The article offers a wide‐ranging, critical reflection on intercultural mediation theory and practice. Rather than following the standard format of literature review and discussion, the author uses his experiences as a mediator and researcher to frame the culture question and analyze intercultural practice models. We begin with the White American author's realization that culture is important, following a mediation session in which the other participants were Black. Reading Kochman's Black and White Styles in Conflict reinforced that realization, and, combined with other works, suggested a relatively straightforward relationship between culture and mediation managed through cultural competency. However, original field research on third‐party peacemaking in West Africa complicated the issue by indicating that worldviews and associated conflict styles are highly diverse, varying both within and across social groups. The second half of the paper examines the nature of cultural perspectives or worldviews and considers proposed methods for intercultural mediation. By analyzing prominent responses to the issue of sociocultural variation, the paper explores the challenge of creating a broadly applicable mediation methodology that addresses the complexity of worldviews.
It has been long and widely forecast that the security situation in the Balkans — indeed, in South-Eastern Europe generally — would become delicate, and would fracture, during the final stages of the Albanian quest for independence for the Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija. The Kosovo region is now a lawless area. It has been ethnically-cleansed of Serbs, and re-populated by Albanians who have progressively and illegally, over the past decades, migrated into the area. Years of so-called peacekeeping by the international community count for nothing. Kosovo's presence as a nominally independent state, without any of the essential foundations to meet the true criteria for sovereignty, can in no way further the stability of the region, or of Europe. Neither can it serve US strategic interests, unless US interests can be defined as a breakdown of viability of Eastern and southern Europe. Not only Kosovo, but all of Albania and other Balkan communities have become captive of the criminal-political movements which owe their power to their alliance with Al-Qaida, Iran, and the Saudi-funded Wahhabist movements. Therefore, new warfare will be supported by many elements of the international Јihadist movements which work closely with Albanian groups such as the KLA along the so-called Green Transversal line (or Zelena Transverzala) — really a clandestine highway or network — which not only carries jihadists but also narcotics and weapons along international supply lines crossing from Turkey and the Adriatic into the Balkans and on into Western Europe. So, the broader battle is now being joined in South-East Europe, in Kosovo, Rashka, the Preshevo Valley, in FYROM, Montenegro, and Epirus being in large part proxy warfare which is symptomatic of the emergence of a new Cold War on a global scale. One can only imagine the negative consequences for Balkan stability if, for example, Turkey's status changes and Ankara no longer feels obliged to temper its activities, or its use of Islamist surrogate or proxy groups to further pan-Turkish ambitions. On the other hand, we have not yet seen the completion of the break-up of Yugoslavia, and even the wrenching of Kosovo may not complete it. We will then see the dismemberment of some of the Yugoslav parts already independent, perhaps even the dismemberment of FYROM and Bosnia. Perhaps those State Department officials will be surprised, too, to see — a decade or two hence — the claims of autonomy emerging for parts of Arizona, Southern California, or Texas, citing the same pretext of "self-determination" now being claimed by those who moved across the borders to occupy Serbia's Kosovo province. The Balkans region and the Eastern Mediterranean generally are entering a further period of crisis, insurrection, and possibly open conflict. None of the regional states, but particularly Serbia, are doing enough to address the security ramifications of the coming de facto independence of Kosovo. Finally, conflict issues in the Middle East, and specifically in Iraq, and relating to Iran, will continue to have a profound impact on the stability of the Balkans, and vice-versa
AbstractAfter decades of fighting and suffering, the Kurds in Iraq have achieved far-reaching self-rule. Looking at the history of conflicts and alliances between the Kurds and their counterparts inside Iraq and beyond its borders, the authors find that the region faces an uncertain future because major issues like the future status of Kirkuk remain unsolved. A federal and democratic Iraq offers a rare opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question in Iraq – and for national reconciliation. While certain groups and currents in Iraq and the wider Arab world have to overcome the notion that federalism equals partition, the Kurds can only dispel fears about their drive for independence if they fully reintegrate into Iraq and show greater commitment to democratic reforms in the Kurdistan Region.
Three key developments brought me back to eastern Congo in early 2006 after several years away: rapidly changing patterns of violence in the region, the buildup to Congo's historic first elections since independence, and new attempts to bring perpetrators of mass crimes to justice. As conflict rages, Congo confronts questions fraught enough during peacetime: Can a highly fragmented state of 250 ethnic groups, with a long history of violence, corruption, and extreme poverty, embrace democracy and create effective political institutions? Can individuals responsible for committing atrocities be held accountable? And can democracy and justice contribute to a stable, vibrant nation in the long term? Given Congo's strategic importance, bordered by ten countries in the heart of Africa, these are not merely questions for the nation but for the Great Lakes Region as a whole?
This article examines two court cases from Marseille's civil court in 1424 and the three competing goals of the people involved. Silona Calverie initiated the suits to dissolve her marriage and reclaim her dowry from her husband, whom she claimed had mismanaged her dowry, usurped her inheritance, beaten and imprisoned her. Johannes Calverie dismissed Silona's claim, saying the court had no jurisdiction over marriage, and he had a right to chastise his wife as he saw fit. Having recently survived a Catalan attack, Silona's witnesses, from her neighborhood and the city's hierarchy, intervened to limit the violence in their midst. Unlike other studies, which have found communities rallying behind abused women and supporting their desire to separate from their husbands, the witnesses in this case did not stand entirely behind Silona's story. The discrepancy between Silona's claims and the witness testimony in her case suggests anxieties about unattached women and maintaining a peaceful neighborhood.
This article reassesses German junior officers' performance in the First World War. Contrary to current historiography, it argues that the peacetime corps's social elitism was successful in ensuring a militarily effective, naturally paternalistic and conscientious leadership. The infamous wartime Offiziershaβ (`officer hate') did not derive from social segregation between ranks but was rather a form of the `front—rear' tension common to all belligerent armies, aggravated by material shortage. Despite training and organizational difficulties, the successful dissemination of the corps's aristocratic values to wartime-recruited officers maintained good inter-rank relations within combat units, enabling the army to endure four years of gruelling warfare.
Common religious, cultural, and ethnic bonds can hold communities together, while differences along these same lines often lead to calls for national independence, complicate nation building, and confound inter-communal peacemaking efforts. In particular, when religious differences exist between groups in conflict there is a marked tendency for such differences to become emphasized. This is not to say that religion is the root cause of all internecine and inter-communal conflict, which certainly is not the case. But conflicts become fundamentally altered as they rage on, and factors that were at the root cause of a conflict at its outset may no longer be the primary causes in later stages. That is, once conflicts have significantly evolved, thepriorcauses may no longer be theprimarycauses.
This article explores how peaceful protest and armed resistance reflected and shaped certain gender identities in the southern US civil rights movement and the Black Power movement, and reveals much about the significance of violence for 'marginalised masculinities' within the African American freedom struggle of the 1950s and 1960s. In the Deep South, civil rights organisers found that their non‐violent strategy's connotations of effeminate submissiveness hampered attempts to win over black men to the movement's cause. Conversely, those African Americans who decided to use armed force to protect the movement against racist attacks were proud of their ability to defend themselves and their communities. A comparison of armed resistance efforts in southern civil rights campaigns with those of post‐1965 Black Power groups such as the Black Panther Party shows both commonalities and differences with regard to the inter‐relationship between self‐defence and gender. In the southern movement, the affirmation of manhood remained a by‐product of the physical imperative to protect black lives against racism. Among Black Power militants and their black nationalist precursors, self‐defence, while initially intended to stop police brutality and other racist oppression, ultimately became mainly a symbol of militant black manhood. The Black Power movement's affirmative message countered stereotypes of black male powerlessness and instilled a positive black identity into many activists, but the gendered discourse it produced also tended to perpetuate black women's subordination.
AbstractThis article provides an in‐depth look at Colombia's national policy on national citizenship competencies designed to foster the peaceful resolution of conflict, promote the understanding of differences, and involve young people in mutual decision making and democratic engagement in schools. It also provides a brief overview of similar efforts in the United States in social and emotional learning and the development of civic engagement and compares and contrasts these efforts. Finally, it offers suggestions for school systems that wish to engage in similar processes to ensure the future of democracy and peaceful coexistence using education as the vehicle of change.
AbstractUsing exchange visits, Fairfax County Public Schools worked with educators in Israel and in Palestine to develop programs in conflict resolution and mediation. Fairfax County Public Schools has had mediation programs in the majority of their schools for more than ten years. Starting in the fall of 2003, Fairfax County educators sought to share their programs with educators in the Middle East and also to learn from them about other ways to provide conflict resolution education and peacemaking skills.
Throughout the past years, substantial discussions have dealt with the factors associated with ethnic conflicts such as institutional designs, group dynamics and the influence of external peacemakers. However, one area remains largely uncovered: this is how the domestic politics of a nation state shape minority issues from the same ethnicity in another country. In this paper we discuss the dynamics of Hungarian politics relative to the Hungarian minority in Romania, and identify factors that resulted in exporting domestic political contention to another country.
The Dutch Polder Model gained international reputation in the 1990s as an example of a successful and peaceful incomes management policy while coping with severe pressure. This article claims that the Polder Model has been overrated and so has its performance in terms of consensus (central agreements). The article discusses the emergence and working of this model in three parts. First, the behaviour of the relevant actors (government, trade unions and employers' organizations) during negotiations on incomes policy is examined. The government employed more often than not a corporatist strategy; however, the social partners did not comply and displayed competitive behaviour. Second, the outcome of the negotiations in terms of central agreements is analysed. The actual performance rate is low due to `tough' bargaining between social partners, and not all central agreements were reached through a corporatist government strategy. Finally, the dominance of social democracy in government after 1994 did not increase the number of central agreements. This research demonstrates that there is no typical or successful Dutch Polder Model. Rather, the behaviour of the actors and related performance are structured by macroeconomic circumstances and exogenous influences.
The article examines conflict patterns in Latin America since the second half of the twentieth century. It seems paradoxical that the region is one of the most peaceful in terms of interstate conflicts while contending with numerous domestic crises. The article first examines the peace studies literature and argues that neither the micro, macro, or more recent meso approach fits the Latin American experience well. Instead, a different approach proposes incorporating the effects of transnationalism, especially of transnational security concerns, into any consideration of peace in the region. Transnational threat perception diverts attention, suggests the need to handle a common enemy, increases the cost of fighting a conventional war, and involves issue-linkages. These factors along with the traditional absence of ethnic rivalries and the presence of international actors sustain the long peace in Latin America.
