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Thomas Hobbes has recently been cast as one of the forefathers of political realism. This article evaluates his place in the realist tradition by focusing on three key themes: the priority of legitimacy over justice, the relation between ethics and politics, and the place of imagination in politics. The thread uniting these themes is the importance Hobbes placed on achieving a moral consensus around peaceful coexistence, a point which distances him from realists who view the two as competing goals of politics. The article maintains that only a qualified version of the autonomy of the political position can be attributed to Hobbes, while arguing more generally that attending to the relation between ethics and politics is central to assessing his liberal credentials from a realist perspective. Against the prevalent reading of Hobbes as a hypothetical contract theorist, the article proceeds to show that the place of consent in his theory is better understood as part of his wider goal of transforming the imagination of his audience; a goal which is animated by concerns that realists share.

This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. We defend the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory's groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem, we combine insights from theories of legitimacy by Bernard Williams and other realists, Critical Theory, and analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology and social construction. The upshot is an account of realism as empirically informed critique of social and political phenomena. We reject a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and so provide an alternative to the anti-empiricism of some approaches to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise.

This project responds to and expands upon Sheldon Wolin's magnum opus, "Politics and Vision." It critiques Wolin's unnecessarily fragile conception of democracy, as being by nature "ephemeral," and thus fundamentally non-institutional, by comparing it with the more pragmatic, realist approaches of two historical organizers, Saul Alinsky and V.I. Lenin. The project uses Wolin's insightful analysis of the state of American politics under late capitalism, to ask, "What is to be done?" exploring the possibilities of organizing and political realism for the Left in the current day.

This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. We defend the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory's groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem, we combine insights from theories of legitimacy by Bernard Williams and other realists, Critical Theory, and analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology and social construction. The upshot is an account of realism as empirically informed critique of social and political phenomena. We reject a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and so provide an alternative to the anti-empiricism of some approaches to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise.

This paper aims to advocate a Williamsian approach to political realism and contends that contemporary realist political theory is built on an 'a-theoretical core' that the paper will call 'political realism' in the broader sense (for a very different approach to Williams, see Hall, 2013). The central tenet of this thesis is that contemporary realist political theory fundamentally differs from mainstream political theory not only in its political outlook, but also in its views about the tasks and prospects of theorizing. In other words, 'political realism' imposes severe constraints on theorizing in a realist key and makes contemporary realist political theory especially vulnerable to criticisms coming from mainstream political theory. This paper contends, however, that the inherent limitedness of contemporary realist political theory is a fair price that is worth paying for a more realistic understanding of politics.The argument of the paper is built on the Williamsian assumption that mainstream political theory is ultimately a sort of 'applied morality' and that the fundamental problem with mainstream political theory as 'applied morality' is not so much its strong commitment to pre-political moral principles as its being fundamentally shaped by an ethical theory.

This article challenges the association between realist methodology and ideals of legitimacy. Many who seek a more "realistic" or "political" approach to political theory replace the familiar orientation towards a state of (perfect) justice with a structurally similar orientation towards a state of (sufficient) legitimacy. As a result, they fail to provide more reliable practical guidance, and wrongly displace radical demands. Rather than orienting action towards any state of affairs, I suggest that a more practically useful approach to political theory would directly address judgments, by comparing the concrete possibilities for action faced by real political actors.

This thesis places Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the "realist" or raison d'état tradition of political thought. While highly critical of the conceptualization of political sovereignty among earlier social contract theorists such as Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes and also very condemnatory of the popular eighteen-century discourse of reason of state, Rousseau preserves some of the most important insights in the theory of state and political sovereignty of earlier authors, in particular the value, status, and justification of political life. This thesis thus looks at both the continuity and the disruption or corrections that Rousseau represents in the tradition of political realism.The first part of the dissertation looks at Rousseau's reflections on international politics, political economy, and the role of government. It examines Rousseau's criticism of the seemingly triumphant theory and practice of realpolitik and mercantilism in the eighteenth-century and how this criticism derives from his overriding concern with political equality and liberty in the Social Contract.The second part of the dissertation details the necessary link between Rousseau's conceptualization of the political and his epistemology and linguistic anthropology. Rousseau's linguistics accounts for both his emphasis on equality as the condition of the political and his anxiety over the fragility of the political. Rousseau must confront a gap between the concept of the political as a just and equitable form of civil association and the utter impossibility of the literality of the political condition. Rousseau's theory of government and his resentment of mercantile administration must be read in light of this gap between the concept and literality of the political.

The purpose of this article is to analyze US foreign policy under the new White House administration and to present the most important aspects of Trump's emerging doctrine, with the aim of answering the following questions: what are the goals and tenets of, and the measures to implement, the foreign policy outlined in the new US National Security Strategy? Which trends can be considered dominant in Trump's emerging doctrine? What challenges and threats to international security were mentioned in the document? Do traditional US allies still play an important role in the superpower's security strategy? The thesis of this paper is that political realism is the main trend in Trump's emerging doctrine and that US foreign policy has taken a unilateral course, with a large dose of populism.

Abstract In this thesis I tackle the question of what the normative logic of political realism is. Thus, I have two goals to accomplish. First, and foremost, I want to offer an account of what it means to be a political realist. Secondly, I want to inquire why one should be a political realist. As, for the first question, what are the defining features of a realistic political philosopher? Given that realists tend to defend a variety of positions and that they are not often systematic in their arguments, this question is not as simple as it might seem. Thus, in the first three methodological chapters I develop a possible systematic account for political realism. While I am evidently sympathetic with the tradition of political realism, my aim here is merely reconstructive. However, such rational reconstruction aims to fix a significant flaw in this tradition: a lack of clarity and structure. In the first chapter, I argue that realists rely on a specific account of reality, in the second that from this account they derive a particular view of possibility and necessity and in the third one that the most important necessities in politics are the recurrence of conflicts and the need for order. My aim here is to provide a rational reconstruction of political realism by outlining a possible consistent interpretation of its basic commitments. More specifically, Chapter 1 focuses on the notion of reality adopted by political realists. I open the chapter by introducing a preliminary discussion of the commitments a realistic political philosophy seems bound to subscribe. I then argue that a metaphysical view matching these commitments is one that links reality with causality. This view, which I call 'effectual realism', is partially drawn from Alexander's dictum and the 'ad lapidem' argument in metaphysics, and claims that something is real if and only if it causally interacts with the world in some way. I close this chapter by observing that this view of reality is a form of metaphysical realism, because it satisfies three conditions: reality is knowable, independent from desires and independent from beliefs. These conditions, I conclude, fit very well with the idea common throughout the literature of political realism, that reality is something that resists our actions. From this causal account of reality, Chapter 2 draws a causal account of possibility and necessity. While political idealists focus on conceivability or compatibility with the world as criteria for possibility, a more realistic criterion would be one that links possibility and causality. I call this relation of realistic possibility 'trackability': a state of affairs is trackable if and only if there is some causal chain to move there from the actual world. I debate the implications of this view, and conclude that it allows to account for the contextual importance of the starting point, the inclination to prudence, and the focus on action. From this conception, I can derive a symmetric notion of necessity, whereby something is necessary, if there is no causal chain to avoid it. By the same argument, something is impossible, if no causal chain allows us to realize it. These two arguments can be neatly derived from effectual realism and the additional assumption that we are not omnipotent. Given that reality is independent from our beliefs and desires, and assuming that our power is limited, some states of affairs will lay beyond our ability to change. Among these necessary states of affairs, I argue in Chapter 3 that there are two, which are particularly relevant in the political sphere: the inevitability of conflict and the need for order. Conflicts, in my definition, emerge among actors with different views when one wants to impose his will against the resistance of others. Given that there is no causal chain to consistently avoid neither the different views nor the will to prevail, conflict appears a necessary feature in the sense specified in the previous chapter. The second necessary element is the need for order. As men need to feed, whether or not they want to, so they need a cooperative order, whether or not they want to. This is a weaker necessity compared to that of conflict, because it holds only conditionally. While conflicts are always inevitable and therefore necessary, order is necessary only provided that we want to survive. I conclude the chapter by suggesting that these two necessities of politics can be used as a criterion to determine whether a political theory is realistic or not. Clearly not every political realist would recognize himself in this reconstruction. 'Isms' are always more discordant than their adversaries believe them to be, and political realists are particularly diverse in their reflections. Thus, any unified account is likely to leave some disagreeing. This is inevitable, and thus one cannot realistically be blamed for it. Nevertheless, I think it is important to try to develop a consistent positive view of political realism. To summarize, in the first three chapters I defended the following conception of political realism: 1. Realism  Reality 2. Reality  Possibility and Necessity 3. Political Necessity  Conflict and Order Being realist means, in this view, paying attention to reality. Paying attention to reality means identifying accurately what is possible and what is necessary. Thus, being realist means that we should acknowledge that conflict and order are the two cardinal necessities of politics. The fourth and last chapter is intended to tackle the question of why one ought to be a realist and, thus, to turn the results of the first three chapters from reconstructive into normative claims. Political realism, I argue here, offers a set of hypothetical imperatives based on the conditional assumption that one wants to realize one's own preferences. This, I maintain, provides the driving force behind normative political realism. In fact, if it is true that one wants to realize one's own preferences, then, contrary to idealism, one ought not to choose between end-states, but among courses of action. I suggest that a more realistic account of rationality is one that tempers the value of a desired state of affairs with the costs or benefits of the best available means to reach it, their likelihood of success, and the unintended consequences of one's action. If this is how a realistically rational deliberation works, than the distinctive features of political realism I reconstructed in the first three chapters are shown to have an important normative force, as they are revealed to be the path realists point at in order for political actors to realize their preferences. In short, if you want to realize your preferences, you ought to be a realist. Differently from what I do in the previous chapters, here I try to put forward a justificatory argument for political realism. Notwithstanding this difference between the first three chapters and the last one, they all combine to provide a possible answer to my research question. If we put together the first three chapters with the conditional assumption that you want to realize your preferences, we get the following hypothetical imperatives: 1) You ought to be rational, and for realists this means that when you deliberate what is best you should not limit yourself to consider the value or disvalue of the ideal that you want to realize. Along with this, you ought to ponder the costs of the best means available to you, their likelihood of success, and the cost of their consequences. 2) You ought to acknowledge reality. This means that any descriptive theory of the world is normative for the agent, insofar as it sets the background conditions of his action. Reality determines the means he has at his disposal, his likelihood of success in reaching what he desires, and the consequences of his action. It thus gives him reasons to do something instead of something else. 3) You ought to pinpoint possibilities and necessities accurately. Reality sets the conditions of what is possible and what is necessary. Necessary states of affairs are of paramount importance for action, and political realism rightly emphasizes them. A necessary state of affairs is a state of affairs whose avoidance is impossible and thus any desire that requires that this be abandoned is unrealistic. This does not mean that there is nothing we can do in such cases. Rather, realists claim that necessities give us reasons to contain their negative consequences instead than eliminate them at their root, and to reallocate our efforts in alternative goals which can actually be reached. 4) You ought to acknowledge that the recurrence of conflicts and the need for order are necessary features of the political sphere. This is the substantive and defining claim of political realism. Any desire that requires one to be done with conflict or the need for order is unrealistic, whatever one wants. Moreover, any political theory that pays insufficient attention to this fact is bound to be of inadequate guidance in political matters. Any actor who does not satisfy these requirements risks being irrational insofar as he would be self-undermines his own preferences, whatever they are. Thus, we end up with the following claims: 0. If you want to realize your preferences, then you ought to: 1. Evaluate courses of action instead of states of affairs 2. Pay attention to reality 3. Individuate its possibilities and necessities 4. In politics, consider specifically the inevitability of conflict and the need for order In synthesis, political realism as an affirmative, analytical, normative theory would be, in my opinion, committed to these claims.

Morgenthau's critique of ethical theory. Morgenthau's critique of human nature. Morgenthau's positive account of human nature. Defending Morgenthau's 'Tragic Understanding'. ; Morgenthau's critique of ethical theory. Morgenthau's critique of human nature. Morgenthau's positive account of human nature. Defending Morgenthau's 'Tragic Understanding'. ; LUISS PhD Thesis

Abstract. The political stability and governance of a country are greatly influenced by public support and the commitment of public officials to accommodate the people's voice. The chaos that occurred in mainland China from June 2019 until the end of 2020 became a reflection that the political system of government of 'One Country, Two Systems' was a formidable challenge for the Chinese government after the surrender of Hong Kong by the British on July 1, 1997, where China used the communism system and on the other hand, Hong Kong uses a system of liberalism. Hong Kong's strong understanding of freedom makes this region very sensitive on several issues, one of which is legal issues due to the killing of Hong Kong citizens in the country of Taiwan. This article aims to explain the dualism of leadership used by the Hong Kong-China government, which led to anarchism, political instability of the government, and causing the investment climate in Hong Kong-China to decline sharply. The research method used is a qualitative method, with secondary data types taken from journals, book literature, and official websites used to search for theories and data that are vaild. This research shows that political realism in the demonstration case in Hong Kong is proof that the state in this case the central government in Beijing still has the power to always interfere in Hong Kong's domestic affairs.Keywords: Democratic Instability, Political Realism, One Country Two SystemsAbstrak. Stabilitas politik dan pemerintahan sebuah negara sangat dipengaruhi dukungan masyarakat dan komitmen pejabat publik untuk mengakomodir suara rakyat. Kekacauan yang terjadi di daratan China sejak bulan Juni 2019 hingga akhir tahun 2020 menjadi cerminan bahwa sistem politik pemerintahan 'Satu Negara, Dua Sistem' merupakan tantangan berat bagi pemerintah China pasca diserahkannya Hongkong oleh Inggris pada 1 Juli 1997, dimana China menggunakan sistem komunisme, dan dipihak lain Hongkong menggunakan sistem liberalisme. Kuatnya pemahaman Hongkong terhadap kebebasan menyebabkan wilayah ini sangat sensitif dalam beberapa isu, salah satunya isu hukum akibat adanya peristiwa pembunuhan yang dilakukan warga Hongkong di negara Taiwan. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan dualisme kepemimpinan yang digunakan pemerintah Hongkong-China, yang berujung pada peristiwa anarkisme, instabilitas politik pemerintahan, hingga menyebabkan iklim investasi di Hongkong-China merosot tajam. Metode penelitian yang digunakan metode kualitatif, dengan jenis data sekunder diambil dari jurnal, literatur buku, dan website resmi yang digunakan untuk mencari teori dan data yang vaild. Penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa realisme politik dalam kasus demonstrasi di Hongkong menjadi bukti bahwa negara dalam hal ini pemerintah pusat di Beijing tetap memiliki kekuasaan untuk selalu ikut campur tangan terhadap urusan dalam negeri HongkongKata Kunci: Instabilitas Demokrasi, Realisme Politik, Satu Negara Dua Sistem

This thesis focuses on Hans J. Morgenthau's theory of political realism. Despite his prominent reputation, Morgenthau's theory has long been criticized on the grounds that it is ambiguous, contains contradictory elements and is, to some extent, morally inadequate. This thesis contests such criticisms, seeking to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the ideas that Morgenthau was trying to communicate. I explore what I regard to be the four fundamental concepts underpinning his work, namely, reason, power, the national interest, and morality, arguing that an understanding of these concepts, their intended applications to politics and their interplay will better illuminate Morgenthau's theoretical stance. Never before have the criticisms of these core concepts been addressed together in spite of the abundance of secondary literature on Morgenthau. The evaluation contained herein includes a review of his published works and some of his unpublished materials which are held in the Hans J. Morgenthau archive. This thesis reveals that although Morgenthau was often vague in his use of key terms and concepts, and was thus partly responsible for the criticism he received, his theory of political realism represents a thoughtful and balanced approach to foreign policy. As Morgenthau viewed politics as an ongoing struggle for power, a view based in his understanding of human nature, he urged leaders to apply their faculty of reason in developing policy to civilize politics. He stressed that leaders should exercise 'prudence,' a notion that implies a need to morally evaluate alternate political actions. Based on Morgenthau's analysis of foreign policy issues, we find that the cautionary note he struck in relation to the use of military force, notably in the context of the Vietnam War, was based on a realistic assessment of the operations of power and on moral grounds. This cautionary note remains highly relevant today as numerous analyses of the 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrate. This thesis argues that Morgenthau's ...

Political realism is not easy to define. The analysis of specific cases may help. In this text, I wonder whether Aleksander Bocheński was a political realist. His journalism has undergone a significant evolution. He was a supporter of the Polish "power state" before 1939, he wanted to collaborate with the nazi Germans during the war years, and after the war he was an apologist for People's Poland and a critic of the Third Polish Republic. My considerations prove, that Bocheński was looking for political realism in his life and oeuvre, not always, however, entering this trend of reflection on politics. ; Realizm polityczny jest pojęciem trudnym w definicji. Pomocna może być w tym przypadku analiza specyficznych przykładów. Niniejszy tekst dotyczy problemu realizmu w myśli politycznej Aleksandra Bocheńskiego. Wyrażana przez publicystykę, ulegała znamiennej ewolucji. Przed 1939 r. był on rzecznikiem Polski "mocarstwowej", podczas wojny snuł plany kolaboracji z Niemcami, po 1945 r. był apologetą Polski Ludowej, broniąc jej także w III Rzeczypospolitej. Bocheński szukał politycznego realizmu, nie oznacza to jednak, że zawsze udało mu się pozostać w tym nurcie refleksji o polityce.

Bernard Williams was an ethical sceptic, but he was also a proponent of liberalism. To what extent can one finally be both? This article explores this question through a particular emphasis on Williams, but seeks to draw wider lessons regarding what ethical scepticism should and should not amount to. It shows how ethical scepticism can be reconciled with a commitment to what Williams, following Judith Shklar, called 'the liberalism of fear', which is revealed as an ecumenical outlook for different stripes of ethical sceptic. The article concludes by drawing some lessons for the recent 'realist' turn in political theory. ; Research for this article was undertaken while I was the recipient of an Arts and Humanities Research Council PhD studentship at the University of Cambridge, and was later supported by the Cambridge Faculty of History's Prince Consort and Thirlwall fund.

This article explores the conception of human nature that underlies the realistic point of view of Politics. The writer tries to design and explain some characteristics of such conception, which acquire a greater clearness when they are compared with the ; Este artículo explora la concepción de la naturaleza humana que subyace en el punto de vista realista de la política. El escritor intenta diseñar y explicar algunas características de tal concepción, que adquieren una mayor claridad cuando se comparan con