These issues took time to be actually solved. Especially with regard to the future of Eritrea the tensions between Italy and Ethiopia flared up despite the fact that diplomatic relations were resumed at the beginning of 1952. In addition there were complex negotiations on the amount of the war reparations to be paid. Finally, the artworks carried away from Ethiopia during the occupation period were returned with delay and in several tranches between 1954 and 2005. As a general consideration, the whole picture of the bilateral relations between 1947 and the beginning of the '70s shows the alternation of long periods of strong tension with shorter ones of détente. Chapter 2 and 3 outline the main characteristics and the evolution of the Italian economic presence in Ethiopia and in Eritrea between 1941 and 1974. The first years after 1941 were extremely troubled. Many Italians were expelled from the two countries, many were confined to concentration camps, and in Ethiopia many became clandestines in order not to be forced to leave the country. In the late '40s, Italians in Eritrea became the target of terrorist actions by the shifta. Many Italians were killed and several companies managed by them were destroyed or seriously damaged. Italians went through other serious difficulties in the early '70s when the growing guerrilla made Eritrea highly insecure. Despite these difficulties Italians kept on carrying out their activities that flourished in the '50s and the '60s but were decimated by the nationalizations of the Derg during the first half of the '70s. Main Results With regard to the bilateral relations Italian diplomatic documents show the will of both parties to reach an agreement on the post war issues. However it was a very tough negotiation, as expected. In contrast to the belief expressed in some relevant and well-known works, i.e. Del Boca's one, the complexity of such a negotiation seems to be due more to the Ethiopian tactics than to the alleged Italian purpose to delay the final settlement. Furthermore it is crystal clear that one of the top priority of the Italian Government in negotiating was to protect the Italian communities in Ethiopia and Eritrea. This result is in contrast with what affirmed by Del Boca in particular, who stressed a sort of lack of interest of Italy in the co-nationals resident in the two countries. Chapter 2 and 3 shows that the efforts of Italians workers and entrepreneurs in Ethiopia and Eritrea after the end of the occupation are worthy of note and memory. Such efforts testify to an extraordinary commitment. Italians arrived in Ethiopia and Eritrea with dreams and hopes that many were finally able to see come true. Some of their stories are uniquely interesting. Emperor Haile Selassie undoubtedly played a significant role in fostering the rapid development of Italian economic activities and in shaping fruitful and cooperative relations between Italians and Ethiopians. He protected the Italians because he was deeply convinced of the important economic role that Italians would still have been able to play in Ethiopia, not only in the early post-occupation period, but also for the future of the country. Italian economic presence was strong in quantity and quality both in Ethiopia and Eritrea. However it is quite clear that throughout the period between 1941 and 1974 the incidence of Italian economic activities was significantly higher in Eritrea than Ethiopia. Italian firms were modern and efficient, and they were the backbone of the economy of Eritrea. The higher impact of our entrepreneurs in Eritrea was due to the longer stay of Eritrea itself under the Italian Government, which resulted in a much larger Italian community in Eritrea than in Ethiopia, both in absolute and relative terms. Almost the entire industrial and advanced agricultural sectors in Eritrea was in hands of the Italians. Provided that at the beginning of the '50s, the 80% of manufacturing plants of the Ethio-Eritrean Federation was based in Eritrea, it must concluded that the incidence of the Italian companies in the whole industrial sector was huge. In addition, except for the Italian activities, there were only a few other companies, especially in the agricultural and commercial sectors, managed by Eritreans or expatriates of other communities. In agriculture, where traditional ways and means of cultivation and a subsistence production still prevailed, the big agricultural and agro-processing companies run by the Italians were extraordinarily efficient. The Italians used modern techniques and machinery. They diversified their production. They also built dams, irrigation systems and major infrastructure projects for the reclamation of land to production. Even before the 50's and increasingly in the following decades, the Italian agricultural firms were able to export to neighboring markets, after meeting domestic demand. For the rest, the Eritrean economy was based on subsistence and largely unproductive agriculture. Italian activities strongly contributed to the national economy. In the economy of the Empire, characterized by a very low incidence of industrial development and the export of a few agricultural products (coffee, hides, oilseeds), the production for export made by Italian companies represented a unique economic opportunity for the entire country. The contribution of Italian economic activities was more evident in Eritrea than in Ethiopia. According to many sources, if Eritrean exports and imports would have been precisely accounted for - that is without considering the value of the goods that passed through Eritrea, but whose final destination was Ethiopia - Eritrea's trade deficit would have been significantly reduced or even zeroed out. Furthermore, the presence of flourishing Italian companies had positive repercussions also on the Eritrean state budget thanks to the tax 5 income they produced. By the way, the rates applied to Italian companies were much higher than those applied to local ones. The Italian business elite was also able to translate in images the social renewal processes of the 50's and the 60's. The buildings designed by Arturo Mezzedimi were perhaps the most evident symbols of such ability. Such buildings represented the avant-garde architecture of those years. Another building contractor, Mario Buschi, very active throughout the Empire, highly contributed to shape the modern image of Addis Ababa. The statistics shows that from 1957 to 1974 Italy was, together with USA, the main commercial partner of the Ethiopian Empire. Even in the period 1941-1951, during which official diplomatic relations between Italy and Ethiopia were absent, the bilateral trade was relevant and in particular Italy was in those years the first importer from Ethiopia. These exceptional results were due indeed to Italian resident community that with its economic activities highly contributed to nurture commercial flows from and to Italy. The good relations between the Italians who remained after 1941 and the Ethiopians played a decisive role in rapidly archiving the memory of the Italians as colonizers. Indeed such relationship was generally dominated by a constructive spirit of cooperation and probably fueled by some deep affinity of character between our two peoples. They were the Italians that contributed to maintain a good image of Italy in Ethiopia even during the absence of official diplomatic relations or at times of misunderstandings and difficulties in the dialogue between the two governments. In decades of coexistence the Italians and Ethiopians have been able to establish a fruitful dialogue, marked by mutual understanding, esteem and respect. Workplaces were the main venue where such a dialogue has taken its shape. The author spent 4 years in Ethiopia, from 2008 to 2012, as head of the commercial section of the Italian Embassy. This experience allowed her to learn parts of the history of the Italian community in Ethiopia and in Eritrea between 1941 and 1974 directly from the present generations of Italian businessmen resident in Ethiopia. The author also had the opportunity to consult Italians' personal archives in which she could find documents and books that are not anymore on the market and difficult to find in libraries. Her personal experience and knowledge of the country and the people added depth to this work that is however based almost exclusively on written sources.
