Political Institutions
In: European Politics: An Introduction, S. 94-114
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In: European Politics: An Introduction, S. 94-114
In: Failed States and Institutional Decay : Understanding Instability and Poverty in the Developing World
In: Soviet Politics and Political Science, S. 52-70
In: Routledge Revivals Series
First published in 1958, Russian Political Institutions is intended primarily to meet the need of university students for a good account of the political institutions of the Soviet Union in terms similar to those used in their study of other countries.
In: Principles of European Constitutional Law
In: Indigenous African Institutions, 2nd Edition, S. 105-142
In: American political science review, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 213-223
ISSN: 1537-5943
Liberia will long be a source of permanent interest to the government and people of the United States, not only because it was founded and fostered by American citizens, but because there is going on there in the interest of the African races one of the unique struggles in modern state-building, in an endeavor to perpetuate in West Africa a government fashioned after the American democracy in which liberty shall be limited and regulated by law.Under the most unfavorable circumstances the Liberian people have entered upon a grave and stupendous undertaking. The high political ideas and principles which they represent, the ardor and fidelity with which they have maintained them for nearly three quarters of a century against European opposition and in the midst and in the presence of the overwhelming numbers and dissimilar civilization of their African kinsmen, entitle them to the sympathetic consideration and good will of all liberty-loving nations.
A clear, accessible introduction to the institutional regimes of 15 countries in western Europe, by an outstanding team of European political scientists.
In: Why Politics Matters, S. 165-186
In: International Governance of War-Torn Territories, S. 109-134
In: A New Handbook of Political Science, S. 133-166
In: International affairs, Band 34, Heft 3, S. 382-382
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: Social studies: a periodical for teachers and administrators, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 57-58
ISSN: 2152-405X
In: Quarterly Journal of Economics , 119 (2) pp. 565-611. (2004)
A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice, we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both "optimal" constitutional design and "positive" aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.
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