The Rise of "Peaceocracy" in Africa
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"The Rise of "Peaceocracy" in Africa" published on by Oxford University Press.
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In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"The Rise of "Peaceocracy" in Africa" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: African affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society
ISSN: 1468-2621
Research on Kenya's 2013 elections has suggested that a "peace narrative" was deliberately promoted by an establishment elite to delegitimize protest and justify the use of excessive force. It has also tended to see the Kenyan case as exceptional and to assume that such a narrative was only possible because of the 2007/2008 post-election violence. We agree that peace campaigns are often particularly intense in the wake of violence and that they can be manipulated to generate a "peaceocracy", a system in which an emphasis on peace is used to prioritize stability and order to the detriment of democracy. However, by comparing Kenya to Ghana and Uganda, two countries that have had very different experiences of elections and election-related violence, we demonstrate that peace messaging is neither unique to countries that have experienced recent electoral conflict, nor a recent phenomenon. Instead, we highlight the pervasiveness of peace narratives across the sub-continent, which we show is due to a number of factors. These include but are not limited to the way that elections are used to assert and perform state autonomy and an associated ideal of elections as orderly processes; the capacity of multiple actors to instrumentalize the ideal of orderly elections; a popular fear of electoral violence even in countries where it is rare; a growing tendency to individualize responsibility for peace; and the availability of international funding. Taken together, these factors help to explain the rise of peace messaging. At the same time, we argue that the risk that this messaging will foster a "peaceocracy" varies markedly and that the likelihood of incumbent manipulation is greatest in countries with a recent history of civil conflict and where the quality of democracy is already low.
In: African affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society, Band 118, Heft 473, S. 603-627
ISSN: 0001-9909
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of Asian and African studies: JAAS, Band 56, Heft 8, S. 1967-1981
ISSN: 1745-2538
International election observation in Africa is in crisis. This crisis manifests in various ways, including lowering of standards from democracy promotion to 'peaceocracy'; strategic interest bias; progress bias; low-tech methodologies; dominance over citizen observer groups; and contradiction of verdicts of election observation missions with court judgments. The crisis characterizes the wound of international election observation. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic found a pre-existing unhealthy condition of international election observation, thereby pouring salt into the wound. It accentuated the existential crisis of international election observation. Observation has to be recalibrated during and after the pandemic. Existing challenges facing international election observation have to be redressed. International election observation has to adapt to the new condition marked by COVID-19. This adaptation should include development and implementation of guidelines on election observation during COVID-19. In the long run, sustainability of election observation rests in the institutional strengthening of citizen-based observer groups.
World Affairs Online
In: International affairs, Band 97, Heft 6, S. 1749-1765
ISSN: 1468-2346
Somaliland's endurance as Africa's longest de facto state has for decades preoccupied scholarship on state formation and democratization. The prevailing democratic success narrative has, however, downplayed the complex internal political dynamics and crises that have characterized Somaliland's independence since 1991. Relying on a number of robust resources, including 110 interviews and archival work conducted in Somaliland from 2015 until 2021, this article examines at close range Somaliland's political economy and provides a more cautious assessment of Somaliland's democratization trajectory. It argues that the political authority of cross-border oligarchic–corporate structures and the securitization of aid created an 'oligopolistic state' and 'peaceocracy' rather than a national, democratic government. This analysis highlights how de facto states struggle to balance political control and financial hardship generating creative and uneven governance structures. This study also raises important questions about how donors in the Gulf and in Asia provide new opportunities for recognition through Islamic finance and business that may affect de facto states' commitments to democratization. Finally, it contributes to theorizing about the ideologies of privatized governance that emerge in peripheral and developing economies and the political consequences of perennial non-recognition.
Somaliland's endurance as Africa's longest de facto state has for decades preoccupied scholarship on state formation and democratization. The prevailing democratic success narrative has, however, downplayed the complex internal political dynamics and crises that have characterized Somaliland's independence since 1991. Relying on a number of robust resources, including 110 interviews and archival work conducted in Somaliland from 2015 until 2021, this article examines at close range Somaliland's political economy and provides a more cautious assessment of Somaliland's democratization trajectory. It argues that the political authority of cross-border oligarchic-corporate structures and the securitization of aid created an 'oligopolistic state' and 'peaceocracy' rather than a national, democratic government. This analysis highlights how de facto states struggle to balance political control and financial hardship generating creative and uneven governance structures. This study also raises important questions about how donors in the Gulf and in Asia provide new opportunities for recognition through Islamic finance and business that may affect de facto states' commitments to democratization. Finally, it contributes to theorizing about the ideologies of privatized governance that emerge in peripheral and developing economies and the political consequences of perennial non-recognition.
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