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The position of Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, concerning the establishment of a Palestinian State has been, at a conceptual level, rather consistent. Since assuming the office of Prime Minister for the second time some months ago (he served as Prime Minister between 1996 and 1999), his stance on this matter has evolved in a coherent manner.To begin with, Netanyahu said that, in the context of a peace agreement with the Palestinian Authority, he would be in favour of the creation of an entity in which the Palestinians would enjoy the fullest possible degree of liberty and political authority commensurate with Israel's vital security interests.Following his first official meeting with US President Barack Obama, Netanyahu was asked by reporters whether he would agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state. He retorted by saying that it was not important how one defined a Palestinian entity that would emerge as a result of a peace accord so long as there was agreement on its contents.In his speech at Bar Ilan University in Israel, in which, for the first time, Netanyahu endorsed, in principle, the idea a Palestinian state, the Israeli Prime Minister did not argue his case in a top-bottom manner. Netanyahu did not say he was in favour of a two-state solution and went on to explain what he meant by that. He did not state, first and foremost, that he would accept a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel. Rather, he argued his case in a bottom-up way.He started by describing the kind of Palestinian entity that would be acceptable to Israel in the framework of a peace agreement. That entity would have to be, according to Netanyahu, fully demilitarized, with iron-clad international supervision. He made it clear, albeit in a rather implicit manner, that the frontiers would have to be supervised to prevent smuggling of prohibited weaponry, and the freedom of its airspace would have to be partially curtailed to avert any possible aerial attack of Israeli targets.Netanyahu then went on to say that, if the aforementioned conditions were met, he would agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state.In other words, the kind of Palestinian entity Netanyahu would accept was identical to the kind of entity he was ready to accept even prior to his Bar Ilan speech. Now, however, he went a step further, saying that he would agree that such an entity be a state. Netanyahu was prepared to endorse the idea of a Palestinian state as long as the main characteristics he thought essential for an autonomous entity were to be applied to such a state. Netanyahu agreed to the creation of a Palestinian state primarily due the pressures exerted by the Obama Administration. To be sure, other countries with which Israel had close relations, such as Germany, Britain, France and Italy made it clear to Israel, both in private and in public, that the endorsement of a Palestinian state, as an integral component of a peace agreement, was essential.However, the manner by which Netanyahu presented his consent to the creation of a Palestinian state was related to his domestic audience. The bottom-up approach adopted by him during his Bar Ilan speech could be understood as an attempt by Netanyahu to assuage his domestic constituency. By describing first the main characteristics of a Palestinian entity, by emphasizing the security elements essential to Israel to begin with, and then moving on to state that he would be ready to accept a Palestinian state, Netanyahu may have wished to convey the impression that the change entailed in his position was of a gradual, incremental nature, rather than a radical departure from his previous stance.Netanyahu did not wish to portray himself as the De Gaule of a Palestinian state. He had no intention for his Bar Ilan speech to become the Balfour Declaration for the Palestinian people.His speech was designed to fend off external pressures while maintaining the support of his domestic audience. He had to maintain a delicate equilibrium by adopting the idea of a Palestinian state while doing so in a manner that did not cause a political earthquake in Israel. His whole speech, to be sure, was aimed at eliciting the support of the international community while maintaining the backing of his domestic base.Although many on the right of the Israeli political spectrum objected to the speech and some in the international community were not fully satisfied with it, Netanyahu managed, so far, to remove this issue from the international agenda as a bone of contention without causing any ruptures within his domestic base.The bottom-up analytical approach of Netanyahu in presenting his endorsement of a Palestinian state stands in contrasts to the way the parties to the left of the Likud argue their case in favour of a Palestinian state.Kadima, Labour and Meretz, the three main Zionist political parties to the left of the Likud, advance their position on this matter in a top-bottom dialectical manner. They start by the headline, so to speak, by saying that they favour a two-state solution or the establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel. They hardly move into specifics, at least not in public. Netanyahu, as we have seen, moved from the main features of a Palestinian entity to the headline, to the endorsement of a Palestinian state.Indeed, these parties argue their case in an instrumental vein as well. The creation of a Palestinian state, they contend, is an interest of Israel. Israel would not be making any favours by agreeing to such a state. It would be operating in its own self interest.Netanyahu's argument in this regard is not instrumental. He wishes to convey the impression that such a Palestinian state would entail some notable sacrifices. It is a concession done under duress, rather than a unilateral decision reached from purely self-interest.Notwithstanding all this, it should be stressed that none of the Zionist parties to the left of Netanyahu would accept a Palestinian state that would not be demilitarized, the frontiers of which would not be supervised and the aerial space of which would be fully under the control of a Palestinian state.In this regard, Netanyahu expresses explicitly what these parties say implicitly.In contrast to his first tenure as Prime Minister, Netanyahu has been adopting a consensual rather than a confrontational approach to policy-making. Indeed, he has even said so explicitly on more than one occasion. Both in shaping his domestic and his foreign policy Netanyahu has been endeavouring to be inclusive rather than exclusive. Following his Bar Ilan speech, he stated that he has embraced a policy towards the peace process which encompasses a large consensus within Israel.Netanyahu has been, so far, more of a problem solver than an opportunity creator. This has led him to adopt a somewhat defensive posture aimed at avoiding political and diplomatic convulsions. His main objective seems to be stability. Paradoxically, his adoption of the idea of a Palestinian state was undertaken as part of this same defensive posture. *Diplomacy Program. Tel Aviv University. Israel

This article by Ambassador Thomas Greminger, former Head of the Political Affairs Division IV, provides a comprehensive assessment of the Swiss civilian peace promotion efforts of the past five years. Switzerland is a key actor in the field of peace promotion and human rights. This is based on Switzerland's humanitarian values, but it can also be seen as an expression of interest-driven politics. The international community expects a wealthy country that benefits greatly from globalization to make an adequate contribution to resolving global issues. This study is a special offprint of the CSS publication Switzerland's Civilian Peace Support: Inventory and Development Potential (Zivile Friedensförderung der Schweiz: Bestandesaufnahme und Entwicklungspotenzial, Zurich Contributions to Security Policy No. 83). ; ISSN:2296-7397

This report is intended for development professionals as a way to help them understand some of the key characteristics of peace negotiations and how the points of impasse between parties are often strikingly similar. Development professionals can play an important role in any peace process, providing the technical knowledge and practical, on-the-ground insights necessary to create a peace agreement that is durable. They are often in a position to facilitate dialogue among the parties in conflict, provide funding to support peace processes, contribute technical expertise and deliver practical knowledge as to what is feasible during the implementation of the peace agreement based on existing dynamics on the ground. Because development is a key component in any peace process, it is important to have development professionals present at the negotiation table, not just in the post-conflict implementation phase. This is often important because necessary technical issues will be reflected within an agreement to bring about successful implementation. This brief provides a number of lessons learned that are important for development practitioners to keep in mind when supporting peace processes. Much of the guidance offered in this brief has been distilled from multiple sources in academic literature, from background materials used in developing Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation's toolkit on supporting peace processes and from materials produced by numerous other research institutions.

The language manage of the Official Development Assistance by the Corporation de Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio CDPMM, the international cooperation world uncertainly at about Colombia during the years 2000 and 2001 and the dialogue possibility with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional ELN during the Andrés Pastrana Government, allowed the creation of an opportunity to the Corporación for being listened by the European decision makers and create the Peace Laboratories Program. The project has contribute to establish the necessary conditions for motivating a peace process in the region by the construction of a social subject capable of leading his own progress constituting alliances with different social sectors. However the initiative effectiveness has been limited because the European Union participation concentrates its attention on the econometric revision of the project objectives and the cooperation manuals rather than in the regional dynamics comprehension; and because the state role and the low coverage of the initiative do not ensure the long term sustainability. ; El manejo del discurso de la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo por parte de la Corporación de Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio CDPMM, la incertidumbre en el mundo de la cooperación internacional hacia Colombia en los años 2000 y 2001 y la posibilidad de diálogo con el Ejército de Liberación Nacional ELN durante la administración de Andrés Pastrana, permitieron la creación de una oportunidad para que la corporación fuera escuchada por los órganos de decisión europea y se pudiera crear finalmente el programa Laboratorios de Paz. El proyecto ha contribuido a establecer las condiciones necesarias para impulsar un proceso de paz en la región por medio de la construcción de un sujeto social capaz de liderar su propio progreso constituyendo alianzas con diferentes sectores de la sociedad. Sin embargo la eficacia de la iniciativa frente al proceso de paz y desarrollo ha sido limitada debido a que la participación de la Unión Europea se concentró en la revisión econométrica de los objetivos del proyecto y de los manuales de la cooperación más no en la comprensión de las dinámicas regionales; y a que el rol del estado y la baja cobertura de la iniciativa no aseguran su sostenibilidad a largo plazo.

The language manage of the Official Development Assistance by the Corporation de Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio CDPMM, the international cooperation world uncertainly at about Colombia during the years 2000 and 2001 and the dialogue possibility with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional ELN during the Andrés Pastrana Government, allowed the creation of an opportunity to the Corporación for being listened by the European decision makers and create the Peace Laboratories Program. The project has contribute to establish the necessary conditions for motivating a peace process in the region by the construction of a social subject capable of leading his own progress constituting alliances with different social sectors. However the initiative effectiveness has been limited because the European Union participation concentrates its attention on the econometric revision of the project objectives and the cooperation manuals rather than in the regional dynamics comprehension; and because the state role and the low coverage of the initiative do not ensure the long term sustainability. ; El manejo del discurso de la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo por parte de la Corporación de Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio CDPMM, la incertidumbre en el mundo de la cooperación internacional hacia Colombia en los años 2000 y 2001 y la posibilidad de diálogo con el Ejército de Liberación Nacional ELN durante la administración de Andrés Pastrana, permitieron la creación de una oportunidad para que la corporación fuera escuchada por los órganos de decisión europea y se pudiera crear finalmente el programa Laboratorios de Paz. El proyecto ha contribuido a establecer las condiciones necesarias para impulsar un proceso de paz en la región por medio de la construcción de un sujeto social capaz de liderar su propio progreso constituyendo alianzas con diferentes sectores de la sociedad. Sin embargo la eficacia de la iniciativa frente al proceso de paz y desarrollo ha sido limitada debido a que la participación de la Unión Europea se concentró en la revisión econométrica de los objetivos del proyecto y de los manuales de la cooperación más no en la comprensión de las dinámicas regionales; y a que el rol del estado y la baja cobertura de la iniciativa no aseguran su sostenibilidad a largo plazo.

In the last fifteen years, Colombia's rapidly growing peace movement has produced activists who fervently work to create peace in a country that has been in conflict for more than forty years. These activists and the organizations that support them represent a heterogeneous group of people who use a diverse array of peace initiatives (or peace actions) to achieve their peace goals. Their work has attempted (and often succeeded) in influencing and impacting Colombian citizens, the government and foreign entities. This thesis focuses on how civil society peace initiatives have influenced and reacted to a changing political climate between 1997-2008 as the Colombian government shifted strategies from a negotiated settlement to a more militaristic approach. In this study I first examine the birth, decline, and rebirth of citizen participation in the Colombian peace movement. I demonstrate how the rise of citizen peace activism strongly influenced the government to sit at the negotiating table with non-state armed actors and how citizen frustration and the decline in participation caused the government to end negotiations and begin a new policy of Democratic Security. Next I analyze how peace organizations, especially at the national level have changed strategies in response to less citizen support and a governmental policy that has shifted away from a peaceful settlement. I suggest that these organizations have relied more heavily on public education, awareness, and networking than in previous years, and that these changes have made them more successful in fulfilling their missions.

Indonesia's soft power policy in foreign policy for peace in Afghanistan is because at this time there are several similarities in religion which are the most easily accepted things in both countries. The problem under study is how to determine several criteria for the factors that encourage Indonesia to help bring peace in Afghanistan. The research method used is a combination method, a combination of qualitative and quantitative, with the process of collecting data through interviews and questionnaires to six experts in soft power efforts for peace in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, data analysis used the Delphi and Borda technique. The results show that seven reasons drive the need for Indonesia to use soft power for peace in Afghanistan, namely Indonesia's aspirations in realizing world peace (27%), Building the image of Indonesia as a peace bridge country (21%), Encouragement from Community Organizations (18 %), Studying Islam as the religion of Rahmatan lil Allamin (12%), Indonesia's proximity to Afghanistan and equality of identity (9%), Learning to handle conflict (8%) and Learning the values of Pancasila (5%).

Since the introduction of democracy, political and societal conflicts have become more visible in Indonesia. This article focuses on religious conflicts, highlights the recent developments and patterns, and analyzes the state insufficient performance in protecting all of its citizens. The current Indonesian government tends to react rather passively to religious intolerance, discrimination and violence, and the many Indonesian non-governmental organizations and individuals committed to interrelig ious dialogue are running in place. Three main causes are identified that trigger religious discrimination and violence in Indonesia namely, the legal framework and its implementation, Islamization and Christianization, and the military and police. The thesis of this article is that policy engagement with these three factors is crucial in order to foster religious peace. ; Since the introduction of democracy, political and societal conflicts have become more visible in Indonesia. This article focuses on religious conflicts, highlights the recent developments and patterns, and analyzes the state insufficient performance in protecting all of its citizens. The current Indonesian government tends to react rather passively to religious intolerance, discrimination and violence, and the many Indonesian non-governmental organizations and individuals committed to interrelig ious dialogue are running in place. Three main causes are identified that trigger religious discrimination and violence in Indonesia namely, the legal framework and its implementation, Islamization and Christianization, and the military and police. The thesis of this article is that policy engagement with these three factors is crucial in order to foster religious peace.

Throughout past history Jordan has participated in Arab-Israeli conflicts that took place in the Middle East. This country has participated in two wars against Israel, the first in 1967, and the second in 1973. Jordan lost both of these wars, resulting in the loss of the West Bank and East Jerusalem and causing a large number of Palestinian refugees to flee to Jordan. In the first half of the 90's dramatic changes occurred in the world; such as the fall of the Soviet Union, Iraq invading Kuwait, and then an alliance with the United States as leader forcing Iraq to leave Kuwait. The affects of these changes led to a so called "peace" between Arab countries and Israel. In this period of peace, Jordan had participated in peace talks between Arab countries and Israel in Madrid, Spain. Then Jordan signed peace treaty with Israel in 1994 watched over by the U.S.A.Entering these peace treaties in 1994, gave rise to many important questions. Most of which focused on the true reasons behind why Jordan agreed to peace with Israel and the American role in the process. Thus, the researcher shall attempt to answer these questions, as well as shedding some light on the factors that affect the relations between Israel and Jordan which will be divided into internal and external affairs. The researcher will try to predict how these factors will affect the future of Jordanian-Israeli relations, especially the role of the U.S.A.

"On January 2, 1943 the Department of state released a publication entitled 'Peace and war: United States foreign policy, 1931-1941,' containing references to a number of documents concerning the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States during that ten-year period. It was stated at the time that these documents would be published later. They are accordingly published herein, together with a reprint of the publication released on January 2."--Foreword. ; On verso of t.-p.: Dept. of state. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This report provides background and analysis on Sudan, and discusses the humanitarian crises, peace talks, terrorism and U.S. policy towards Sudan.

Reprinted in 1943, with other documents, as Dept. of state Publication 1983. ; "An introduction to a collection of documents concerning the foreign relations of the United States."--Foreword. ; On verso of t.-p.: Dept. of state. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Peace Research has long been criticized for the gap between the theory and practice of peace. This paper focuses on the role of knowledge production in peace research on knowledge-policy transfer. Delving into the mechanics of synergies developed between the academics and practitioners, the paper inquires how the multiparty interplay among the academia, practitioners and hybrid institutions acting as both research and practice-oriented bodies contributes to the knowledge production in Peace Studies. As related, the study examines following questions: How are the expectations of donors from the researchers and research institutions shaped? Do peace researchers tailor their research output in a specific manner that is expected by the donors to guarantee the flow of funding? And last but not least, how is the "knowledge" produced in the research integrated to the practice by the practitioners, local actors and facilitators? The paper relies on a field research conducted in Switzerland in 2019 and data collected through interviews with the representatives of certain peace research institutes, academics and donor institutions in Switzerland. Findings suggest that there is a general tendency among peace researchers to distinguish between the knowledge they produce for their academic agenda from the "handy" knowledge for the donor institutions. ; No sponsor

Problem statement: This study examined foreign aid as administered by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) through four presidencies, beginning with the Reagan era. Aid dispensed to the Peace Corps for humanitarian purposes was the major focus of the investigation. The research proposed that such aid should continue under the President Barack Obama administration. Approach: The approach taken used both qualitative analyses of the four administrations along with quantitative analyses of the data from USAID. Results: The findings indicated that, while many forms of economic and military assistance had been both used and abused throughout much of American history, the Peace Corps created under President John F. Kennedy presented an exception. However, the Peace Corps had received both benefit and harm as a beneficiary of US foreign aid due to fluctuating economic realities associated with the federal budget. President Reagan was a strong supporter of the Peace Corps; yet, it was "under his watch" that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act of 1985 was passed, which negatively influenced nearly all forms of economic and military assistance distributed through USAID. Starting with President Clinton's second term funding for USAID dramatically increased. Conclusion: The Peace Corps was not immune to the adverse effects, but funding also increased under President Clinton. From this time onward, the Peace Corps has enjoyed a high level of political and financial support, a scenario that deserves to be continued under President Obama. This study can help future analyses of the US presidential responses to the giving of assistance to the Peace Corps.

מגב כריכת ההוצאה הראשונה, 1961 הספר סוקר את התפתחות יחסי ישראל-ערב בשנים 1961-1948 כפי שהשתקפו בעיתונות הישראלית ומעל במת הכנסת. דעות כל החוגים בישראל -- מ"חרות" עד מק"י – מובאות בהרחבה מפי דובריהם המוסמכים ביותר. רבים ימצאו כאן לראשונה תאור מפורט של עובדות נשכחות. המעטים היודעים את העובדות יופתעו להיווכח באיזו מידה מסוגל מנגנון תעמולה ממלכתי לעצב לא רק את השקפתו של האזרח אלא גם את זכרונו מההקדמה להוצאה השניה, 1999 למהדורה זו צורפו נספחים הכוללים מידע שהיה חסוי בשעתו ונחשף רק עשרות שנים לאחר שכתבנו את הספר. שיערנו שניתוחינו יקבלו לימים אישור נוסף. ואכן, העובדות שנחשפו מאז, שאחדות מהן הפתיעו גם אותנו, מאשרות את ניתוחנו. אין פירוש הדבר שכל המידע החסוי מאותה תקופה כבר נחשף