Suchergebnisse

MacIntyre reviews 'Australian Political Institutions, 5th edn' by Gwyneth Singleton, Don Aitkin, Brian Jinks and John Warhurst.

First published in 1958, Russian Political Institutions is intended primarily to meet the need of university students for a good account of the political institutions of the Soviet Union in terms similar to those used in their study of other countries.

Great Britain and Ireland : variations of party government / Ian Budge -- Germany : the grand coalition state / Manfred G. Schmidt -- France : the institutionalization of leadership / Yves Mény -- Italy : a democratic regime in transition / Gianfranco Pasquino -- Spain and Portugal : rule by party leadership / Josep M. Colomer -- The Low Countries : confrontation and co-operation in segmented societies / Hans Keman -- The Nordic countries : contention, compromise and corporatism / Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson -- The European Union : federalism in the making / Josep M. Colomer

Part 1 is listed in the 1932 annual.

Liberia will long be a source of permanent interest to the government and people of the United States, not only because it was founded and fostered by American citizens, but because there is going on there in the interest of the African races one of the unique struggles in modern state-building, in an endeavor to perpetuate in West Africa a government fashioned after the American democracy in which liberty shall be limited and regulated by law.Under the most unfavorable circumstances the Liberian people have entered upon a grave and stupendous undertaking. The high political ideas and principles which they represent, the ardor and fidelity with which they have maintained them for nearly three quarters of a century against European opposition and in the midst and in the presence of the overwhelming numbers and dissimilar civilization of their African kinsmen, entitle them to the sympathetic consideration and good will of all liberty-loving nations.

A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice, we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both "optimal" constitutional design and "positive" aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.