The title of the article refers to P. Manent's essay, describing "the return of political philosophy". Using the distinction between science and art, suggested by thinkers such as J.S. Mill, an analysis was made of the possible responses of legal theory to the so-called "political turn" in social sciences and humanities. Attempts were made to show that transplanting such terms as "politics", "the political", "polity" (in the text they function under more theoretically neutral term: "politicalness") into the field of legal discourse leads to the rejection of the so far dominant (referring to the ideal of Ch. Montesquieu) image of the activity of lawyers as "artisans" practicing the art of law and to replacing it with the image of a lawyer-artists or lawyer-scientist. ; Tytuł artykułu nawiązuje do eseju P. Manenta, opisującego "powrót filozofii politycznej". Korzystając z rozróżnienia między nauką a sztuką, zaproponowanego przez J.S. Milla, dokonano analizy możliwych reakcji prawników i teorii prawa na wyraźny "zwrot polityczny" w naukach społecznych i humanistycznych. Starano się wykazać, że przeszczepienie takich terminów jak "polityka" i "polityczność" na grunt nauk prawnych prowadzi do odrzucenia dominującego dotąd (nawiązującego do ideału K. Monteskiusza) wyobrażenia działalności prawników jako "rzemieślników" uprawiających sztukę prawniczą oraz do zastąpienia go wyobrażeniem prawnika-artysty lub prawnika-naukowca.
The separation of theory and practice of the European integration created a very dangerous situation for the European Union. The article presents this crisis from the points of view of philosophy, political science and journalism. The"European poison of thought" expressed by a lack of trust of citizens towards the EU institutions perceived as inadequate in addressing the most fundamental problems of the EU citizens, as well as scepticism towards the enlargement of the Union, aversion to financial solidarity with weaker Member States, and disappointment with legal overregulation and money wasting, are just a few out of a long list of problems that make people lose their trust in the European integration. The author also considers the greatest weaknesses of the European Union: preferring interests of those who are present and well-organised on the political arena and the fact that the real majority of EU citizens stays outside the formal democratic structures thus becoming a part of the process of exclusion and fragmentation. The state of affairs in the EU, following according to Karl Jaspers, is called a limit situation, where it possible either to withdraw or rise and exceed restrictions. The author considers hope and radicalism as two forces that power the European political activists; in order to unite them, a new faith, values and hope based on the traditional foundations are needed. This new way of thinking about the EU, the joined-up thinking, is possibly a response to the demand for a radical revival in the EU.
The separation of theory and practice of the European integration created a very dangerous situation for the European Union. The article presents this crisis from the points of view of philosophy, political science and journalism. The"European poison of thought" expressed by a lack of trust of citizens towards the EU institutions perceived as inadequate in addressing the most fundamental problems of the EU citizens, as well as scepticism towards the enlargement of the Union, aversion to financial solidarity with weaker Member States, and disappointment with legal overregulation and money wasting, are just a few out of a long list of problems that make people lose their trust in the European integration. The author also considers the greatest weaknesses of the European Union: preferring interests of those who are present and well-organised on the political arena and the fact that the real majority of EU citizens stays outside the formal democratic structures thus becoming a part of the process of exclusion and fragmentation. The state of affairs in the EU, following according to Karl Jaspers, is called a limit situation, where it possible either to withdraw or rise and exceed restrictions. The author considers hope and radicalism as two forces that power the European political activists; in order to unite them, a new faith, values and hope based on the traditional foundations are needed. This new way of thinking about the EU, the joined-up thinking, is possibly a response to the demand for a radical revival in the EU.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The aim of this article is an analysis of Witold Gombrowicz's position in reference to the archetype of Polish political culture. THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND METHODS: The main problem undertaken in the article is an analysis of Witold Gombrowicz's position in reference to the question of Polishness, its components, and its relationship to Latin civilization. The article is based on an analysis of Gombrowicz's Diary. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: The article begins with a synthetic outline of two fundamental issues: the Latinness of European civilization and the debate surrounding the archetype of Polish political culture. This is followed by what constitutes the main body of the article: an analysis of Gombrowicz's views on Polishness. RESEARCH RESULTS: The most important result of the scientific analysis conducted here is the indication of the main theses of Gombrowicz's understanding of Polishness and of the relationship between Polishness and Latin civilization. Gombrowicz's conception is presented as an innovative approach to the problem, transcending traditional takes on Polishness as a specific type of realism. CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: In his conclusions, the author indicates interpretative possibilities resulting from the perspective taken in the article, as well as areas that require further study, concerning such issues as the relationship between the Sonland and the Fatherland, and the culture of the Polish nobility during the "Saxon Era."
This study aims to highlight the role of education in a democratic society in the political philosophy of Nicolas de Condorcet. Condorcet refuted legitimising political power on the idea of general will and postulated to replace it with the notion of reason and probability of truth. This assumption tightly linked the wellbeing of democracy with a public education system which, on the one hand, was to prepare citizens to take an active role in the public sphere, and on the other, allow them to improve the political system in which they function in accordance with the progress of the human spirit. ; This study aims to highlight the role of education in a democratic society in the political philosophy of Nicolas de Condorcet. Condorcet refuted legitimising political power on the idea of general will and postulated to replace it with the notion of reason and probability of truth. This assumption tightly linked the wellbeing of democracy with a public education system which, on the one hand, was to prepare citizens to take an active role in the public sphere, and on the other, allow them to improve the political system in which they function in accordance with the progress of the human spirit.
In multiculturalism, "exit", or to be more precise, "right to exit" is very often thought of in terms of a condition of state's non-interference in the minority groups. However popular, this account seems to be flawed with a number of controversial assumptions, questionable theoretical and practical implications and can lead to significant paradoxes. First of all, treating "exit" as a state's non-interventionism condition also means that in fact representatives of minority groups should actually leave their communities in order to obtain all of the civil rights and liberties – be treated as "full", not "partial" citizens. Various other problems connected with this account (i.a. the issue of general function of "right to exit" and civil rights and liberties or mutual relations between these two categories) presented and discussed in the paper justify a proposal of change of approach towards concept of "exit". Either one should take really seriously the assumed normative character of it and construct a whole separate theory of "right to exit" from scratch, or maybe one should simply stop treating leaving one's oppressive culture in terms of "right" or "freedom" and understand it only in descriptive manner. ; In multiculturalism, "exit", or to be more precise, "right to exit" is very often thought of in terms of a condition of state's non-interference in the minority groups. However popular, this account seems to be flawed with a number of controversial assumptions, questionable theoretical and practical implications and can lead to significant paradoxes. First of all, treating "exit" as a state's non-interventionism condition also means that in fact representatives of minority groups should actually leave their communities in order to obtain all of the civil rights and liberties – be treated as "full", not "partial" citizens. Various other problems connected with this account (i.a. the issue of general function of "right to exit" and civil rights and liberties or mutual relations between these two categories) presented and discussed in the paper justify a proposal of change of approach towards concept of "exit". Either one should take really seriously the assumed normative character of it and construct a whole separate theory of "right to exit" from scratch, or maybe one should simply stop treating leaving one's oppressive culture in terms of "right" or "freedom" and understand it only in descriptive manner.
In multiculturalism, "exit", or to be more precise, "right to exit" is very often thought of in terms of a condition of state's non-interference in the minority groups. However popular, this account seems to be flawed with a number of controversial assumptions, questionable theoretical and practical implications and can lead to significant paradoxes. First of all, treating "exit" as a state's non-interventionism condition also means that in fact representatives of minority groups should actually leave their communities in order to obtain all of the civil rights and liberties – be treated as "full", not "partial" citizens. Various other problems connected with this account (i.a. the issue of general function of "right to exit" and civil rights and liberties or mutual relations between these two categories) presented and discussed in the paper justify a proposal of change of approach towards concept of "exit". Either one should take really seriously the assumed normative character of it and construct a whole separate theory of "right to exit" from scratch, or maybe one should simply stop treating leaving one's oppressive culture in terms of "right" or "freedom" and understand it only in descriptive manner. ; 3 ; 1 ; 103 ; 124 ; 6 ; Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna
The article analyzes paradoxes concerning the notion of freedom in Thomas G. Masaryk's political philosophy. The Czech president and statesman has become a symbol not only for his countrymen but also personified the democratic ideal for citizens of many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the United States and Western Europe. However, his "democratism" had very special marks, making it easy to misinterpret the ideas he proclaimed. Masaryk expressed his conviction about the duty of strict linking of free choice with a reasonably recognized good, which transferred the center of gravity in defining the democratic system from liberalism to ethics. ; W artykule przeprowadzono analizę paradoksów dotyczących pojęcia wolności, występujących w filozofii politycznej Tomasza G. Masaryka. Czeski prezydent i mąż stanu stał się symbolem nie tylko dla swoich rodaków, ale też uosabiał demokratyczny ideał dla obywateli wielu krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Stanów Zjednoczonych i Europy Zachodniej. Jednakże jego "demokratyzm" nosił bardzo szczególne znamiona, przez co łatwo o błędy w interpretacji głoszonych przez niego idei. Masaryk wyrażał przekonanie o powinności ścisłego powiązania wolnego wyboru z rozumowo rozpoznanym dobrem, co przenosiło środek ciężkości w definiowaniu systemu demokratycznego z liberalizmu na etykę.
Celebrating the 100th anniversary of Poland's independence, representatives of various humanistic disciplines reflect on relations between the state. This article is about the proposal to understand democracy by representatives of personalism. Among the various concepts describing the "rule of the people" there is a one aimed at the person who is the subject of action, and the goal of this action is the common good. This article presents the proposal of three philosophers: E. Mounier, J. Maritain and J. Tischner. ; Obchodząc 100-lecie odzyskania przez Polskę niepodległości przedstawiciele różnych dyscyplin humanistycznych podejmują refleksję na temat relacji łączących państwo. Artykuł ten jest głosem dotyczącym propozycji rozumienia demokracji przez przedstawicieli personalizmu. Wśród różnych koncepcji opisujących "rządy ludu" pojawia się projekt stawiający w celu osobę, która jest podmiotem działania, zaś celem tego działania jest dobro wspólne. Artykuł ten przedstawia propozycję trzech filozofów: E. Mouniera, J. Maritain oraz J. Tischnera.
The common good is a category from the area of political philosophy, underestimated by liberalism, and very important for the republican tradition. This category is problematic because there are difficulties with defining it and setting the scope. The author puts forward the thesis that the common good – regardless of the controversy that arouses in political philosophy –is a category important for pedagogical reflection, and at the same time is an absent category. The rationale behind this thesis focuses on two issues: 1) the aims of education are neoliberally oriented and the category of the common good is almost absent in them, which is very undesirable in the context of shaping the citizens of a democratic community; 2) processes taking place inside the education are also not conducive to thinking in terms of the common good, mainly due to the advantage of rivalry over cooperation and faulty interpersonal communication. ; Dobro wspólne jest kategorią z obszaru filozofii politycznej, niedocenianą przez liberalizm, bardzo ważną zaś dla tradycji republikańskiej. Ta kategoria jest problematyczna, ponieważ są trudności z jej zdefiniowaniem i ustaleniem zakresu. Autor stawia tezę, że dobro wspólne – niezależnie od kontrowersji, jakie wzbudza w filozofii politycznej – jest kategorią ważną dla refleksji pedagogicznej, a jednocześnie kategorią nieobecną. Uzasadnienia tej tezy skupiają się na dwu zagadnieniach: 1) cele edukacji są zorientowane neoliberalnie i kategoria dobra wspólnego jest w nich prawie nieobecna, co jest bardzo niepożądane w kontekście kształtowania obywateli demokratycznej wspólnoty; 2) procesy zachodzące we wnętrzu edukacji również nie sprzyjają myśleniu w kategoriach dobra wspólnego, głównie z powodu przewagi rywalizacji nad kooperacją oraz wadliwej komunikacji międzyludzkiej.
The author of this article aims at presenting a particular aspect of the political philosophy of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, an Austrian school economist and anarchocapitalist philosopher. The purpose of this article is to present and analyse the part of his thinking concerning a ruler, as known as "caretaker" and "trustee". The critique of democratic ruler is one of the most important, or even the most important part in the Hoppe's critique of democracy. It is mostly based on a comparison of an essence of a democratic caretaker and a private ruler – a classical monarch. The author presents an intellectual profile of Hoppe, being a German who decided to emigrate to United States of America. In the USA he used to work as a scientist and studied along with Murray Rothbard – one of the leaders of Austrian school economists and libertarian. The author also presents the methodological view of Hoppe, which is based on an a priori knowledge. The Hoppe's critique of democratic caretaker consists of two ways of argumentation. The first one is based on the critique of public ruler per se. Hoppe states that a private-owned government is better than a publicowned one. To prove this statement, Hoppe uses an apparatus of economics. He proves that a democratic caretaker has a higher time preference than a king. It has a bad influence on the ruled people. According to Hoppe, public ruler must to concentrate on consuming and not taking care about a capital values of the resources of the government. The only thing which is profitable for him is to be taking care about current income of the government. The author of this article states such an apriorical portrait of a public ruler is not valid and presents arguments on his point of view. The most important part of the author's argumentation is that the Hoppe's view is correct only on a condition that a basic purpose of a democratic ruler is to get rich. When it is not valid, Hoppean deductive portrait becomes useless. The second line of Hoppe's argumentation is based on bad effects of general election. As the philosopher claims, it causes that the highest political function can be held practically only by bad persons who inter alia desire the property of others. The author of this article claims that this sort of critique is less radical, but a better one. The critique of democratic ruler in political philosophy of Hoppe seems to be a substantialistical one, when the thinker bases on an apriorical essence of caretaker. However, the philosopher approaches to accidental sort of critique, as he stays in a field of his second way of argumentation.
The author of this article aims at presenting a particular aspect of the political philosophy of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, an Austrian school economist and anarchocapitalist philosopher. The purpose of this article is to present and analyse the part of his thinking concerning a ruler, as known as "caretaker" and "trustee". The critique of democratic ruler is one of the most important, or even the most important part in the Hoppe's critique of democracy. It is mostly based on a comparison of an essence of a democratic caretaker and a private ruler – a classical monarch. The author presents an intellectual profile of Hoppe, being a German who decided to emigrate to United States of America. In the USA he used to work as a scientist and studied along with Murray Rothbard – one of the leaders of Austrian school economists and libertarian. The author also presents the methodological view of Hoppe, which is based on an a priori knowledge. The Hoppe's critique of democratic caretaker consists of two ways of argumentation. The first one is based on the critique of public ruler per se. Hoppe states that a private-owned government is better than a publicowned one. To prove this statement, Hoppe uses an apparatus of economics. He proves that a democratic caretaker has a higher time preference than a king. It has a bad influence on the ruled people. According to Hoppe, public ruler must to concentrate on consuming and not taking care about a capital values of the resources of the government. The only thing which is profitable for him is to be taking care about current income of the government. The author of this article states such an apriorical portrait of a public ruler is not valid and presents arguments on his point of view. The most important part of the author's argumentation is that the Hoppe's view is correct only on a condition that a basic purpose of a democratic ruler is to get rich. When it is not valid, Hoppean deductive portrait becomes useless. The second line of Hoppe's argumentation is based on bad effects of general election. As the philosopher claims, it causes that the highest political function can be held practically only by bad persons who inter alia desire the property of others. The author of this article claims that this sort of critique is less radical, but a better one. The critique of democratic ruler in political philosophy of Hoppe seems to be a substantialistical one, when the thinker bases on an apriorical essence of caretaker. However, the philosopher approaches to accidental sort of critique, as he stays in a field of his second way of argumentation.
"Communality. In search of the binder for political community" is a study in the field of political philosophy. Its main idea is to analyze, interpret and systematize certain concepts which are present both in European philosophical thought and in cultural and political projects in Europe, and which bind together national and international communities. The study is carried out according to the criteria set by the author. For the sake of the study, a number of Polish and foreign philosophical texts have been selected, the importance of which enables us to capture both complexity and ambiguity of the problem. The foreign reflections on community are selected from the works of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Alexis de Tocqueville, Soren Kierkegaard and Jürgen Habermas. The Polish philosophical thought on the issue is represented by Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski, Piotr Skarga, Hugo Kołłątaj, Maurycy Mochnacki, Karol Libelt, Felix Koneczny, Leszek Kołakowski, Adam Chmielewski and Andrzej Szahaj. The political and cultural projects and visions of the European unification which are analyzed in the study, were developed by Robert Schuman, Jacques Chirac, Angela Merkel, the Wise Men Group, and by the following popes: John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis. By adopting the two sided approach to the issue of the binder: the foreign one (which takes into account the things which are or could be common to everybody within their national and international communities and which are also present in various streams of European philosophical thought) and the Polish one (which concentrates mainly on the question of national unity) the author tries to tackle the problem from two different angles. Their common denominator lies in the issue of community bonds. What makes them different, however, is that the European approach can be seen in terms of the diversity of concepts which have originated in different environments and for the sake of ...
The text presents remarks on four issues political scientists often take into consideration when reflecting on the borders of their research. The first issue concerns the call to scrutinize the course of legislative procedures, the second one – the need to recognize and note various traditions of political thought in the platforms of political parties and the statements uttered by politicians; the third – the fundamental question of whether political topics are grasped in the structure of sensual perceptions reflected in language; and, finally, the disputable postulate that the philosophy of politics, approached as an element of reflection on political science, clarifies exclusively the notions and concepts applied in the political sciences. These considerations pose problems rather than solve them, and they are completed by a warning that political science should not be developed towards common knowledge, and it should not become increasingly indeterminate and blurred. ; The text presents remarks on four issues political scientists often take into consideration when reflecting on the borders of their research. The first issue concerns the call to scrutinize the course of legislative procedures, the second one – the need to recognize and note various traditions of political thought in the platforms of political parties and the statements uttered by politicians; the third – the fundamental question of whether political topics are grasped in the structure of sensual perceptions reflected in language; and, finally, the disputable postulate that the philosophy of politics, approached as an element of reflection on political science, clarifies exclusively the notions and concepts applied in the political sciences. These considerations pose problems rather than solve them, and they are completed by a warning that political science should not be developed towards common knowledge, and it should not become increasingly indeterminate and blurred.
The article discusses the problem of procedures and specific features of functioning of a modern democratic state, as well as threats resulting from weaknesses of democracy despite existence of mechanisms protecting it from abuse. This problem is analysed on the example of the ongoing political conflict about the Constitutional Tribunal: an institution of constitutionally guaranteed independence. This conflict reveals that in Poland a need for discussion and perhaps for verification of the current philosophy and practice of democracy, has arisen. Furthermore, it demonstrates that law and the rule of law are neither sufficient guarantors of a democratic system's stability, nor guardians of civil rights and freedoms. A weakness of the democratic system lies in the fact that in the name of correctly understood democratic principles it is possible to distort the system through enacting wrong laws. Even though the acts of democracy participants, mainly decision-makers, are lege artis, they lead to impairment of democracy. Without doubt, a democratically organized society is an autonomous community and polyarchy which has adopted a democratic system of government as a form of its organization. On the other hand, democracies are highly conflict-prone systems, for example, due to the fact that they are based on the principle that all views and all participants of democracy are equal. As a consequence, such logic leads directly to emergence of disagreements, conflicts and even fights among democracy participants. This feature of democracy has enforced the establishment of appropriate procedures of conflict solving so that to ensure a possibly optimal resolution of crisis situations which could ultimately cause even a collapse of the democratic system. Thus, a simple mathematical rule has been adopted, albeit secondary in relation to any other methods of conflict solving, that is the majority principle. This is a standard of the democratic conduct without which the rule of majority would not be possible. The Constitutional Tribunal has recently become the object of popular interest – one of the many institutions of a democratic state which has not aroused so much factual and political dispute ever before. The conflict over the Tribunal has basically the formal and legal character, this is a technical dispute whose solution should be dictated by binding regulations and developed by experts in law. However, this is not the case. This conflict has turned into an argument of a political character, so it has become a genuine clash of interests, additionally aggravated by values. Moreover, it has stirred up the society and the environment of lawyers. When a political conflict, as one of the conflict types, is analysed, it is defined as a disagreement over power, whose participants are these individuals, groups, institutions and organizations which have a direct impact on politics or influence it through political channels. The practice of democratic states of the Western world does not prescribe a way at the beginning of which there is a sign "the winner takes it all". This practice is corroborated by philosophy and theory of democracy, as well as by several hundred years of achievements including such principles as Montesquieu's tripartite system of the separation of powers or the contemporary definition of democracy which describes it as a rule of majority that guarantees rights to minorities. ; Artykuł porusza problem procedur i specyfiki funkcjonowania nowoczesnego państwa demokratycznego oraz zagrożeń wynikających ze słabości demokracji mimo istnienia mechanizmów zabezpieczających ją przed nadużyciami. Problem ten jest rozpatrywany na przykładzie toczącego się konfliktu politycznego o Trybunał Konstytucyjny, instytucję o gwarantowanej konstytucyjnie niezależności. Konflikt ten pokazał, że w Polsce pojawiła się konieczność dyskusji i być może weryfikacji dotychczasowej filozofii i praktyki demokratycznej. Również to, że prawo i rządy prawa nie są wystarczającymi gwarantami stabilności ustroju demokratycznego, tym bardziej strażnikami praw i wolności obywatelskich. Ułomność systemu demokratycznego polega na tym, iż w imię właściwie pojętych zasad demokratycznych możliwe jest wypaczanie systemu przez tworzenie złego prawa. Działania uczestników demokracji, głównie decydentów, są lege artis, ale prowadzą do jej osłabiania. Demokratycznie urządzone społeczeństwo jest bez wątpienia autonomiczną wspólnotą i poliarchią, a przyjęło jako formę swojej organizacji demokratyczny system rządów. Demokracje są natomiast systemami wybitnie konfliktogennymi, choćby z tego powodu iż opierają się na zasadzie równości wszystkich poglądów i wszystkich podmiotów biorących udział w demokracji. Taka logika prowadzi w prostej konsekwencji do pojawienia się niezgodności i konfliktów, a nawet walk pomiędzy uczestnikami demokracji. Ta właściwość demokracji wymusiła stworzenie odpowiednich procedur rozstrzygania konfliktów, by zagwarantować w miarę optymalne wychodzenie z sytuacji kryzysowych, mogących w ostateczności doprowadzić nawet do upadku systemu demokratycznego. Przyjęto zatem prostą zasadę matematyczną, co prawda wtórną wobec wszystkich innych sposobów rozwiązywania konfliktów – zasadę większości. Jest ona regułą demokratycznej gry, bez której nie mogłyby istnieć rządy większości. Przedmiotem społecznego zainteresowania stał się ostatnio Trybunał Konstytucyjny, jedna z wielu instytucji demokratycznego państwa, która dotychczas nie wywoływała aż takich sporów merytorycznych i politycznych. Konflikt o Trybunał ma przede wszystkim charakter formalno-prawny, jest to techniczny spór, którego rozwiązanie powinno być podyktowane przez obwiązujące prawo, a jego rozstrzyganiem powinni się zająć eksperci z dziedziny prawa. Tak jednak nie jest. Konflikt ten przerodził się w konflikt o charakterze politycznym, stał się więc rzeczywistym konfliktem interesów, uzupełnionym dodatkowo o wartości. Zaktywizował ponadto społeczeństwo oraz środowisko prawnicze. Gdy rozważa się jeden z typów konfliktów, mianowicie polityczny, definiuje się go jako taki, którego przedmiotem jest władza, a podmiotami biorącymi w nim udział są te jednostki, grupy, instytucje, organizacje, które bezpośrednio mają wpływ na politykę lub oddziałują na nią za pośrednictwem kanałów politycznych. Praktyka demokratycznych państw świata zachodniego nie wskazuje drogi, na początku której stoi znak "zwycięzca bierze wszystko". Praktykę tę wyznacza filozofia i teoria demokracji oraz kilkusetletni dorobek z takimi dogmatami, jak choćby monteskiuszowski trójpodział władz czy współczesna definicja demokracji, według której są to rządy większości gwarantujące prawa mniejszościom.