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'Polarization' has become a catchword in Dutch politics, denoting the emphasis on conflicting rather than mutual interests. It is assumed that the efforts made to 'polarize' the voter population are aimed at reducing the large reservoir of middle-of-the-roaders. In its weekly opinion survey, the Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion (NIPO) consistently finds about 30% of the Rs choosing the center of a left/right semantic differential scale with almost an equal number of Rs going to right & left positions. The almost Gaussian overall distribution is shown to be highly correlated with party choice & voting behavior. The frequency distributions along the left/right Osgood scale are highly skewed inside each separate political preference group. The results of a new additional question are reported. The question reads: "If you were not allowed or could not choose this position would you then go for the one adjoining to the right or to the left?" A very large proportion of Rs move over to the left or right even beyond the extremes of the seven-point scale, effectively extending it to a nine-point scale. The popular center position is then reduced to about 12%. Even more interesting are larger variations over time that are shown for an interesting period extending from late Sept to the end of Nov 1977, during which efforts to form a new socialist-dominated government failed. The extended scale is shown to be a more sensitive instrument than the seven-point semantic differential alone. 6 Tables. Modified HA.

Existing models for the formation of governmental coalitions do not score high in predictability for Belgium. A more complex model, covering 3 fields, 7 vectors, & 1 strong actor among a limited number of decisionmakers, fits much better. A prerequisite for a coalition is a majority within the elitist parties in Parliament. Favoring coalition formation are: the decision-making capabilities of the cabinet; elite consensus on the basic values prominent in Belgian society; similarities of program among the political parties; & their capacity to manipulate issues. Hampering coalition formation are: the development of partisan options; the polarization of issues; & internal dissensions within the political parties. This model stresses the combined action of strong structures & actors, which is paramount in Belgian society. 2 Figures. Modified HA

The question is explored whether municipal elections can be compared to nat'l parliamentary elections, & shifts in party-choice in Belgium in the municipal elections of 1964 & the parliamentary elections of 1965 are compared. The methodology of this study is described. Shifts of the electoral bodies in the Flemish, the Walloon & the Brussels cantons (counties) were controlled individually. These shifts were then specified according to the canton's degree of Ur'ization. It appeared that some notable party-shifts had been realized during the short period between the municipal elections of 1964 & the legislative elections of 1965. In general, a certain polarization took place, due to a centrifugal vote shift to the left. The direction of vote shifts in the municipal elections of 1964 was affirmed at the legislative elections of 1965, & was accentuated from some parties, eg, the CVP & the PVV. The size & pattern of these shifts was not the same everywhere; it differed according to linguistic region & degree of Ur'ization. The level of oscillations grew higher as the degree of Ur'ization decreased. The largest shifts took place in the Walloon cantons. The lowest oscillations were noted in the Flemish & Brussels cantons; ie, the voting behavior of the big agglomerations during the municipal elections of 1964 were the closest to the nat'l electoral pattern. It is noted that the limitations of the study do not allow generalization of conclusions. The short period between the 2 elections compared was itself an exceptional situation which may have influenced the results. 7 Tables. Modified HA.

Recent trends in election campaigns in Belgium & the Netherlands are compared from both political & historical perspective; it is stressed that primary reference is made to Flanders, & only occasionally to Wallonia, when the political landscape of Belgium is discussed. Developments since the 1960s in both countries are examined, identifying similarities & differences across the following areas: (1) the consociational democracy of Belgium & the Netherlands & its erosion with the formation of new political parties, growing polarization, & negative campaigning, (2) the election system & rules; the structure of parliamentary democracy in the two countries & its reflection in election campaigns; the voter's choices & influence on the composition of both houses of the parliament & the office of prime minister, (3) the content & form of election campaigns; campaign financing, presence in the traditional & new media; free TV time, (4) what is the campaign about & for whom is the vote cast? the principal role played by the party's first candidate on the list, (5) the election rules of the prime minister & new government formation; the role of party leadership. It is concluded that Belgium & the Netherlands still share some characteristics of consensus democracies, however, developments since the 1960s, in particular the growing division between the Flemish & French-speaking regions of Belgium, led to significant institutional changes in the latter country's election campaigns & its citizen's declining interest in this political process on both federal & regional levels. Election campaigns in the Netherlands seem to be more concrete & relevant to the voter. However, both countries suffer from voters' losing direct control over who is elected & over the composition of their future government. Z. Dubiel