Suchergebnisse

Die weltpolitische Umbruchsituation 1989/90 barg für die internationale Ordnung wie für die nationalen Sicherheitsarchitekturen große Herausforderungen. In vielen Staaten musste das Militär seine Rolle neu definieren. Zugleich hofften westliche Regierungen und Zivilgesellschaften auf eine neue (Welt-)Friedensordnung. In diesem Spannungsfeld mussten Antworten auf ein Grundproblem moderner Demokratien gefunden werden: Wie lassen sich Streitkräfte, Militäreinsätze und damit verbundene (Todes-)Opfer legitimieren? In Kanada, einem wichtigen Truppensteller von UN-Blauhelm-Einheiten schon seit den späten 1940er-Jahren, wurde dieser Ausgleich mit einem Rückgriff auf die eigene Peacekeeping-Tradition versucht. Anhand der Errichtung des weltweit ersten »Peacekeeping Monument« in der kanadischen Hauptstadt Ottawa lässt sich exemplarisch analysieren, wie die gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzung um militärisches Traditionsverständnis und (postkoloniale) Identitätsentwicklung einer Gesellschaft verlief, die sich zunehmend als friedliebend verstand. Während das Denkmal und das nationale Peacekeeping-Narrativ weithin positive Resonanz finden, ist die tatsächliche kanadische Beteiligung an UN-Blauhelm-Einsätzen seit etwa 20 Jahren nur noch marginal.

The German Armed Forces contribute to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This is the first time in more than 20 years that Germany has deployed a strong contingent for a United Nations peacekeeping operation, though the UN's multilateral crisis management is currently required to operate in very different conflict contexts. The Federal Government should scrutinize how Germany can participate more comprehensively and more strategically in these missions than it has done up to now. There are a number of reasons to sustain, prioritize and extend this commitment which pertains to issues of strategy, personnel policy, training and equipment. (author's abstract)

Unbewaffnetes Ziviles Peacekeeping - wie man ZivilistInnen wirksam ohne die Drohung mit Gewalt schützt. Das ist die Übersetzung des Titels des englischsprachigen Hintergrund- und Diskussionspapiers, das jetzt neu erschienen ist. Die drei Autorinnen fassen in dem Papier den Stand der wissenschaftlichen Forschung zu Zivilem Peacekeeping zusammen. Sie stellen die Grundgedanken dieses Ansatzes dar, Menschen vor kriegerischer Gewalt auf gewaltfreiem Wege zu schützen, beschäftigen sich mit der Akzeptanz dieses Ansatzes in der Politik und geben einen Überblick über die vorhandene Literatur zum Thema.

The number of uniformed personnel serving in UN peace missions reached a new record in 2016, at almost 123,000. Following grave failings of UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, there is growing awareness within the UN of a widening disjoint between the expectations placed upon peacekeeping forces and what they can actually achieve. One aspect of the debate relates to the question of how robustly UN missions should operate in enforcing their mandate. In some quarters the resolute use of force is seen as the key to greater success. Almost three years ago the UN sent a Force Intervention Brigade to Congo with an explicit mandate to neutralise armed groups. An assessment of its record reveals that the brigade cannot be regarded as an organisational model worth replicating, and that peace-enforcing mandates do not necessarily lead to greater success in peacekeeping. (author's abstract)

"Although prospects for peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa have significantly improved since the end of the East-West conflict, creating the conditions for lasting peace nevertheless remains a challenge. While liberal peace as ideological frame and strong regional security organisations (RSOs) account for positive impacts and great potential, their effectiveness remains a hope, rather than a given. This report contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of peacekeeping/ peacebuilding on the African continent by analysing the policies and activities of the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) as well as some of its member states regarding two global norms: a) Protection of Civilians (POC) as one task of peacekeeping operations and b) Security Sector Reform (SSR). Based on the examples of Darfur, Chad, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, the report finds that the similar interpretation of doctrines is promising and can be considered an indicator that a layered system of global security governance based on strong and connected RSOs could be both effective and legitimate. However, this alignment of doctrines remains fragile and does not always translate into increased effectiveness at the local level due to three classes of frictions the report identifies." (author's abstract)

Die NATO übernahm mit dem Einsatz in Afghanistan zum dritten Mal nach Bosnien und dem Kosovo wichtige Aufgaben bei der Aufrechterhaltung des Friedens in einem Nachkriegsland. Die vorliegende Arbeit entstand im Kontext dieser Missionserweiterung und untersucht zwei Computerprogramme, die von der NATO entwickelt worden sind, um Missionen zu planen und zu simulieren, im Hinblick auf die Frage, inwiefern diese in der Lage sind, den Herausforderungen von eskalierten Gewaltkonflikten zu begegnen. Der Schwerpunkt wird dabei auf das so genannte "post-conflict peacebuilding" gelegt, das in den letzten Jahren einen immer größeren Stellenwert bei der Nachbearbeitung solcher Konflikte erlangt hat. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden zum einen die Erkenntnisse aus den praktischen Erfahrungen mit Peacebuilding und aus dem wissenschaftlichen Diskurs herausgearbeitet und andererseits mit den Möglichkeiten der beiden Computerprogramme ZETA und GAMMA verglichen. Die Kernfrage bei diesem Abgleich ist auf die Anforderungen an externe Peacebuilding-Strategien gerichtet: Wie können diese prinzipiell in den bestehenden Programmen abgebildet werden und wie werden sie in den einzelnen Szenarien dargestellt? (ICI)

Die Bundeswehr engagiert sich als Teil der VN-Mission MINUSMA im westafrikanischen Mali. Mit diesem Einsatz stellt Deutschland erstmals seit über 20 Jahren wieder ein umfangreiches Kontingent für eine Friedensoperation der Vereinten Nationen. Dabei ist das multilaterale Krisenmanagement der VN derzeit in ganz unterschiedlichen Konfliktkontexten gefordert. Die Bundesregierung sollte prüfen, wie Deutschland sich umfassender und strategischer als bisher an solchen Missionen beteiligen kann. Denn eine Reihe von Gründen spricht dafür, dieses Engagement zu verstetigen, zu priorisieren und auszubauen. Das betrifft Fragen von Strategie, Personalpolitik, Ausbildung und Ausrüstung. (Autorenreferat)

Die Zahl der in Friedensmissionen der Vereinten Nationen (VN) tätigen Personen hat 2016 mit knapp 123000 einen historischen Höchststand erreicht. Angesichts schwerer Versäumnisse der VN-Missionen in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo und im Südsudan verfestigt sich auch innerhalb der VN der Eindruck einer zunehmenden Kluft zwischen den Erwartungen, die an die Friedenstruppen geknüpft werden, und deren Fähigkeiten. Ein Aspekt der Debatte betrifft die Frage, wie robust VN-Missionen bei der Durchsetzung ihres Mandats vorgehen sollen. Manche sehen im resoluten Gebrauch militärischer Zwangsmittel den Schlüssel zu größerem Erfolg. Seit fast drei Jahren setzen die VN im Kongo eine Interventionsbrigade ein, die explizit das Mandat hat, bewaffnete Gruppen zu neutralisieren. Die Bilanz zeigt indes sowohl, dass die Brigade nicht als nachahmenswertes organisatorisches Pilotmodell gelten kann, als auch, dass friedenserzwingende Mandate nicht unbedingt mehr Erfolg bei der Friedenssicherung bedeuten. (Autorenreferat)

Brazil has been the largest troop contributor and provided all force commanders to the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004–2017). As the military embraced a leading role in UN peacekeeping's turn towards peace-enforcement, Brazil's governments have increasingly relied on soldiers in public security – occasionally even portraying these operations as a sort of 'peacekeeping at home'. Yet how has Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH affected internal military operations? I argue that narratives of the military's effectiveness in Haiti have been used to legitimise the growing scope of internal public security missions. Drawing on data from a questionnaire-based survey, interviews and focus groups with soldiers and officers, this paper argues that the experience in Haiti has fuelled troops' demands for rules of engagement that resemble those in UN peacekeeping. Given the armed forces' increasing bargaining power in Brazil's politics, the military leadership has been able to successfully lobby in favour of changing parts of the legal framework for internal operations. Lessons from the 'robust turn' have been used to promote more coercive internal missions of Brazil's armed forces. Yet it is impossible to fully reconcile the content of the military's demands with the rule of law in a democracy.

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are increasingly contracted to provide security in international peacekeeping missions. Yet, we know very little about the practical implications of this development. How do PMSCs reinforce and shape security management within UN peacekeeping operations, and what are the consequences for UN missions and their host populations? To answer these questions, we explore the operational, representative and regulatory security practices in the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). Our findings show how seemingly uncontroversial, even benign security practices can have unintended negative consequences. Specifically, we observe that the participation of security firms in MONUSCO's security management contributes to three developments: the differentiation of security between staff and locals, the hardening of MONUSCO's security posture, and the perpetuation of insecurity through the emergence of a local security economy. Contracted security is thus involved in reproducing forms of security that are in some ways diametrically opposed to the aims of the mission to protect civilians and facilitate a sustainable peace.

In this article, internationally supported peacebuilding is conceptualized as a cross-cultural relational endeavour, with international and local actors engaged in multiple forms of interactions in a local everyday context. Using a cultural-relational approach, two cases of peacebuilding are presented: Bougainville and Sierra Leone, which are at opposite poles of the spectrum of international-local peacebuilding interaction. Peacebuilding on Bougainville has drawn relatively little attention; the international intervention there was modest and small in size, and locals had considerable control of the peace process. By contrast, Sierra Leone is one of the best-known cases of peacebuilding, with massive external engagement and comprehensive external control. Both cases are considered success stories, but they differ considerably due to the differences in local-international relations. This is explained by focusing on two interrelated core aspects of the local-international interface: building relationships and trust, and security provision. Furthermore, another generally underestimated dimension of peacebuilding is explored, namely culturally different understandings of the spiritual realm and their effects on peacebuilding interventions.

Coherence is a core objective in most multinational interventions and seems of particular relevance to UN peacekeeping missions with their increasing complexity and multidimensionality. Yet, coherence has rarely been studied empirically. We borrow the concept of 'fit' from organizational theory and use it to develop a conceptual framework to study coherence in peacekeeping operations. Fit is the degree of match between what is required by the mandate, on the one hand, and an institutional set-up and the implemented practices, on the other. We identify three relevant dimensions of fit to study coherence: strategic and organizational, cultural and human and operational fit. Our empirical material focuses on the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and in particular on the interplay between the intelligence components and the rest of the mission. We draw upon a large empirical dataset containing over 120 semi-structured interviews, field observations and participation in pre-deployment exercises and evaluation sessions. Our empirical analysis suggests that low level of fit across several dimensions leads to inertial and widespread frictions in the practice of peacekeeping and could potentially undermine peacekeeping effectiveness. Building on existing scholarship on micro-level approaches to peacekeeping, we hope to further the debate on organizational dynamics within peace operations.

International peacebuilding is no longer dominated by Western actors and their liberal peace framework, neither there is a full-fledged alternative formulated by emerging peacebuilding actors. In this paper, I first establish the relationship between the liminality of emerging powers and their mimicry of the liberal peace. Secondly, I distinguish three forms of mimicry in peacebuilding that stem from emerging power liminality: a discursive mimicry, a complete mimicry and a substantive mimicry. In the case of the discursive mimicry, there is a liberal peacebuilding discourse which is rarely substantiated with policies. The complete mimicry is when both the liberal discourse and the policies are mimicked, and the substantive mimicry is a genuine adaptation of the liberal peacebuilding by the emerging power. The case of Turkish peacebuilding is analysed to illustrate the tripartite distinction. I demonstrate that Turkey mimics solely the discourse of the democratic peace thesis, while there is a complete mimicry of the Western model in security sector reform. However, the Turkish civil society peacebuilding and Turkey's approach to economic development substantively mimic their liberal peace counterparts. This article contributes to the critical literature on liberal peacebuilding by identifying the different forms of emerging actors' mimicry of the liberal peace.

Brazil's role in UN peacekeeping operations has been subject to increasing attention from academics and policy makers alike. While some authors praise Brazil's engagement in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as a case of innovative South-South cooperation, others accuse Brazil of using Haiti as a 'testing ground' for repressive anti-gang tactics that have subsequently been introduced at home. This article challenges these two dominant views on Brazil's role in Haiti. Based on a period of six months of fieldwork in Port-au-Prince and interviews with key Brazilian actors, the article draws a parallel between MINUSTAH's military raids in gang-ruled neighbourhoods coupled with police reform in Haiti, on one hand, and the Pacifying Police Units (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora) plus the accompanying UPP Social in Rio de Janeiro, on the other hand. It is argued that Brazil's peacekeeping strategy, at home and abroad, is a mix of coercive and cooperative measures reminiscent of counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics already employed during the French colonial war in Algeria. Moreover, it is shown that policing techniques borrowed from the US are employed to ease the tension between carrots and sticks, notably so in the urban environment in which Brazilian peacekeeping is taking place.

The assumption that peacekeeping requires soldiers carrying weapons is widespread; 35 years of successful peacekeeping by unarmed civilians is often overlooked. The original definition of peacekeeping is being confused with peace enforcement and peace operations. Limited interest has led to underfunding of unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) with fewer resources for both study and praxis. Marginalization of civilian peacekeeping has restricted the options for complex interventions; this reduced vision of peacekeeping is open to challenge in the light of evidence from the field. This paper first examines what is meant by peacekeeping and UCP. The relationship of UCP to nonviolence, feminism, and peace studies is considered. The constraints and limits of peacekeeping by armed military personnel during, or after, violent conflict are outlined. The core tasks of peacekeeping are analysed, and evidence from the field is presented to show that these core tasks can be (and have been) successfully undertaken by unarmed civilians for three decades, world-wide. The argument that armed military personnel are necessary, even essential, for peacekeeping is not supported by the evidence of civilian success in undertaking the core tasks. The paper ends with conclusions and a call for a new paradigm for peacekeeping.