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Liberal peacebuilding's imperfect record of involving local actors in rebuilding post-conflict societies paved the way for the local turn in peacebuilding. One of the issues the local turn highlights is local involvement in peacebuilding processes. Drawing from the experiences of previous peacebuilding missions in Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste, this paper contributes to the local turn by identifying the types of local involvement in peacebuilding and their consequences on post-conflict societies. This identification could be useful in steering the local turn away from the same flawed local involvement that brought liberal peacebuilding into crisis. The analysis in this paper demonstrates how exclusive, superficial, non-representative, and politicized types of local involvement failed to achieve or sustain peace in Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste. The conflict-promoting tendencies of these types of local involvement make a case for a normative agenda that is inclusive, substantive, representative, and transformative.

The United Nations' Department of Peacekeeping Operations increasingly employs private military and security companies (PMSCs) to provide a range of services in peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The UN's reliance on PMSCs is often justified by quantity and quality gaps in traditional peacekeeping forces that must be filled by private companies' expertise and efficiency. We argue that these long-standing gaps cannot adequately explain the use of PMSCs, which do not bring unique services and potentially undermine UN legitimacy. Instead, the UN's organizational rigidity, financial flexibility, and procurement opaqueness encourage PMSC use without accurately assessing their need, costs, and benefits. We suggest organizational reforms, without which PMSC involvement in peacekeeping operations is likely to continue and expand, and we propose further research to explain the PMSC phenomenon.

Recent trends in international responses to civil war and humanitarian crises highlight the growing importance of multilateral intervention by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Academics and practitioners agree that higher levels of cooperation should yield better outcomes, while the literature emphasizes the importance of commitment. Yet the question of how organizations collaborate with each other and local authorities remains largely uncharted, despite its growing importance for the future of international peacemaking and peacebuilding. This paper analyzes DDR processes within the context of organizational networks and programme 'ownership.' It extends existing literature by adding nuanced understandings of ownership and assessment of the interactive processes through which the programme is offered as factors in understanding outcomes. The paper focuses on two factors – ownership and collaboration (both type and scope) –to analyze how IGOs interact and in particular comprise or respond to the local/international nexus of DDR peacemaking and peacebuilding. Its findings suggest that no single factor is sufficient for understanding DDR outcomes. Contrary to standard beliefs, the locus of ownership of may not be as critical as other factors, and context may be more important to outcomes than incentives. These findings define areas for further research related to specific combinations of factors and the causal dynamics and challenges of collaboration among participants.

Does UN peacekeeping reduce the number of people forcibly displaced by violence? While previous research has found that the presence and size of peacekeeping deployments can reduce violence, little is known about how peacekeepers affect other aspects of civilian protection. Using original data on sub-national events of forced displacement and the location and size of UN troop deployments this study systematically evaluates the criticized efforts of UNMISS in South Sudan, while simultaneously testing hypotheses on peacekeepers and forced displacement. It is hypothesized that increasing numbers of troops affect the flight equation among civilians through the promise of and actual deterrence of violence. These deterrence-based hypotheses are also discussed in relation to the South Sudan context, creating scope conditions for their possible application in this case. The statistical analysis provides, however, no robust evidence for peacekeepers reducing the occurrence or levels of forced displacement, and only weak evidence of displaced congregating in larger numbers around peacekeeping locations. The paper ends by arguing that the theoretical argument provided may still be valid, but that an effect was not feasible to identify in South Sudan where the peacekeeping mission – despite its comparatively large numbers – lacks credible deterrent capacity.

In the face of the repeated failure of international peacebuilding to build peace, one strand of the literature argues that failure can only be understood by 'zooming in' – by focusing on peacebuilders, the local populations they purport to help, and the relationship between them. This article draws on the insights of this literature to argue that international peacebuilding should be understood as an instance of structural injustice. Studies of the encounter between international interveners and local populations tend to focus on the differences between these groups and their problematic relationship. I argue that 'zooming in' reveals much more than the differences between interveners and locals: it uncovers how their relationship presents parallels and similarities with others, such as the relation between colonizers and colonized. The relationship between internationals and locals is problematic not because of each group's characteristics and their difference, but because of the social positions they relate from. These hierarchical social positions give some groups the power to intervene in the lives of others. The article argues that the encounter between internationals and locals should be 'de-exoticized' and that hierarchy, rather than difference, should be at the centre of the critical peacebuilding literature.

Militaries around the world have benefited from computerized games. Many recruits have been attracted to the military through military-style video games. After recruitment, games and simulations provide an important means of soldier training, including before actual deployments. However, electronic games are lacking for UN peace operations. The multidimensionality of peacekeeping has yet to be simulated in serious games to complement the many games that too often depict a binary battlefield of blue-team versus red-team (or, often in public games, good versus evil). Not only could soldiers benefit from nuanced and ambitious peace-related games, so too could civilian peacekeepers, and the public at large. Peacekeeping gaming should not be merely at the tactical level; the operational and strategic levels can be gamed as well. The decision-making in future peacekeeping simulations could help instruct conflict-resolution and critical thinking skills. The paper posits that such digital games could be an important tool for current and future peacekeepers, both military and civilian. Commercial games could also help educate the public on UN peacekeeping. The paper suggests that the United Nations partner with some member states and perhaps the video game industry to provide in-depth training simulations that mirror the challenges and complexities of modern peace operations.

Do UN peacekeeping forces protect civilians from harm in post-war environments? Current evidence suggests that the answer to this question is yes. But extant research mostly examines this relationship at the country-level and consequently has logical difficulty tracing decreases in civilian fatalities to actual peacekeeper activities. We would have more confidence in the ability of peacekeepers to limit harm and protect non-combatants if the reduction in violence occurred locally where blue helmets were positioned. Using original geocoded data of yearly UN deployments in four Sub-Saharan African conflicts (Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ivory Coast), we find that peacekeeping units get locally deployed to violent post-war areas and they reduce the level of civilian harm almost immediately. But, in areas without violent clashes between government forces and rebels, we find peacekeeping units more responsive to civilian targeting by rebels, which indicates a reluctance among peacekeepers to confront government forces that target civilians. While host nation consent is crucial for the success of a peacekeeping mission, the findings from this study caution against nurturing illiberal regimes by failing to check government atrocities. The failure to confront government abuse can jeopardize long-term peace and reconciliation.

This article studies how when post-conflict justice works alongside a peacekeeping operation following a civil conflict, a two-pronged pacifying effect is activated. While justice mechanisms deal with the factors underlying the conflict, peacekeepers increase the costs for the potential spoilers of the peace while also supporting the justice processes. The findings in this study have important implications for conflict-ridden states attempting to escape the 'conflict trap'.

While the extant literature has highlighted the importance of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in addressing commitment problems in civil wars, actor fragmentation presents additional challenges for conflict resolution. A higher number of competing actors not only worsens coordination problems but also aggravates the risk of opposition to a peace process, generating an environment prone to spoiler violence. This article argues that UN interventions matter more when commitment and coordination problems are worse, which corresponds to known traits of fragmented conflicts. Using data on civil conflict duration and intensity, we present evidence that UN PKOs are effective at mitigating adverse impacts of fragmentation. Fragmented conflicts are both longer and deadlier when the UN is not involved to support a peace process, while UN peacekeeping mitigates the effects of fragmentation.

After a decade of remarkable growth in the early 2000s, UN peacekeeping has entered a period of sharp contraction. This trend has been especially severe for civilian peacekeepers, who play vital though often neglected roles in UN operations: the number of civilian peacekeeper positions has shrunk by 37% since 2010. This article draws on 164 research interviews and the vast Business literature on downsizing to explore the effects of this contraction of the UN's remaining civilian peacekeepers and the missions that employ them. To conceptualize this impact, the article begins by outlining the contributions a range of civilians – international and national staff, UN Volunteers and contractors – make to UN peacekeeping. Mobilizing insights from Business scholars, it then argues that difficult downsizing processes, high employee commitment, and workforce stratification place UN missions at high risk of 'downsizing survivor syndrome': sustained organizational productivity losses due to decreased individual performance and team coherence. The article then confirms empirically that the nature of UN peacekeeping downsizing, job insecurity, and competition among personnel categories pose profound risks to civilian peacekeeper performance and therefore challenge effective mandate implementation. It also highlights that decreased inter-mission mobility due to the contraction of UN peacekeeping overall exacerbates this effect.

This article contributes to refining our understanding of how a robust Protection of Civilians mandate in peacekeeping missions may have unintended and harmful consequences for key local actors involved. It focuses specifically on local mission staff employed to collect vital data on human rights abuses, taking the example of the hybrid UN-African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Darfur, UNAMID. It further explores how the UN system lacks a clear policy or automatically built-in mechanisms to prevent potential harm to those on whose local knowledge it relies. While predominately based on interview data with a small number of former UNAMID frontline human rights data-collectors from Darfur, the dynamics unveiled speak to more general issues when interrogating protection of civilians as the central pillar of UN peacekeeping missions, also beyond scenarios where the government of a host-state is hostile to the mission. The article concludes that the protection of local staff should feature prominently in any mission's approach, including an active commitment to withdraw staff from their positions if their security is threatened or compromised.

What makes a UN member state contribute more peacekeepers to be deployed in hostile environments and place their troops at risk? A significant amount of scholarly research explores the need for, and effectiveness of, UN peacekeeping in conflict zones around the world. Few studies examine the factors that determine the size of peacekeeping contributions, and these studies do not focus on the role of neoliberal institutions. This study examines the relationship between the degree of linkages in neoliberal institutions and the size of peacekeeping contributions. I argue that the degree of linkages in neoliberal international institutions creates structural conditions that facilitate the information gathering process on the preferences and needs of UN member states and incentivize these states to contribute more peacekeeping troops. In my analysis of UN peacekeeping troop contributions data for all countries between 1990 and 2015, I find that the degree of neoliberal institutional linkages is the most consistent predictor of a UN member state's size of peacekeeping contributions.

This article documents humanitarian action undertaken by Chinese troops in six UN peacekeeping missions and shows that Chinese peacekeepers engaged in very similar types of humanitarian action regardless of their unit type or mission area. The patterns in their behaviour strongly suggest that their activities constitute a humanitarian program that is coordinated systematically at the level of China's national military organization. Potential explanations for the humanitarianism of Chinese peacekeepers include China's broader foreign policy objectives, its internal model of civil–military relations, the 'developmental peace' theory of peacekeeping and domestic public relations in China. Despite the UN's official policy of discouraging humanitarian action by military actors, national contingents can still implement humanitarian tactics largely due to the decentralized and fragmented command and control structure of UN peacekeeping missions. More broadly, such failure to protect the humanitarian space speaks to shortcomings of the current system of UN peacekeeping. Overall, closer attention to the role of national military doctrines and national military cultures would add significantly to our understanding of the behaviour of UN peacekeepers.

Brazil has been the largest troop contributor and provided all force commanders to the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004–2017). As the military embraced a leading role in UN peacekeeping's turn towards peace-enforcement, Brazil's governments have increasingly relied on soldiers in public security – occasionally even portraying these operations as a sort of 'peacekeeping at home'. Yet how has Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH affected internal military operations? I argue that narratives of the military's effectiveness in Haiti have been used to legitimise the growing scope of internal public security missions. Drawing on data from a questionnaire-based survey, interviews and focus groups with soldiers and officers, this paper argues that the experience in Haiti has fuelled troops' demands for rules of engagement that resemble those in UN peacekeeping. Given the armed forces' increasing bargaining power in Brazil's politics, the military leadership has been able to successfully lobby in favour of changing parts of the legal framework for internal operations. Lessons from the 'robust turn' have been used to promote more coercive internal missions of Brazil's armed forces. Yet it is impossible to fully reconcile the content of the military's demands with the rule of law in a democracy.

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are increasingly contracted to provide security in international peacekeeping missions. Yet, we know very little about the practical implications of this development. How do PMSCs reinforce and shape security management within UN peacekeeping operations, and what are the consequences for UN missions and their host populations? To answer these questions, we explore the operational, representative and regulatory security practices in the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). Our findings show how seemingly uncontroversial, even benign security practices can have unintended negative consequences. Specifically, we observe that the participation of security firms in MONUSCO's security management contributes to three developments: the differentiation of security between staff and locals, the hardening of MONUSCO's security posture, and the perpetuation of insecurity through the emergence of a local security economy. Contracted security is thus involved in reproducing forms of security that are in some ways diametrically opposed to the aims of the mission to protect civilians and facilitate a sustainable peace.