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In light of recent interest among political theorists in the idea of political realism, Judith Shklar's liberalism of fear has come to be associated with anti-Rawlsian thought. This paper seeks to show that, on the contrary, Shklar's specific formulation of political realism, unlike more recent variations, was not motivated by a critique of Rawls. This paper will address three concerns: first, it will show what exactly Shklar's initial realism was responding to; second, it will consider the implications of this realism for thinking about liberal democracies; third, it will attempt, briefly, in light of this, to make sense of her relationship with Rawls and, in turn, through a comparison with Bernard Williams's thought, her relationship to anti-Rawlsian political realism.

This paper aims to advocate a Williamsian approach to political realism and contends that contemporary realist political theory is built on an 'a-theoretical core' that the paper will call 'political realism' in the broader sense (for a very different approach to Williams, see Hall, 2013). The central tenet of this thesis is that contemporary realist political theory fundamentally differs from mainstream political theory not only in its political outlook, but also in its views about the tasks and prospects of theorizing. In other words, 'political realism' imposes severe constraints on theorizing in a realist key and makes contemporary realist political theory especially vulnerable to criticisms coming from mainstream political theory. This paper contends, however, that the inherent limitedness of contemporary realist political theory is a fair price that is worth paying for a more realistic understanding of politics.The argument of the paper is built on the Williamsian assumption that mainstream political theory is ultimately a sort of 'applied morality' and that the fundamental problem with mainstream political theory as 'applied morality' is not so much its strong commitment to pre-political moral principles as its being fundamentally shaped by an ethical theory.

This paper aims to advocate a Williamsian approach to political realism and contends that contemporary realist political theory is built on an 'a-theoretical core' that the paper will call 'political realism' in the broader sense (for a very different approach to Williams, see Hall, 2013). The central tenet of this thesis is that contemporary realist political theory fundamentally differs from mainstream political theory not only in its political outlook, but also in its views about the tasks and prospects of theorizing. In other words, 'political realism' imposes severe constraints on theorizing in a realist key and makes contemporary realist political theory especially vulnerable to criticisms coming from mainstream political theory. This paper contends, however, that the inherent limitedness of contemporary realist political theory is a fair price that is worth paying for a more realistic understanding of politics.The argument of the paper is built on the Williamsian assumption that mainstream political theory is ultimately a sort of 'applied morality' and that the fundamental problem with mainstream political theory as 'applied morality' is not so much its strong commitment to pre-political moral principles as its being fundamentally shaped by an ethical theory.

The article joins the current debate between epistemic and procedural democrats in contemporary democratic theory and aims to put epistemic democracy on a more secure footing. Yet, unlike those who explore the question from the bottom-up by analyzing the relationship between "truth" and the "fact of disagreement" within the context of domestic political discourse, I adopt a top-down approach animated by political realism and situate democracy within the actual world that we live in: a competitive ecology of states and regimes. The article thus has two purposes. For those who are interested in the recent revival of realism in political theory, it shows how it can be combined with both the epistemic paradigm in democratic theory and the realist research program in international relations, including the neo-positivist strand that has dominated the field over the past four decades. And for those who see themselves as epistemic democrats, it provides a powerful realist argument to defend their conception of democratic authority against criticisms made by procedural democrats.

Political realism points out that politics is to create and sustain a legitimate order in a context of persistent disagreement, with the possible surge of conflicts, and where political power inevitably uses coercion. Political realists contend that modus vivendi is a contingent political arrangement at the level of the political constitution that allows diverse groups of people to coexist peacefully. Proposals of modus vivendi do not say enough about how to manage disagreements and conflicts. In this paper, I argue that proposals of agonistic democracy supply this lack. I contend that agonistic democracy proposals share the premises of political realism and contribute to the sustainment of a liberal modus vivendi.