De opkomst van China wordt besproken in het theoretisch kader van het debat over de Unpeaceful of Peaceful Rise. (Respectievelijk John Mearsheimer en Zheng Bijian) Hiervoor wordt het lidmaatschap van China van de Shanghai Cooperation Organisation gebruikt. De conclusie is dat het Chinese lidmaatschap van de SCO tot nu toe gezien kan worden als een onderdeel van een Peaceful Rise maar tegelijk ook elementen bevat van de Unpeaceful Rise-theorie.
The military is generally considered to act as a professional when it comes to retreating forces from military battleground or international conflict areas. At the same time recent national experiences with the withdrawal of national troops from international peacekeeping operations are filled with disappointments and crises. In this article the authors question the idea that these disappointments and crises are simply due to problems of reduced military competence or military morale. They argue that the military is still the alleged expert who knows how to perform military retreats and other military actions. At the same time they show that network-like decision-making structures that are inherent to the deployment of troops in international peacekeeping missions, have become a major obstacle for the military to act in its own right. The lessons that government can learn from the military experience are firstly, that decisions for national public cutbacks should be accompanied by a more in-depth (re)consideration of public (key) tasks than up to now was considered appropriate, and secondly, that more trust should be shown in the skills, knowledge and motivation of professionals to delineate and constrain the boundaries of their own fields of expertise.
In the present article the author starts off with a discussion of the Barcelona process and the main reason for its failure: namely the fragility of the Oslo peace process. The second topic focuses on the genesis of the Union for the Mediterranean of July 2008 as a follow-up of the Euromediterranean Partnership dated 1995, and its relevance for both its North African and European shores. Included are the institutional and procedural structures, and an analysis of the place conflict resolution holds within the Union for the Mediterranean, the latter illustrated by the recent Gaza War. O. van Zijl
The question whether the Belgian foreign policy is marked by a continuity or break between the first & second turns of Guy Verhofstadt as a prime minister of this country's governments is addressed, surveying developments in the 1999-2004 period & scrutinizing the rhetorical declarations & concrete initiatives "on the ground" by the foreign minister Louis Michel. The diplomatic style of the first & second administrations are compared, & the principles & directions of Belgian foreign policy in 2004 are assessed in the context of the state of political affairs on the global arena, with special attention to the split between the EU & US on the war in Iraq, the division inside the former vis-a-vis supporting or opposing US intervention in this Middle Eastern country, & the recent troubles the EU experiences with greater degree of political integration, projecting also into a lack of coherent, uniform foreign policy on the supranational level. Some of the major issues the Belgian foreign policy must deal in 2004 & beyond are identified: securing democratic & peaceful governance in Central Africa, responding to the anti-Belgian campaign conducted by the US, & supporting the process of strengthening the EU position as a relevant actor on the geopolitical stage. Z. Dubiel
The foreign policy of the current Belgian government led by the prime minister Guy Verhofstadt, with Louis Michel as the foreign minister, is evaluated, focusing on the country's active stance on the economic & political integration of the European countries & peaceful resolution of conflicts in Central Africa. Belgium's unwavering support & relentless efforts on behalf of the European Union (EU) intensified even more as the country assumed the organization's chairmanship in May 2001, & Michel's personal involvement & physical presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) & the Great Lakes region (Rwanda & Burundi) testify to the shift by the current government toward proactive diplomacy by Belgium toward its former colony & trust territory. The ethical dimension of Belgian foreign policy is noted, mentioning the country position on human rights, support for the International Tribunal in the Hague, & the moral prerogatives followed in the Pinochet, Haider, & Berlusconi controversies. It is observed, however, that many of the country's initiatives abroad may be undercut by the government unwillingness to back its policies with foreign economic aid. Adapted from the source document.
Belgium is a rare example of a centralist state that achieved federalism via peaceful means. This process, which was initiated in 1970 & is ongoing, is fundamentally provoked by the development of two subnations within the Belgian body: the Flemish & the Walloons. Elites within both these nationalist movements identified each other as allies in the struggle for federalization. The role & interaction of this alliance in the federalization process in Belgium are described. Modified HA
An overview of Belgian policy making & implementation targeting countries of the African continent through either bilateral agreements or cooperation in projects launched by international organizations. Belgian African policy is placed in the larger geopolitical context, discussing the legacy of the Cold War, the country's historical ties with the Central African region (Zaire, Burundi, & Rwanda), & current structures & institutions available in the European Union & on the international arena (eg, the World Bank) within which the Belgian government can become effective either bilaterally or multilaterally in this part of Africa. The modernization of the ways & means through which developmental aid is dispensed in Africa is examined, considering Belgian & international initiatives & making comparisons to the traditional foci in Belgium's African policy. Five areas on which the current Belgian government concentrates on Central Africa are identified: (1) humanitarian assistance, (2) support for groups & initiatives targeting a peaceful resolution of conflicts & the enhancement of human rights in this part of the globe, (3) work on the demobilization & reintegration of former military units & ex-soldiers, (4) mobilization of donors & organizations willing to assist in securing peace in Burundi & eastern Congo (Zaire), & (5) actions on behalf of strengthening African "ownership" & diplomatic involvement in local peace initiatives. Z. Dubiel
The subject of this study is the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the Security Council in the period 1946 2000. Because of their right of veto the cooperation of the permanent members has a significant influence on the functioning of the Council. The most important aspects of the cooperation that were investigated are the intensity of the cooperation and the ef-fectiveness of this cooperation in preventing and ending wars. To investigate these aspects, for both the intensity and the effectiveness measuring instruments were constructed. These measuring instruments were based on comprehensive sets of so-called 'leading indicators' and statistical methods and techniques. The intensity of the cooperation increased gradually from 1946 until 1990 (the end of the Cold War). Then it started to increase rapidly until 1996. From 1996 a slight decrease can be discer-ned. The strong increase in the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the security Council can be established in all the majors forms of cooperation in the Council: the numbers of adopted strategic resolutions and presidential statements, the numbers of employed means (like peacekeeping missions and enforcement actions) and the amounts of money that were spent on peacekeeping activities. Further it was established that the response times of the Council regarding potential and waged wars dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War. The effectiveness of the cooperation of the permanent members in the Council was, insofar this was measurable with the applied method, not good for many years, but after the Cold War a clear improvement can be discerned. This goes for the prevention of wars, as well as for post war peacebuilding and the ending of wars. Also the numbers of potential and waged wars in which the Council not intervened dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War, as well as the use of vetoes. The large number of potential and waged wars in which the Council did not intervene during the Cold War was nearly exclusively caused by 'non decisions' (the non placing of wars on the agenda), and not by the use of vetoes by permanent members, as is often assumed in literature. Further, a comparison of two phase classifications of the Cold War showed that the great powers, even when there are great tensions among them, are prepared to cooperate in the Security Council to resolve strategic matters, if they consider this in their interest. Analyses of the adopted strategic resolutions during the Cold War revealed that cooperation here was nearly exclusively limited to issues that were not core issues of the Cold War. From this it can be concluded that cooperation against third party states was a basis of cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council. Finally, the results of this study show clearly that the Security Council was regarded and used to a large extent by the permanent members in the period 1946 2000 as an instrument of foreign policy to pursue their national interests, and not as an instrument of the world community to prevent and end wars.
Approximately 850,000 were killed during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The systematic slaughter of men, women and children which took place over the course of about 100 days between April and July 1994 will be forever be remembered as one of the most abhorrent events of the twentieth century. Rwandans killed Rwandans, brutally decimating the Tutsi population of the country but also targeting moderate Hutu. Appalling atrocities were committed by militias and armed forces but also by civilians attacking other civilians. The international community, in particular the United Nations, did not prevent the genocide nor did it stop the killing when the genocide had begun. Why didn’t they? In this essay I will try to analyze the role of the United Nations before and during the genocide by evaluating each part of the system, in particular the Secretary-General, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Security Council and the Member States of the organization. The failure of the United Nations to prevent and subsequently to stop the genocide in Rwanda was as failure by the United Nations system as a whole. The fundamental failure was a lack of resources and political commitment devoted to development in Rwanda and the United Nations presence there. There was a persistent lack of political will of the Member States to act. This lack of political will affected the response by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the decision-making of the Security Council and left the Tutsi to their fate.
Background: To examine the relation between the influence of parents, siblings and the presence of peers and the principles of the “Vreedzame Wijk” in children a study in Volewijck is conducted. Hereby is studied whether the social norm of the theory of planned behavior is being transferred and an unambiguously pedagogical ambiance is created. Method: A mixed-method design is used to collect information through interviews. A total of 86 children, aged 7 to 13, have answered questions of interviews at playgrounds, schools, and other “vreedzame” activities. Results: There is a significant correlation between conflicts with siblings and conflicts in other situations. There is no significant association between the influence of parents, siblings and the presence of peers and sense of community. Participation in VW activities is correlated with the response of parents to their children when they participate in peaceful tasks. There is also an association between the cultural background of the parents and how much they talk about the VW at home, whereby parents of a non-western background speak most about it. Furthermore, the Code of the Street attitude has a negative influence on solving a conflict in a peaceful manner. Conclusion: There is not enough evidence to confirm the theory of planned behavior in Volewijck, because the social norms are not enough being transferred between children and their context. This indicates that the implementation of the VW in Volewijck is not completed yet.