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This chapter traces three different conceptions of peaceful change in Western Europe since 1945 and discusses their implications for understanding peaceful change in Western Europe today. The first is Hobbesian Western Europe. Corresponding to a largely realist understanding, Hobbesians view peaceful change in Western Europe as a by-product of balancing and hegemony in the Cold War. The second is Lockean Western Europe. Corresponding to a largely liberal understanding of peaceful change, the Lockean perspective views peaceful change in the region as the product of liberal democratic states responding rationally to the challenges of international anarchy by institutionalizing the region. The third is Kantian Western Europe. Corresponding to a largely constructivist understanding of peaceful change, Kantians view peaceful change in Europe as the construction of a civil league of nations exercising 'normative power Europe' inside and outside the region.

African political elites have been forthcoming with military support for United Nations peacekeeping missions, contributing substantially to these missions' workforce. Despite their contribution, most studies on peacekeeping omit the African soldier's voice on his experiences of the African war theatre. This article features Ghanaian soldiers' narratives based on their peacekeeping deployments and illuminates how Ghanaian peacekeepers connect their experiences to their home society. In this contribution, I illustrate how Ghanaian soldiers' narratives about peacekeeping experiences are framed as deterring examples for their home society, thus potentially impacting their actions and behaviours. Based on long-term qualitative research embedded with the Ghanaian military, drawing from interviews and informal conversations with peacekeeping veterans and serving military operatives, it is argued that Ghanaian soldiers' narratives of peacekeeping experiences and the collective processes through which these narratives gain currency in the barracks and beyond are informed by introspection in the post-peacekeeping deployment phase

International organizations' ability to respond promptly to crises is essential for their effectiveness and legitimacy. For the UN, which sends peacekeeping missions to some of the world's most difficult conflicts, responsiveness can save lives and protect peace. Very often, however, the UN fails to deploy peacekeepers rapidly. Lacking a standing army, the UN relies on its member states to provide troops for peacekeeping operations. In the first systematic study of the determinants of deployment speed in UN peacekeeping, we theorize that this speed hinges on the incentives, capabilities, and constraints of the troop-contributing countries. Using duration modeling, we analyze novel data on the deployment speed in 28 peacekeeping operations between 1991 and 2015. Our data reveal three principal findings: All else equal, countries that depend on peacekeeping reimbursements by the UN, are exposed to negative externalities from a particular conflict, or lack parliamentary constraints on sending troops abroad deploy more swiftly than others. By underlining how member state characteristics affect aggregate outcomes, these findings have important implications for research on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, troop contribution dynamics, and rapid deployment initiatives.

While there has been a long engagement with the impact of time on peacebuilding policies and practice, this engagement has to date focused predominately on issues of short- versus long-term initiatives, and of waning donor support for such initiatives. More recently, the critical peacebuilding turn has focused attention on the politics of the everyday as being essential to emancipatory endeavours enacted through localisation. Yet despite this, time itself has not been the subject of analysis, and the politics of time have not been integrated into the study of peacebuilding. This article, drawing both on historical institutionalist and on critical international studies analyses of temporality, provides a framework for analysing the impacts of time on the potential to achieve emancipatory peace. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Cambodia, this article asserts that a focus on Policy Time, Liberal Political Time, and Intergenerational Time highlights how peacebuilding initiatives are framed by disparate timescapes that limit the visibility of local chronopolitics, and that this in turn restricts local empowerment and resistances.

The EU seeks extensive partnership with other international organizations when it comes to security challenges. This is puzzling as the EU relies for its resources mostly on its member states. The relations between the EU and other international organizations have thoroughly been studied, yet scholars rarely question the actual rationale for partnership. We start from resource dependency theory which explains that almost all organizations are dependent on the resources of their partners. Yet we extend this theory by distinguishing between macro, meso and micro-level dependencies. To illustrate resource dependencies between the EU and other international organizations, we analyse EU's peacebuilding policies in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia. By accounting for macro- and micro-level dependencies we provide a more holistic perspective than conventional meso-level explanations. Our contribution is therefore to expand the scope of the resource dependency theory and provide a framework to analyse dependencies between the EU and other international organizations.

The influence of military members' malevolent personality traits on their ethical attitudes and behaviors has been the subject of research for decades. We investigated the relationship between malevolent individual difference factors (Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, the dominance facet of social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism) and aspects of military ethics before and during a peacekeeping mission to Mali. Based on pre-service responses from 175 Swedish soldiers, a factor analysis revealed a latent variable to which all individual difference factors contributed. This latent "core of darkness" was related to being more positive toward unethical behaviors both in a warzone and in the Swedish military organization. Extending these findings using a sub-sample of the soldiers (n = 63), we also found that the latent darkness variable prospectively predicted a higher frequency of self-reported insulting and cursing of noncombatants while in Mali. Our results suggest that malevolent individual difference factors have a common core and that moral transgressions during peacekeeping can be predicted and perhaps minimized by identifying soldiers who score high on this common core. However, more research is needed to understand the unique relations of some malevolent factors and different types of morally questionable warzone behavior.

Does peacebuilding shape the regime type of countries where international missions are deployed? Most peacebuilding missions take place in authoritarian contexts, and seek to overcome the legacies of conflict by overseeing transitions to democratic rule; however, most regimes that experience peacebuilding still retain some form of authoritarian rule. In this article, we examine the extent to which international peacebuilding missions contribute to the consolidation of post-conflict authoritarian regimes even when their stated aims involve the promotion of democracy. We argue that international peacebuilders can act as enablers of authoritarianism in host countries. We distinguish this category of behaviour from explicit 'autocracy promotion', which implies intentional support to autocracy. Instead, enabling is often an unintended consequence, and we identify two mechanisms through which enabling occurs: by building the capacity of incumbent authoritarian leaders and by signalling a permissive environment for authoritarian behaviour for national actors. We illustrate our argument with the case of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The article provides a critical overview of the rise of resilience at the European Union (EU) level and to what extent its adoption is reshaping the terms of the EU's peacebuilding interventions. In reaction to the perceived shortcomings of the "liberal peace" approach, international actors, including the EU, are now describing their interventions through a new resilience discourse. The article argues that resilience offers a four-fold contribution to promoting sustainable peace: (1) a focus on complexity; (2) a systems approach; (3) a shift toward local capacities; and (4) an emphasis on human agency. Focusing on the EU's discourse and its peacebuilding practices in the Western Balkans, the evidence suggests that the EU has only embraced a systems/integrated approach, while neglecting deeper understandings of complexity, local capacities and human agency. As a result, the contribution of resilience to EU peacebuilding remains limited.

This article analyses a programme in which an alliance of ex-combatants from the British Army, and loyalist and republican ex-prisoner backgrounds, engaged with young people about cultures of militarism in Northern Ireland. It argues that the alliance's focus on cultures of militarism sets it apart from other ex-combatant groups; in particular its critique of state militarism alongside paramilitarism makes it a rare example of Richard Jackson's 'post liberal peace plus.' It finds that the alliance could enhance its engagement with young people by developing a more comprehensive programme that expands on the gender dynamics of militarism and on non-violent alternatives to military and paramilitary action. Noting that most peacebuilding funding depends on state-based sources, it concludes that the very critique of state militarism that makes the alliance such a compelling example of 'post-liberal peace plus' limits its ability to secure resources, highlighting a key obstacle to building a radical post-liberal peace.

This document summarises a list of prospective best practices in EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding that have been identified in various EU-CIVCAP research outputs. ; This document summarises a list of prospective best practices in EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding that have been identified in various EU-CIVCAP research outputs.

What does realism tell us about peaceful change? Although recognized by E.H. Carr as a fundamental problem of international politics, realists have rarely sought to tackle the issue of peaceful change directly. This chapter explores how the logic(s) of realism may contribute to our understanding of peaceful change - even if there is no escape from power politics. ; This chapter discusses how to understand peaceful change from the perspective of classical realism, structural realism and neoclassical realism.

A stated aim in the EU Global Strategy is for the EU to work with partners in addressing crises across the world. This article analyses such potential in the area of crisis response and peacebuilding, with an emphasis on the EU's interaction with the UN and OSCE. It starts off comparatively by examining where the EU, UN and OSCE add value in crisis response and peacebuilding and reach complementarities. It shows that deployments differ across geographical locations and that the mandates of these organizations vary considerably with the EU focusing on police capacity building, the OSCE on the judiciary and the UN providing monitoring functions. In the second half, the article uses insights from cooperation between these organizations on the ground in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia to determine levels of interaction. Despite relatively few conflicts between these organizations, we find that they continue to work in parallel with each organization focusing on their narrow mandate and competences. ; A stated aim in the EU Global Strategy is for the EU to work with partners in addressing crises across the world. This article analyses such potential in the area of crisis response and peacebuilding, with an emphasis on the EU's interaction with the UN and OSCE. It starts off comparatively by examining where the EU, UN and OSCE add value in crisis response and peacebuilding and reach complementarities. It shows that deployments differ across geographical locations and that the mandates of these organizations vary considerably with the EU focusing on police capacity building, the OSCE on the judiciary and the UN providing monitoring functions. In the second half, the article uses insights from cooperation between these organizations on the ground in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia to determine levels of interaction. Despite relatively few conflicts between these organizations, we find that they continue to work in parallel with each organization focusing on their narrow mandate and competences.

With the failure of liberal peace strategies in the Global South, resilience has recently become the risk management strategy par excellence in peacebuilding. Since it is not possible to predict when the next crisis will take place, peacebuilders must invest in bottom-up adaptive capacities to cope with external shocks. This article moves away from governmentality accounts of resilience which are overtly deterministic and depoliticizing. Instead, it posits that the uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity associated with resilience mean that we should expect opportunities for contestation and institutional agency. This argument will be illustrated by drawing upon the European Union's adoption of the resilience approach in its peacebuilding and security policies. The article argues that while uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity constitute the ontological conditions that underpin the rise of resilience in peacebuilding, they are also likely to lead to its potential demise.

Since the early 2000s, the "local turn" has thoroughly transformed the field of peacebuilding. The EU policy discourse on peacebuilding has also aligned with this trend, with an increasing number of EU policy statements insisting on the importance of "the local". However, most studies on EU peacebuilding still adopt a top-down approach and focus on institutions, capabilities and decision-making at the EU level. This special issue contributes to the literature by focusing on bottom-up and local dynamics of EU peacebuilding. After outlining the rationale and the scope of the special issue, this article discusses the local turn in international peacebuilding and identifies several interrelated concepts relevant to theorizing the role of the local, specifically those of effectiveness, ownership, and resistance. In the conclusion, we summarize the key contributions of this special issue and suggest some avenues for further research.

Existing studies of European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (EU CSDP) missions often rely on a conceptualisation of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) implementation as a technical, linear and deterministic process. While this scholarship is part of a concerted effort to develop an accountability mechanism and push for organisational change, this paper contends that we also need a more grounded and contextual approach to capture the complex, ambivalent and often tortuous translation of WPS into CSDP relatively new security practices. This suggests that a deeper interrogation of what meaning(s) mainstreaming gender assumes in the context of EU CSDP missions and how this conceptualisation informs the practice of peacekeeping is required. Drawing on interviews with EU peacekeeping personnel, we outline an ambivalent account of how different CSDP actors interpret WPS and gender mainstreaming and compose it in use, with different effects.