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Abstract
This article argues that China's rhetorical support for prevention at the United Nations obscures its underlying contestation of atrocity prevention in both conception and practice. It introduces a novel conceptual framework, coined as the two-level norm cluster of prevention, which includes three conceptually aligned yet distinct parts: operational conflict prevention, direct atrocity prevention and root-cause prevention. Drawing on interviews and policy documents, this article finds that China conflates direct atrocity prevention with operational conflict prevention, with a preference for the agenda of conflict prevention, as seen in China's divergent commitments to preventing armed conflicts and peacetime atrocities. This conflation represents a deliberate political choice rather than a result of misunderstanding or lack of knowledge regarding their distinctions. China also endorses a strong linkage between direct atrocity prevention and development-focused root cause prevention. Despite China's growing assertiveness in shaping liberal norms and the favourable perception of its development-focused approaches among elite groups in host states, the Chinese government hesitates to officially promote the scholarly concept of developmental peace and present it as an alternative to the existing liberal principles. This reluctance reflects China's intention to avoid explicit confrontation with liberal norms and its concerns about the potential failure of norm entrepreneurship.

Yesterday, a bluesky discussion focused on whether the Federation of Planets was essentially the UN with US domination or something else.  While I have written far more here about Star Wars, I have actually used Star Trek more in my teaching, and I have watched far more Trek (there is simply many more hours of Trek content).  Plus having written about NATO (the ebook is less than $18!), I have a few views on the matter.To start, what is the United Federation of Planets and what is Starfleet?  The Federation is an alliance of planets, more so than it is a true federation a la the US.  Not even a confederation like Canada.  How so?  The planets still have their own foreign policies--we see plenty of meetings of diplomats from members to various proceedings.  Note, diplomats, not just leaders or representatives.  Just as I always like to make fun of Texas secessionists for having their embassy in Texas when it should be in Washington, DC or London or some place beyond the territory of the "country" it is representing, federal units (with the funky exception of Quebec) don't have embassies and ambassadors.  This is a short cut, a bit of evidence, for the basic idea that the units in the federation are more independent, more akin to nation-states than they are to units in a federal country.  So, yeah, the name is deceptive.  Starfleet adds to the confusion because it is the military (despite denials) of the Federation.  This would make the Federation appear more like a country if it had a monopoly--if Starfleet was the only armed force within the federation.  However, I seem to remember various planets within the fed having their own armed starships including Vulcan.  So, despite the name, the Federation is not akin to a single country.  It is easier to dispense with the idea that the Federation is the European Union.  How much of the series and movies are about economic regulations and subsidizing agriculture?  Ok, more directly, the European Union, despite many attempts, does not really have a military, and it does not have a common foreign policy.  The EU forces that have shown up in Bosnia and elsewhere only do so (this will be brutal, sorry) after NATO has done all of the heavy lifting. It was NATO that ended the Bosnia conflict, it was NATO that compelled Serbia to let peacekeepers into Kosovo, it is NATO deterring the Russians from attacking the Baltics, and so on.  In trade negotiations, the EU acts as a single actor and with great power.  In other stuff?  Not so much. Which leaves the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Clearly, from the name and from Gene Roddenberry's idealism, the United Federation of Planets is just a spacey UN, right?*  The stuff above that makes the Federation not a country but many countries or nation-states works toward the UN idea--a bunch of different sovereign entities constantly negotiating, sending diplomats hither and yon to settle all kinds of issues.  The big questions are what is the Federation for and what is Starfleet for?  The classic answer is collective security: to deter aggression by any member against any member by providing assurances that any target of aggression will receive assistance from the rest of the community.  Until Alexander Wendt has his way, the entire imagination of the role of the UN is focused on members.  The UN is a universal organization...on Earth--the only countries that are not in the UN are Taiwan and ... depending on how you count the Vatican and Palestine and various unrecognized separatist folks.  The key things about this notion of collective defense are that no member is excluded from its protection, and it is not aimed at any particular aggressor.  The UN does not have a standing military, but has "sent" massive interventions when the membership have agreed, to thwart North Korea's aggression in 1950 (because the Soviet diplomats were stupidly boycotting the UN Security Council at the time) and Iraq's in 1990-91.  In both cases, it was really the US military and some allies under a UN banner in the former and nearly so in the latter.  One could argue that Starfleet is mostly a Terran/American endeavor and its activities are simply under a federation banner.  But again, the aim is at members.  In the original Trek, maybe some of it was aimed at fostering peace among members, but for most of Trek's history, Starfleet was aimed at protecting its members from non-members.Which gets us to NATO, which is not really a collective security organization, but a collective defense organization.  It is not so much aimed at protecting Greece from Turkey, but all of the members from external threats--mostly the Soviet Union/Russia but also terrorism, maybe China, etc.  "An attack on one is an attack on all", Article V, the heart of the alliance, is aimed at outsiders. All of NATO's military endeavors have been on the border of or entirely outside the territory of its members.  Kind of like how much of Starfleet's activities are at the borders, patrolling nearby neutral zones, or going beyond to intervene, despite the Prime Directive, in non-members.  How many episodes are akin to the Kosovo effort?  A boodle. Of course, the parallel is not perfect, since Starfleet is a coherent military organization from the academy to the command staff and in between, which NATO is not.  Its captains may buck orders (Kirk more so than others, but all of them did so), but not because their home country/planet had different rules than the Federation for operating in place x or y.  That is, the Steve and Dave book on the Federation would focus far less on the political systems of members states and far more on the personalities of individual ship captains, compared to our work on NATO (our book and articles focused mostly on whether countries had coalition governments or not, what kinds of coalitions they had, and personality of presidents and prime ministers only kicked in if there were no coalitional bargaining).Of course, there is no perfect parallel between the Federation and an existing Terran international organization, but given the focus of the Federation and the activities of Starfleet, NATO appears to be the closest, and I didn't even discuss enlargement.   *  I'd argue that Babylon 5 comes a lot closer to that, but that is a post for another day.   

This article aims to leave behind the narrow view that considers women only as victims of violence in post-conflict contexts and proposes to recognise their valuable contribution in the search for truth and justice. To this end, on the one hand, stressing that it does not yet consider women as a fundamental part of post-conflict peacebuilding, the international legal framework on women's participation in peace processes will be examined. On the other hand, we will explore which mechanisms have been used by women in Kosovo and Peru in their respective transitional justice processes, showing that they have been an active and relevant collective actor in the struggle for the respect of human rights. Recognising women as an active agent in transitional justice processes would favour the real pacification of the territory, the healing of the wounds of the affected communities and their empowerment, placing them on an equal condition with men.

Este artículo pretende dejar atrás la visión reduccionista que considera a las mujeres sólo como víctimas de la violencia en contextos de posconflicto y propone reconocer su valiosa aportación en la búsqueda de la verdad y la justicia. Para ello, se examinará, por un lado, el marco jurídico internacional sobre la participación de las mujeres en los procesos de paz que, lamentablemente, aún no la considera como un actor fundamental en la pacificación posconflicto. Por otro lado, se explorará cuáles han sido, en la práctica, los mecanismos reales utilizados por las mujeres en Kosovo y Perú, en sus respectivos procesos de justicia transicional, durante los cuales las mujeres han demostrado ser un sujeto colectivo relevante en la lucha para el respeto de los derechos humanos. Reconocer a la mujer como un actor activo de los procesos de justicia transicional favorecería la real pacificación del territorio, la sanación de las heridas de las comunidades afectadas y su empoderamiento, poniéndola en una condición de igualdad con respeto al hombre.

The Iraqi army captain who assassinated King Faisal II and his family in 1958 claimed, "All I did was remember Palestine, and the trigger on the machine-gun just set itself off." Although Iraqi historians refute this assertion and maintain the officer was a delusional madman, in the days leading up to the massacre of the royal family, the Iraqi opposition had been emboldened by growing anti-Israel sentiment and a perception that the Iraqi monarchy leaned too heavily toward Western nations which enabled Israeli aggression toward Arab states. Six decades later, the Palestinian question still enrages the "Arab Street." The war in Gaza raises concerns of violent regional spillover and Iraq would not be not immune from the consequences. Unlike the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, however, it is unlikely that armed conflict will come to Iraq as sympathy for the Palestinians will not trump war fatigue. Yet, there are reasons to fear the indirect costs of war. Chief among those concerns revolve around neighboring Iran being involved in a wider conflict, but no less significant could be the effects on the internal politics of Iraq, its economy, and its international relations. Much will depend on the skills of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani to balance the pressure from his political opponents and the armed militias.Internal politicsAll politics are local, and in Iraq they are often armed. Unlike the dictatorships, dynasties, and monarchies surrounding it, Iraq remains a parliamentary democracy, generally responsive to public sentiment but also coercion from armed militias outside of government control.Iraq's recent history shows the best and worst of democracy, free speech, and the right to assemble. In October 2019, widespread street protests over corruption, unemployment, inadequate services, and poor living conditions brought down the government of Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi. The Tishreen ("October") protesters demanded the resignation of Abdul-Mahdi, commitments to reform, and early elections. While authorities responded with a relatively heavy hand, the government fell within two months. Abdul-Mahdi's replacement, Mustafa al Kadhimi, enjoyed a full term in office but the process of replacing him with the current prime minister, Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani came after Iraq went through the longest period without a formal government in its modern history. Among other factors, his appointment was fiercely opposed by the powerful rabble-rousing Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr when Sadr was unable to form a government. Sadr's party resigned en masse from Parliament but not before his followers stormed the Council of Representatives in July 2022 twice, and occupied the Presidential Palace the following month. The departure of the Sadrists from the palace led to a deadly firefight in the Green Zone which soon spread to Iraq's southern provinces. Against this backdrop of violence and turmoil, the Sudani government came to power in October 2022 fully understanding the need to remain sensitive to public opinion and well armed political opponents. The Sudani government also remains under pressure from militias, a delicate balancing act for a country beholden to the accomplishments of these groups in the fight against Daesh, or ISIS. These militias enjoy quasi-political influence on the Iraqi body politic and are closely tied to Iran. Sudani's political opponents have been closely watching for a misstep (common to all opposition parties worldwide), not least Sadr, who has already called on his supporters to join "peaceful" demonstrations in protest of Israel's war on Gaza. Rarely are Sadrist demonstrations peaceful as shown by the sit-ins in 2021 and the violent attacks into the protected Green Zone in 2022.Against this backdrop, Sudani maintains a careful reading of internal politics. While he may not be ousted by demonstrations like Abdul-Mahdi or fend off assassination attempts as did Khadimi, participating in internal politics remains a risky business in Iraq; so is international diplomacy.External relations While Prime Minister Sudani has demonstrated strong skills in managing Iraq's internal politics, external relations with Iran and the United States could provide the missteps his opponents seek. Despite strong condemnation of the attacks into Gaza, Iran-backed militias have significantly ramped up their drone and rocket attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq and Syria.In response, a parade of U.S. officials from CIA Director William Burns to Secretary of State Antony Blinken (adorned in body armor) have visited Iraq since October 7 persuading, cajoling, and warning Sudani of the consequences of continued attacks on U.S. personnel. Sudani issued stern warnings that Iraqi territory should not be used as a proxy battlefield, and that continued attacks by these groups may provoke U.S. action against Iran even in the absence of proof that these attacks were "explicitly ordered" by Tehran. Arresting a small number of suspects in the attacks has, for the moment, kept the diplomatic situation somewhat calm. Sudani seems to have found a way to acquiesce to Washington's demands while placating Iran and the militias. Keen on maintaining positive relations with both Iran and the U.S., while remaining attentive and in tune to sentiments on the street, Sudani cannot risk being perceived as cowering to Western pressures at a time when public opinion is overwhelmingly in support of Gaza. But that balancing act will require continued statesmanship to uphold Iraq's sovereignty without being labeled by detractors as a puppet of any hegemon, whether Iran or the U.S. A tipping point, however, may be if the war in Gaza continues. The recent outcry against the December 25 airstrikes by the U.S. military in response to a rocket attack which seriously injured an American soldier is the most recent example. Not only did Sudani call the rocket attack an act of terrorism, but also condemned the American strike as a serious violation of Iraqi sovereignty and announced that "the Iraqi government is heading towards ending the presence of international coalition forces."Economic effectsWhile Iraq's economy has shown some signs of recovery in recent months — 25 percent of Iraqis reportedly live below the poverty line — unemployment is forecasted to reach 40 percent, and climate change has contributed to water scarcity. There is little appetite for yet another war in Iraq when average Iraqis are battling to get by.In the event the Gaza conflict expands, Iraqis could be affected by events such as the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Blocking maritime traffic through the Suez Canal and rerouting traffic around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa could affect the relatively modest inflation rate in Iraq at a time when the Iraqi dinar has also gone through a significant depreciation. While the economic situation in Iraq is far better than regional neighbors such as Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, expectations from consumers used to relatively stable prices are high and even a small amount of economic turbulence on top of anger at the situation in Gaza could challenge the Sudani government. As former Iraqi Energy Minister Luay Al Khateeb puts it, "If the Gaza war engulfs Iran, this will lead to major consequences on Iraq's political and economic stability. The ramifications will force Iran to prioritize its needs to meet local demand on power sector and gas supplies and cut natural gas electricity exports to Iraq."Iraq currently imports electricity and gas from Iran that total close to 40 percent of its power supply. "Iran's force majeure cuts will compromise Iraq's national grid to disable 50 percent of Iraq's service sectors and investment projects, affecting the country's revenue; [it will have a] negative impact on GDP and will most certainly ignite unprecedented populous protests against the government and the political system at large," says Al Khateeb. "For Iraq to avoid such a situation, a quick short term resolution will come at a major cost to compensate for the losses by importing expensive diesel and securing more financial allocation for power generation maintenance that will eventually increase the budget deficit beyond control."Iraq's former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Dr Ali Allawi concurs."A war certainly would lead to Iranian cutbacks of gas supplied to Iraq," he says, adding, "It would also be used to pressure Iraq to drop its public neutrality between the U.S. and Iran. The Iraqi public is decidedly in favor of Palestine, and the Gaza war has made the Iranian connection less contentious than before."While international actors seek to contain the violence inside of Israel and Gaza, regional actors seem intent on expanding the war well beyond those borders. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and Iran-backed militias seem hell-bent on spreading the flames. The United States blames Iran as the source of regional provocations and even if inaccurate, the U.S. has put its forces on war footing, sending aircraft carriers and increased intelligence and other combat capabilities into the region, ostensibly to deter and contain the conflict — moves that inadvertently increase the dangers.of that very conflagration either by mistake, miscalculation, or misstep. The recent American-led maritime mission, Operation Prosperity Guardian, will increase the number of international warships in the Red Sea and should a Houthi missile sink a commercial tanker or a U.S. warship, the responses and counter-responses may make the war in Gaza seem minor.The Middle East has not seen this level of instability in decades and Iraq is not immune from that instability. Even if, to date, it has not been directly affected by the Gaza war or a wider regional conflict, Iraq it is already feeling its indirect effects through increased tensions between the U.S. and Iran, large scale street protests in support of Palestine, Iranian -backed militias attacking U.S. personnel, domestic political opponents, and impacts on the Iraqi economy. While Prime Minister Sudani has deftly managed those challenges to date, it remains problematic whether he, or Iraq, can weather the storms blowing in from Gaza for much longer.

Looking back on my thirty years of research about right-wing extremism in the United States, I offer several principles to guide how our field approaches conservative activism in these perilous times. First, I discuss how the causes of right-wing movements are different from other movements. Their goals center on preserving privileges that are slipping away, rather than fighting for privileges historically denied to constituents. This key difference forces us to reconsider the causal role of grievances in the emergence of collective action. Second, rightwing movements are about power. Power is most effective in maintaining dominance when it is not visible. Right-wing mobilization signals a failure to maintain dominance in ways that conceal exploitative relationships. Third, power devaluation theory provides guidance on specifying ways that threats and grievances lead to right-wing mobilization. Finally, the status component of Weber's class-status-power trinity is especially relevant for understanding the rise of rightwing movements. My current research considers how socially constructed status hierarchies of race, gender, sexual orientation and gender identity, citizenship, and religion shape the contours of political divisions in American politics. Apropos of the last point, findings demonstrate the importance of status-preservation goals in structuring political behavior. In the near future it seems that such goals will continue to animate right-wing extremism and pose a threat to democratic governance and efforts to generate equality and a more peaceful world.

Introduction/purpose: This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of a potential implementation of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) systems, focusing on network architecture, VoIP phones, and servers. The study explores potential vulnerabilities and proposes solutions. The paper concludes by advocating for a holistic approach to securing VoIP systems, incorporating supplementary services to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of voice communications in the digital landscape. Methods: Review of the underlying theory, analysis of the end-user needs and potential solutions, practical viability assesment. Results: The theoretical points discussed were proven in practice, using commercially available resources. Communication was established in an expected manner. Conclusions: Implementing solutions similar to the one presented in the paper would be a relatively inexpensive way to make diverse improvements to the operation of tactical level units, both in peacetime and during war.

This article construes the main purposes of foreign policy of Azerbaijan in international security: participation in modern worldwide system, beneficial use of the opportunities of the region, world countries and other foreign actors in order to provide sustainable development of the state, the rights of sovereign state, the security of its territory and population, their peaceful life, political, eco-nomic and geostrategic control over national resources.

Since the launch of the Stabilization and Association Process in 1999, the European Union has become the main conflict mediator on the post-Yugoslav space. The EU's policy towards the region of the so-called Western Balkans implies the juxtaposition of integration and conflict settlement goals, which was not the case during the previous enlargement waves. Besides promoting peacebuilding initiatives through traditional foreign policy instruments, Brussels has been practicing a complicated system of incentives and sanctions related to the European integration procedures. Progress of the post-Yugoslav republics in enlargement is conditional on their willingness to implement particular requirements. The article analyzes the efficiency of the European Union's conditionality from the perspective of regional stability. The ambivalence of such approach lies in politicization of peacebuilding agenda as the EU advances its specific image of recent civil wars in the Balkans. Using the methods of retrospective analysis of European politics, including foreign policy documents, the author substantiates the political nature of the demands made by Brussels on the parties to the conflicts. The distinct feature of the EU enlargement policy is the hierarchization of actors in foreign policy processes, which provides various countries with different negotiating power. This conditionality, due to the value contradictions within the communities, leads to the point when the applied measures of settlement lead not to the expected normalization, but to the aggravation of the situation and polarization of the parties. Thus, the author identifies the discrepancy between the declared objectives of the European Union as a mediator and the practical results. This inconsistency has prompted the decay of neighbor relations on the post-Yugoslav space as the EU member states attempted to instrumentalize their position within the Union for the ultimate solution of bilateral disputes with candidate countries, blocking the integration process in general.

The article examines the role of the phenomenon of civilizational identity in Russia's foreign policy in the context of the current hybrid confrontation based on the study of the parameters of the possibilities for resolving the "Crimean issue". The essence of the global hybrid conflict between Russia and the West is analyzed, the possibilities of using the concept of civilizational identity as a geopolitical toolkit are determined. Aim . Unleashing the potential of the concept of civilizational identity in the global hybrid confrontation with the collective West in the context of the formation of a polycentric world order based on the experience of resolving the "Crimean issue".Tasks. Determine the essence and parameters of the global geopolitical conflict in modern world political conditions; to characterize the role of the civilizational identity of the Crimean population in solving the "Crimean issue", to identify the potential of civilizational identity for solving domestic and foreign political problems, taking into account Russian national interests.Methods. Geopolitical approach, system analysis, retrospective method, document analysis.Results . The study showed the need for the formation and conceptualization of the civilizational foundations of Russia's foreign policy. This should be a larger-scale policy that is creative in nature and translates the principles of justice and peaceful interstate relations. Changes in Russian foreign policy thinking can bring positive results — to strengthen the Russian statehood, Russia's international subjectivity, lay the foundations for a truly polycentric world order and expand the boundaries of the Russian world.Conclusions . The concept of civilizational identity acts as a universal an d effective tool for solving the "Crimean issue" and therefore should be considered both as a basic social value, and as a mandatory category of state document strategies, and as a formative element in th e information sphere.

ABSTRACT: International, national and local peacebuilding documents suggest that islanders confront the legacy of the past as they articulate a vision of the future, and this article assesses the most useful frames, metaphors and terms for thinking about the troubled past and shared future of post-Brexit Ireland, North and South. It suggests that comparative history might help. Considering the history of religion and sustainability in the United States might allow participants to reframe the island's troubled past as a series of shared sustainability crises and to reimagine future-focused deliberations as collective efforts to repair socially and ecologically stressed niches. This approach addresses widespread concerns about the well-being of the next generation and uses terms that already have informed thinking about possible futures. It will not heal old wounds or end sectarian disputes, but, with new language to express shared hopes, this approach might make the post-Brexit transition a little less fraught.

The article retraces how the Soviet Union and the United States tried to establish a partnership in the wake of Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The international community strongly condemned the invasion, and the two superpowers chose to cooperate in finding a solution to the crisis. The Soviet leadership was persistent in searching for a peaceful settlement. But the Bush administration, seeking to lay the grounds for U.S. dominance in a "new world order," opted for the use of force. Moscow opposed this, but cautiously, trying to persuade Iraq to concede, while avoiding an aggravation of relations with the U.S. This policy went nowhere, and the international crisis over the Iraqi invasion catalyzed the post-Cold-War U.S.-centric world order.

The period of deep détente, at the turn of the millennium, has even reduced our ability to manage crises. The skills of prudent confrontation, developed during the Cold War, have been lost. So we must again tread the path to stabilization and peaceful coexistence. But we will first need to set foot on that path.

Japan and India are the two oldest and largest democracies in Asia. Since the inception of their diplomatic relations in 1952, the two countries have maintained a cordial relationship. They remain aloof during the Cold War period due to their ideological differences. After that, India following the economic liberalization followed by the "Look East" policy in the post-Cold War period had a positive impact on bilateral relations. This took a sudden gap due to India's second Pokhran nuclear test in 1998 followed by Japanese economic sanctions. However, the relations normalized soon when Mori visited India along with other South Asian nations in 2000. The bilateral relations further improved when the two countries signed the "strategic orientation of Japan-India global partnership" during Koizumi's visit in 2005. Since then, the two countries have been engaging in different aspects of strategic partnership, and a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific along with the "rule-based order" has always been their priority. Thus, different scholars and statesmen from both countries started the discussion on building a new architecture of 'rule-based order' in the Indo-Pacific. To that end, Japan and India have continuously engaged themselves in bilateral and multilateral dialogue such as G4, Shangri-La Dialogue and Quad. Thus, this paper will try to see how far the two countries can persuade the international community to push the concept of "rule-based order" in the Indo-Pacific.

Contentious politics regards protests and social mobilization as democratic disputes over the public agenda. Three social protests occurring in the department of Ayacucho before the social outburst of December 7, 2022, are examined under this approach. The three contentious actions and the local reactions to the social outburst are reconstructed through newspaper review. This permitted to identify similar dynamics in the protests and state limitations to channel them into peaceful solutions. Although protests had different agendas, it was possible to identify the recurrence of the Ayacucho People's Defense Front (FREDEPA). For this reason, the trajectory of this collective actor from its emergence to the present is explored. It is concluded that contentious politics have different results at local and national levels. Locally it amplifies the public agenda, while at the national level polarizes political actors.

Russia's continuing aggression against Ukraine is exceptional both in terms of its scale and its global implications. A peaceful and prosperous future for Ukraine, neighbouring states and indeed the entire continent, depends upon two interrelated factors. The first is Ukraine's ability to win, with Western support, the war initiated against it by the Russian Federation under Putin. This would bring about a new global opening, ending the Moscow-Beijing anti-Western axis in world politics. The second factor is Ukraine's ability to take advantage of the constitutional moment that will present itself as attention shifts from the military effort toward the process of state reconstruction. Presenting the situation of Ukraine in regional, historical, and global context, we draw attention to specific challenges and choices that state elites will face post-war. We explain the internal and external implications of these choices to show why Ukraine should seize its upcoming constitutional moment. Drawing on both political theory and real world examples of constitutional revolutions, we explain the factors involved in the effective exploitation of the constitutional moment. We suggest that, channelled to constructive purposes, the demands and aspirations of Ukrainian citizens may help propel the political and economic reforms needed to secure social trust and a stable future. We conclude that multi-level political and civic engagement in a new constitutional process will be indispensable for reconstructing the institutional foundations for peace, democratic governance and the rule of law in post-conflict Ukraine.