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AbstractIt is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in time, but some philosophers, roughly those who have been traditionally called A-theorists, hold that reality is temporal in a far more profound sense than what is implied by the mere existence of such entities. This hypothesis ofdeep temporalitytypically involves two ideas: that reality istemporally compartmentalisedinto distinct present, past, and future 'realms', and that this compartmentalisation istemporally dynamicin the sense that the boundaries of those temporal realms change from one moment to the next. The truth of something like this hypothesis is commonly thought to require that at least some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality betensed. While this seems plausible, realism about fundamental tensed facts does not seem to entail deep temporality. Nor is it clear exactly what realism about tense amounts to, given that no informative answer has been given to the question of what it is for a fact to be tensed. In this paper, I introduce a novel approach,perspectivalism about temporal reality, that seeks to vindicate the hypothesis of deep temporality by ascribing to reality a certain kind of temporally perspectival structure, which also provides a straightforward answer to the question of what the tensedness of facts consists in as well as to the question of what it is for reality to be constituted by such facts.

When viewing a circular coin rotated in depth, it fills an elliptical region of the distal scene. For some, this appears to generate a two-fold experience, in which one sees the coin as simultaneously circular (in light of its 3D shape) and elliptical (in light of its 2D 'perspectival shape' or 'p-shape'). An energetic philosophical debate asks whether the latter p-shapes are genuinely presented in perceptual experience (as 'perspectivalists' argue) or if, instead, this appearance is somehow derived or inferred from experience (as 'anti-perspectivalists' argue). This debate, however, has largely turned on introspection. In a recent study, Morales et al. (2020) aim to provide the first empirical test of this question. They asked subjects to find an elliptical coin seen face-on from a search array that also included a circular coin seen either face-on or at an angle. They found that subjects reacted more slowly when the distracting circle was seen at an angle, such that its p-shape matched that of the target ellipse. From this, they concluded that the similar p-shape between the ellipse and circle constituted a phenomenal similarity between the two, and thus that perspectivalism is true. We show that these results can also be explained by pre-attentive guidance by unconscious representations (in what follows, just "unconscious pre-attentive guidance") and that this explanation is at least as plausible as one from phenomenal similarity. Thus, we conclude that the experiment does not support perspectivalism over anti-perspectivalism.

Cover -- Dedication -- Title Page -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. From Legalese to Ontologese -- I. Dworkin's Vision of Jurisprudential Disagreement -- II. The Site and Scope of Jurisprudential Disagreement -- III. Legal Facts and Legal Propositions -- 2. Relating Legal Propositions to Legal Facts -- I. Legal Truthmakers -- II. From a Theory of Truth to a Theory of Truthmaking -- III. Legal Propositionalism -- IV. Legal Propositionalism without Legal Truthmakers -- 3. Relating Legal Facts to Legal Propositions -- I. Two Hypotheses about Jurisprudential Perspectivalism -- A. Pragmatic Perspectivalism -- B. Semantic Perspectivalism -- C. Perspectival Theoretical Disagreement -- II. Non-perspectival Jurisprudential Statements -- III. Are Constitutive Disputes Merely Verbal? -- IV. Constitutive Disagreement and the Practical Point of View -- 4. Two Levels of Disagreement about the Metaphysics of Law -- I. Legal Constitution and its Discontents -- A. First-Order Disagreement over Legal Constitution -- B. Second-Order Disagreement over Legal Constitution -- II. Objectionable Jurisprudential Commitments -- III. Disagreement over Legal Grounding -- 5. Resisting Ordinary Reasons Imperialism -- I. Axes of Normative Relevance -- II. Normative Roles -- III. Rational Requirements, Asymmetry and Response-Constraint -- IV. Thick Evaluation, Global Judgement and Constitutive Impact -- 6. The Metric Approach to Legal Normativity -- I. The Limits of the Metric Approach -- II. Legal Facts as Nexus Reasons -- A. The Influential Role of Legal Facts -- B. The Evaluative Role of Legal Facts -- C. The Explanatory Role of Legal Facts -- 7. Two Levels of Disagreement about the Normativity of Law -- I. First-Order Disagreement about the Grounds of Nexus Facts -- II. Second-Order Disagreement about the Normativity of Legal Facts.

"Evil" and evil -- Evil versus goodness: Satan and other "evildoers" -- Evil as the good in disguise: theodicy and the crisis of meaning -- Evil as "evil": perspectivalism and the construction of evil -- Evil as the absence of Goodness: privation and the ubiquity of wickedness -- Evil as inaction: Augustine, Aristotle, and connecting the thesis of privation to virtue ethics

In this new edition of Foundations for Moral Relativism a distinguished moral philosopher tames a bugbear of current debate about cultural difference. J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, ""moral black holes". The six self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual worlds, lying in Russian and truth-telling in Quechua, the pleasure of solitude and the fear of absurdity. Accessibly written, this book presupposes no prior training in philosophy.

How can I honour my ageing loved one, caring for her with respect and dignity, thereby loving her to the end? This paper is an autoethnography of my experience providing elder care for my mother during the final six years of her life. At the conclusion of this personal narrative, I offer a reflection on the practice of embodied caregiving and perspectivalism, which prompted a transformation in me. The scope encompasses the stages of elder care, from taking on the task to the time of death of the loved one. Adult transformative learning theory informs the paper, as I progress through these steps in learning how to care for my mother. A subtext is that of ascribing great value to the elderly through the means of stepping into their world in embodied caregiving. This process of honouring my mother leads to the goal of loving her to the end.

This essay examines how François Debrix's Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping: The United Nations and the Mobilization of Ideology "revisions global politics" and complicates scholarship in international relations and human geography by situating his analysis at the level of simulation, conceptualizing United Nations peacekeeping efforts as trompe l'oeil games that "fool the eye." Specifically, it analyzes how Debrix's analysis pushes the borderlines of scholarship in human geography by going beyond the critique of Cartesian perspectivalism with its attendant masculine mind/body dualism that is often levied at mainstream geographical discourses by critical and feminist geographers. After doing this, this essay outlines how Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping casts a critical light on the foreign policy analyses disseminated by scholars such as Samantha Power and Thomas Weiss, who ascribe specific "moralizing intentions" to international institutions like the UN. This essay ultimately argues that Debrix's analysis of the "New Word Order" and disciplinary neoliberalism is increasingly relevant in the contemporary setting, where YouTube and TikTok videos and images contribute to the proliferation of individualizing empty frames.

Richard Rorty makes the case that Friedrich Nietzsche shared a common pragmatism with William James in order to incorporate certain Nietzschean themes into neo-pragmatism and to give his philosophy stronger pragmatic credentials. In making this connection, he establishes a version of pragmatism that rejects both epistemology and metaphysics, reduces the pragmatic theory of truth to "truth is what works," places the Darwinian account of man at the center of the human narrative, and makes Nietzschean "self-creation" the chief end of a postmodern, post-religious liberal society. But if one reads James more faithfully (a task that Rorty rejects), it is clear that James does not succumb to the nihilism, perspectivalism, and atheism characteristic of Rorty's Nietzschean pragmatism. A more comprehensive reading of James's philosophy brings together James's pragmatism, his pluralism, and his radical empiricism. And this more complete interpretation of James's pragmatism offers a pluralistic and hopeful approach to politics that does not suffer from Nietzsche's and Rorty's nihilistic, relativistic, and antipolitical tendencies.