Political economy describes how human societies are organized by exchange. The critical issue for political economists is the interaction between self-directed decision making and the incentives that turn decisions into approved outcomes. In this interaction, political economists see a key role for leadership, a role that depends upon our common concern for others (Robbins, 1981). There are three roles, then, for leadership in the political economist's model: self-directed decision making, incentive making, and establishing the criteria for approved outcomes.
Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath's book-in-progress, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, offers a radical alternative to the constitutional histories that emerged in the 1990s to defend the New Deal synthesis. Fishkin and Forbath's new constitutional history promises to recast the New Deal as a contingent and incomplete resolution of a centuries-long struggle to achieve the political-economic conditions that the Constitution requires – "requires" in the double sense of "demands" and "depends upon." This struggle is still ongoing and even accelerating, Fishkin and Forbath report, yet it has become increasingly "one-sided." First, the post-WWII economic boom dissipated, taking with it much of the middle class that the New Deal and Great Society legal orders had hoped to create. Then, conservative lawyers and politicians stepped up their attacks on the New Deal and Great Society's remaining achievements, trumpeting a constitutional political economy in which private property free of overweening public management is the pillar of constitutional democracy. Confronted by these dire conditions, legal liberals have forgotten how to fight back, rendered mute by the New Deal synthesis itself, which ironically and erroneously implied that political economy was no longer a matter of constitutional concern. Hoping to even the odds, Fishkin and Forbath offer liberals a grammar of egalitarian constitutional political economy – "the constitution of opportunity" – that was once spoken fluently and effectively by those Americans who argued that the Constitution prohibited oligarchic concentrations of wealth and mandated the political and judicial construction of a broad, inclusive middle class. By placing the discourse of political economy back at the center of constitutional debate, Fishkin and Forbath have – by any fair measure – done more than enough. Yet scholarly innovators tend to find the ranks of their critics swelled by those who have benefited most from their labor. This Essay is no exception to the oedipal rule. It argues that Fishkin and Forbath could go further still in integrating political economy and constitutional history. At times, their detailed analysis of the discourse of "constitutional political economy" comes at the expense of a more fully materialist account of the political-economic conditions and effects of that discourse. Such a discursive emphasis, in turn, risks an overly optimistic assessment of the past virtues and present utility of "the constitution of opportunity," the egalitarian dialect of constitutional political economy that Fishkin and Forbath commend to legal liberals today
Since the early 1990s, constitutional history has experienced a renaissance. This revival had many causes, but three stand out: the Rehnquist Court's attack on formerly sacrosanct features of the "New Deal agenda"; Reagan-Era reassessments of American political development by political scientists, historians, and historical sociologists; and the frustration of constitutional scholars with the inability of legal process theory or political philosophy to produce "authoritative constitutional principles." Spurred by legal crisis and this mix of disciplinary innovation and stagnation, law professors began to tell new stories about our constitutional heritage. They focused on the sources and significance of the New Deal's "constitutional revolution," while also re-examining the constitutionalism of the Founding and Reconstruction in light of New Deal transformations. Given the centrality of the New Deal to this project, constitutional historians seemed to be heading toward a fundamental reconsideration of the relationship between constitutional law and political economy. That is, after all, what New Deal constitutional conflict was all about: the extent to which the Constitution allowed a national political movement to alter the country's economic life in fundamental and lasting ways. And yet, the new generation of constitutional historians generally avoided political economy as such. To be sure, their histories carefully reconstructed early twentieth-century debates about the constitutional authority of the state and federal governments to displace common law economic regulation. But the focus remained on the purely legal logics and purely political events that led the federal judiciary to get out of the business of adjudicating the constitutional merits of various schemes of economic regulation. The economic reasons that political and judicial actors might have had for transforming constitutional democracy received little attention. This exclusion of economic reason from constitutional analysis is symptomatic of what Professors Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath call the "Great Forgetting." From the Founding through the New Deal, Fishkin and Forbath demonstrate, the discourse of "constitutional political economy" was a fundamental feature of American constitutionalism. It was only in the wake of the epochal New Deal synthesis – judicial deference to political regulation of the economy and judicial guardianship of civil liberty and equality – that constitutional political economy became something of a dead language. Prior to that time, constitutional actors across the ideological spectrum spoke in terms of constitutional political economy, believing that "economics and politics [we]re inextricably linked, and [that] a republican constitution require[d] a republican political economy to sustain it, and vice versa." By recovering this language, Fishkin and Forbath's book-in-progress, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, offers a radical alternative to the constitutional histories that emerged in the 1990s to defend the New Deal synthesis. Fishkin and Forbath's new constitutional history promises to recast the New Deal as a contingent and incomplete resolution of a centuries-long struggle to achieve the political-economic conditions that the Constitution requires – "requires" in the double sense of "demands" and "depends upon." This struggle is still ongoing and even accelerating, Fishkin and Forbath report, yet it has become increasingly "one-sided." First, the post-WWII economic boom dissipated, taking with it much of the middle class that the New Deal and Great Society legal orders had hoped to create. Then, conservative lawyers and politicians stepped up their attacks on the New Deal and Great Society's remaining achievements, trumpeting a constitutional political economy in which private property free of overweening public management is the pillar of constitutional democracy. Confronted by these dire conditions, legal liberals have forgotten how to fight back, rendered mute by the New Deal synthesis itself, which ironically and erroneously implied that political economy was no longer a matter of constitutional concern. Hoping to even the odds, Fishkin and Forbath offer liberals a grammar of egalitarian constitutional political economy – "the constitution of opportunity" – that was once spoken fluently and effectively by those Americans who argued that the Constitution prohibited oligarchic concentrations of wealth and mandated the political and judicial construction of a broad, inclusive middle class.
European integration is a fundamentally open-ended and contested process. Within the 'mosaic of European integration theories', critical political economy perspectives highlight the imbalances and structural power asymmetries of the European project, and how they have become manifest in the multiple crises in Europe. How to account for both the origins and consequences of this crisis has become a key question for scholars and students of European integration. We argue that critical political economy (CPE) has an important and unique contribution to make here. Unlike other approaches, CPE seeks to uncover the deep connections between the (internal) dynamics of the European integration process and the dynamics of global capitalism, arguing that European integration, or disintegration for that matter, takes place in a global, structural context that shapes and conditions both form and content of the integration process. In this paper, we provide an overview of the key concepts, methodology and arguments of a critical political economy perspective on European integration. Following a discussion of the core conceptual framework, the paper then proceeds with an integrated analysis of EMU as a political project, with a particular focus on continuity and changes within the political economy of neoliberalism. The Euro crisis here serves as a contemporary reference point to illustrate the strengths and contributions of critical political economy perspectives to the overall mosaic of European integration theories.
Cover -- Title -- Table of Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface -- 1 How Dreadful Life Used to Be -- 2 Making and Taking -- 3 Taste, Technology, and Markets -- 4 Putting Demand and Supply Curves to Work -- 5 Taste -- 6 Technology -- 7 Associations -- 8 The Common Good -- 9 Voting -- 10 Administration -- 11 Law -- The Four Pillars -- Notes -- Author Index.
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