Pluralism is the term which it has many difference meaning. Atthe same time, someone can accept and refuse pluralism accordingto that meaning. Secular humanism argues that there is no anAbsolute Truth, because the truth is depend on human. The truth issubjective and relative, so unity just can be built by secularism.Global theology offers a new theology that is global theology tounite the difference religions. Syncretism selected and mixedreligions become a new religion. Perennial Philosophy tries to findmeeting is understood as a framework of interaction in whichgroups show point of religions in the esoteric area. In the socialsciences, pluralism sufficient respect and tolerance of each other,that they fruitfully coexist and interact without conflict or assimilation.Pluralism as theory is a social construction. Indonesian can constructpluralism base on the values of Pancasila that are Goddess,humanity, unity, democracy and justice.
A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly recall the "practical" impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the entire community (theory of the "hidden hand"). Certainly the scientific community is one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) "consensualists" maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other, (b) "pluralists" accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be "the limit of inquiry," i.e. either what science will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a "final" answer to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various unfortunate consequences. In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the course of our daily life. In his "communicative theory of consensus," furthermore, he claims that human communication rests on an implicit commitment to a sort of "ideal speech situation" which is the normative foundation of agreement in linguistic matters. Consequently, the quest for consensus is a constitutive feature of our nature of (rational) human beings: rationality and consensus are tied together. A very strong consequence derives from Habermas' premises: were we to abandon the search for consensus we would lose rationality, too, and this makes us understand that he views the pursuit of consensus as a regulative principle (rather than as a merely practical objective). Rescher opposes both Peirce's eschatological view and Habermas' regulative and idealized one.
International audience ; Ethnos groups, religions, languages: the society of Reunion is often presented like a model of cultural diversity. With this one could correspond a legal diversity, i.e. a plurality of rules : with each one its right. The safeguarding of the identity of the people could depend on this legal pluralism. Between negation and assertion of the characteristics of each one, the study will show that laws can have sufficiently flexibility to adapt to plurality. ; Ethnies, religions, langues : la société de l'île de la Réunion est souvent présentée comme un modèle de diversité culturelle. A celle-ci pourrait correspondre une diversité juridique, c'est-à-dire une pluralité de règles : à chacun son droit. La préservation de l'identité des personnes pourrait dépendre de ce pluralisme juridique. Entre négation et affirmation des particularités de chacun, l'étude montrera que le droit peut avoir suffisamment de flexibilité pour s'adapter à la pluralité.
International audience ; Ethnos groups, religions, languages: the society of Reunion is often presented like a model of cultural diversity. With this one could correspond a legal diversity, i.e. a plurality of rules : with each one its right. The safeguarding of the identity of the people could depend on this legal pluralism. Between negation and assertion of the characteristics of each one, the study will show that laws can have sufficiently flexibility to adapt to plurality. ; Ethnies, religions, langues : la société de l'île de la Réunion est souvent présentée comme un modèle de diversité culturelle. A celle-ci pourrait correspondre une diversité juridique, c'est-à-dire une pluralité de règles : à chacun son droit. La préservation de l'identité des personnes pourrait dépendre de ce pluralisme juridique. Entre négation et affirmation des particularités de chacun, l'étude montrera que le droit peut avoir suffisamment de flexibilité pour s'adapter à la pluralité.
t the end of the Cold War, the renowned political scientist, Samuel Huntington, argued that future conflicts were more likely to stem from cultural frictions– ideologies, social norms, and political systems– rather than political or economic frictions. Huntington focused his concern on the future of geopolitics in a rapidly shrinking world. But his argument applies as forcefully (if not more) to the interaction of technocultures.
Hanoch Dagan is among "those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can," in the phrase of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. His pluralism is a perfectionism for polytheists: There are many human goods, and each has its domain, including some portion of the law of property. Depending on where we stand on the property landscape at any time, we may be community-minded sharers, devoted romantics in marriage, or coolly rational market actors, and the local property law will smooth each of these paths for us. Property law is built on the design of the multifarious human heart, or, if you prefer, the many purposes we pursue in our projects and relationships. Each of these implies a way of regarding others – as arm's length collaborators, joint venturers, or other halves whose purposes we have joined to ours; property's default rules anticipate and confirm these various attitudes.
Much of contemporary Anglo-American Liberal political theory is still living under the shadow of Max Weber. In particular, it seems to accept the idea of disenchantment and has more recently discovered the problem value pluralism. Max Weber's idea of the political still serves as an antidote to the prevalence in much of this kind of theory of the priority of the moral over the political. Unfortunately, Weber's own theory is incomplete and needs to be supplemented.
Westfaalse doctrine statensoevereiniteit ook toepasbaar op Europese Unie Het aloude leerstuk van staatssoevereiniteit heeft nog steeds verklarende werking met betrekking tot de Europese Unie. Dat komt doordat soevereiniteit in de kern een modern concept is – het ziet toe op de vraag waar overheidsgezag vandaan komt en hoe dit wordt gelegitimeerd. Dat concludeert Jan Willem van Rossem op basis van zijn promotieonderzoek. ; Has Europe entered into a new constitutional era? An increasing number of legal commentators answers this question in the affirmative. In the manner in which the European Union develops, they see the end of the Westphalian doctrine – the paradigm that takes the sovereignty of states as starting point and that approaches legal relationships hierarchically. Van Rossem's study questions this point of view. On the basis of an anatomy of the concept of sovereignty, it critically engages with a popular theoretical alternative for Westphalia: the theory of constitutional pluralism. According to the theory of constitutional pluralism, hierarchy has been replaced by heterarchy in the European Union. Democracy and rule of law would no longer originate in one constitutional source, but instead come together in a multilayered legal order, in which legal norms do not need an unequivocal explanation. But is it possible to construe such a conceptual framework in a secular, modern world? Can freedom and democracy, the European core values, live without legal unity and an explanation for the question why norms are valid? This study in the final analysis answers these questions negatively. In a constitutional sense, Europe has not passed the year 1648. Yet a conclusion in this book is also that the European Union can approached from a Westphalian perspective, without being confronted with a static world view in which many sovereignty accounts get trapped. A returning point in this book is that constitutive power and constituted power, the two building blocks of sovereignty, are mutually constitutive. As a result of this paradox, it becomes possible to envisage competing sovereignty claims, which exclude each other, yet nonetheless are somehow in the world together. According to this study, this image is the most convincing explanation for the current, crisis-riddled constitutional reality in Europe.
Some challenges of legal globalization closely resemble those formulated earlier for legal pluralism: the irreducible plurality of legal orders, the coexistence of domestic state law with other legal orders, the absence of a hierarchically superior position transcending the differences. This review discusses how legal pluralism engages with legal globalization and how legal globalization utilizes legal pluralism. It demonstrates how several international legal disciplines---comparative law, conflict of laws, public international law, and European Union law---have slowly begun to adopt some ideas of legal pluralism. It shows how traditional themes and questions of legal pluralism---the definition of law, the role of the state, of community, and of space---are altered under conditions of globalization. It addresses interrelations between different legal orders and various ways, both theoretical and practical, to deal with them. And it provides an outlook on the future of global legal pluralism as theory and practice of global law.
Pluralisme saat ini tidak hanya diartikan untuk dipakai dalam konteks agama, budaya dan sosial masyrakat, tetapi juga melebar pada media. Prinsip pluralisme mediamerupakan otonomi penyiar layanan secara independen dalam memberikan tontonan kepada masyarakat. Tulisan ini selanjutnya ingin mendeskripsikan peranan pluralisme yang dilakukan media dengan konten yang disampaikan media tersebut. Dapat dilihat bahwasanya perkembangan program acara pada stasiun televisi yang berbeda tak selamanya menyampaikan informasi yang berbeda juga. Ternyata konsentrasi pluralisme media hanya terletak pada perkembangan dan pertumbuhan perusahaan media yang demokratis, sehingga informasi yang diberikan oleh media-media yang ada cenderung seragam.Isi media massa tidak dapat terlepas dari siapa penguasa sumber-sumber produksi media massa. Ini dapat dilihat antara lain dari kepemilikian media massa, kepemilikan rumah produksi penghasil acara-acara televisi yang ada. Dapat dikatakan bahwa penguasa sumber- sumber media televisi adalah pengusaha. Ideologi dari aktivitas pengusaha adalah menjual sesuatu untuk mendapatkan profit/keuntungan. Tanpa keuntungan perusahaan akan ditutup. Jadi televisi adalah bisnis, pemilik televisi adalah pengusaha media. Kata Kunci: pluralisme dan media televisi
This contribution to the Constance Baker Motley Symposium examines the future of civil rights reform at a time in which longstanding limitations of the antidiscrimination law framework, as well as newer pressures such as the rise of economic populism, are placing stress on the traditional antidiscrimination project. This Essay explores the openings that nevertheless remain in public law for confronting persistent forms of exclusion and makes the case for greater pluralism in equality law frameworks. In particular, this Essay examines innovations that widen the range of regulatory levers for promoting inclusion, such as competitive grants, tax incentives, contests for labor agreements and licenses, requirements attached to land-use development, and scoring systems for public contracts that reward entities for pursuing equity goals. Relying on these types of regulatory incentives and levers expands the mechanisms typically employed to advance integration and equity and builds on tools available not just at the federal level but also at the state and local level. Even in the present political environment, this Essay argues there is utility in advancing new regulatory regimes that move beyond the formalist, liberalist assumptions of traditional civil rights regimes and that seek to link questions of identity inclusion to economic inequality and the distribution of public goods.
This chapter introduces the terms of the question: what is the 'religion' and the 'pluralism' in 'religious pluralism'? Though their ideas were developed in a workshop at the European University Institute in 2015, contributors here and elsewhere in the volume speak from their own disciplinary traditions, taking different approaches to terminology as a result. Therefore, this chapter works across disciplines, providing an overview of some of the central ways in which different disciplines have approached and understood 'religious pluralism'. This chapter makes a particular distinction between what Rouméas terms theological, sociological, philosophical pluralisms alongside the idea of religious pluralism as a political ideal. This chapter draws attention to how different methodological and ideological approaches give rise to distinctive understandings of 'religious pluralism', as well as to how disciplinary-specific assumptions shape how the concept is interpreted.
This chapter introduces the terms of the question: what is the 'religion' and the 'pluralism' in 'religious pluralism'? Though their ideas were developed in a workshop at the European University Institute in 2015, contributors here and elsewhere in the volume speak from their own disciplinary traditions, taking different approaches to terminology as a result. Therefore, this chapter works across disciplines, providing an overview of some of the central ways in which different disciplines have approached and understood 'religious pluralism'. This chapter makes a particular distinction between what Rouméas terms theological, sociological, philosophical pluralisms alongside the idea of religious pluralism as a political ideal. This chapter draws attention to how different methodological and ideological approaches give rise to distinctive understandings of 'religious pluralism', as well as to how disciplinary-specific assumptions shape how the concept is interpreted.
Ahlu al-Kitab has become one of the unique concepts in Islam. Islam acknow-ledges the holy books and the ummah prior to Islam. This acknowledgement does not means that all religions are the similar to all aspects. Since each religion has its distinct creeds, rituals and code of conducts, all religions are to respect and tolerate each other. Through respect and tolerance, all religions can cooperate and solve problems of religious, social, political and cultural issues emerging in their ummah. This is what calls religious pluralism concept that aims to built a harmonious and peaceful community, the community with pluralistic beliefs, but united to handle the problems of its people.
A central question in the debate surrounding contemporary proposals for a new international order is whether accepting the fact of global pluralism should lead us to lower our ambitions for global justice. Many participants in that debate answer such a question positively. Even authors such as Rawls and Habermas both prominent defenders of ambitious conceptions of domestic justice seem to reach the same pessimistic conclusion with their respective proposals for a new international order. In this paper, I question the plausibility of such a conclusion on the basis of an analysis of the cosmopolitan project that Habermas articulates in recent publications. I argue that his presentation of the project oscillates between two models. The first is an ambitious model for a future international order geared towards fulfilling the human rights goals of the UN Charter. The second is a minimalist model, in which the international community's obligation to protect human rights is limited to the negative duty of preventing wars of aggression and massive human rights violations stemming from armed conflicts such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. According to this model, any more ambitious goals should be left to a global domestic politics, which would have to come about through negotiated compromises among domesticated major powers at the transnational level. I defend the ambitious model by arguing that there is no plausible basis for drawing a normatively significant distinction between massive human rights violations stemming from armed conflicts and those stemming from regulations of the global economic order. If this is correct, acceptance of the fact of global pluralism does not offer a plausible justification to exclude economic justice from the principles of transnational justice recognized by the international community ; Una cuestión central en el debate en torno a propuestas contemporáneas para un nuevo orden internacional es la de si aceptar el hecho del pluralismo global ha de llevarnos a rebajar nuestras expectativas de justicia global. Muchos de los participantes en este debate responden de modo afirmativo a esta pregunta. Incluso autores como Rawls y Habermas ambos prominentes defensores de concepciones ambiciosas de justicia doméstica parecen llegar a dicha conclusión pesimista en sus respectivas propuestas para un nuevo orden internacional. En este artículo, cuestiono la plausibilidad de tal conclusión a partir de un análisis del proyecto cosmopolita que Habermas ha articulado en publicaciones recientes. Argumento que su presentación del proyecto oscila entre dos modelos. El primero es un modelo ambicioso para un futuro orden internacional dirigido a cumplir los objetivos de derechos humanos contenidos en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. El segundo es un modelo minimalista donde el deber de proteger los derechos humanos por parte de la comunidad internacional está limitado a la obligación negativa de prevenir guerras de agresión y violaciones masivas de los derechos humanos provenientes de conflictos armados como limpiezas étnicas o genocidio. Según este modelo, cualquier objetivo de justicia más ambicioso quedaría relegado a una política doméstica global acordada mediante la negociación de compromisos entre unas grandes potencias domesticadas. En contra de esta interpretación minimalista y a favor de la interpretación ambiciosa del modelo, argumento que no hay ninguna base normativa plausible para trazar una distinción significativa entre violaciones masivas de los derechos humanos debidas a conflictos armados y violaciones debidas a las regulaciones internacionales del orden económico global. Si esto es cierto, aceptar el hecho del pluralismo global no ofrece una justificación plausible para excluir la justicia económica de los principios de justicia transnacional reconocidos por la comunidad internacional.
