Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Half-Title Page -- Dedication -- Title Page -- Epigraph -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- Part I -- Chapter One -- Chapter Two -- Chapter Three -- Chapter Four -- Chapter Five -- Part II -- Chapter Six -- Chapter Seven -- Chapter Eight -- Chapter Nine -- Part III -- Chapter Ten -- Chapter Eleven -- Chapter Twelve -- Chapter Thirteen -- Chapter Fourteen -- Chapter Fifteen -- Chapter Sixteen -- Chapter Seventeen -- Chapter Eighteen -- Chapter Nineteen -- Chapter Twenty -- Part IV -- Chapter Twenty-One -- Chapter Twenty-Two -- Chapter Twenty-Three -- Chapter Twenty-Four -- Chapter Twenty-Five -- Chapter Twenty-Six -- Conclusion: Duty -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- Index -- A Note on the Authors -- Copyright -- By the Same Authors.

1. Introduction -- 2. The urban environment : mirror and mediator of radicalisation? -- 3. Polarisation as a socio-material phenomenon : a bibliographical review -- 4. The Belfast Case -- 5. The Beirut Case -- 6. The Berlin Case -- 7. The Amsterdam Case -- 8. Implications for planning practice and policy -- 9. Interviews.

Anthropogenic climate change presents an immediate threat, necessitating a rapid shift in climate change relevant behaviors and public policies. A robust literature has identified a number of individual-level determinants of climate change attitudes and behaviors. In particular, political orientations and self-transcendent values are amongst the most consistent and substantive predictors. But, political orientations and individual values do not operate in isolation of each other, and rather are deeply related constructs. Accordingly, this analysis focuses on identifying the direct and interactive effects of political orientations and human values on climate change attitudes and behaviors. Adopting cross-national data from 16 Western European states (2016 ESS), we find that when in alignment, the effect of human values on climate change concern and policy support is amplified by political orientations. The moderating effect of political orientations is most substantive for self-transcendence (positive) and conservation (negative) values. ; ISSN:0165-0009 ; ISSN:1573-1480

Can political leaders change constituents' beliefs? If so, is it rhetoric, identity, or the interaction of the two that matters? We construct a large-scale experiment where participants are exposed to anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant speeches from both Presidents Obama and Trump. We benchmark these treatments to versions recorded by an actor to control for speech messages. Our findings show that both leader messages and sources matter. Holding messages fixed, leaders persuade when participants hear unanticipated messages from sources perceived as reliable, consistent with a Bayesian framework. This evidence supports the hypothesis that individuals will "follow their leader" to new policy positions.

The unprecedented consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic have raised concerns about intensified social unrest, but evidence for such a link and the underlying channels is still lacking. We use a unique combination of nationally representative survey data, event data on social unrest, and data on Covid-19 fatalities and unemployment at a weekly resolution to investigate the forces behind social unrest in the context of the strains on public health and the economy due to the pandemic in the USA. The results show that pandemic-related unemployment and Covid-19 fatalities intensified negative emotional stress and led to a deterioration of economic confidence among individuals. The prevalence of negative emotional stress, particularly in economically strained and politically polarized environments, was, in turn, associated with intensified social unrest as measured by political protests. No such link is found for economic perceptions.

Donald Trump came roaring onto the political stage when he announced his presidential candidacy in 2015. In the years that followed, he amassed a loyal following of motivated voters. During the Trump era, his followers have developed a reputation for loud bigotry, shameless xenophobia, and unmasked white supremacy. The movement has to come to strongly resemble the nativist populism that, until Trump, was generally confined to Europe. In order to better understand the motivation of Trump voters and their intense dedication to the 45th president, I surveyed 82 voters from the Midwest about their feelings towards politicians, policies, and political opponents. The Midwestern Swing District Voter Survey offers both qualitative and quantitative responses and suggests that Trumpism has redefined identity politics for Trump and Biden voters alike. I find that the great consequence of Donald Trump is not the mass movement of white working class Americans to the Republican party, it is the accelerated evolution of the identity of cultural whiteness that has come to bind together the Republican base.