Suchergebnisse

A political transformation that has started in Argentina in 1983 put an end on the reign of military junta, but at the same time it was related with a number of challenges for both first democratic governments and the argentine society as a whole. One of the most problematic issues resulting from the confrontation with the crimes from 1976 – 1983 was so called transitional justice and the problem of identity and collective memory of societies coming out of the period of trauma, which are characterized by a high polarization due to different, even contradictory at times interpretations and ideas about the past. The article attempts to analyze the difficult process of settlement of the dirty war period, including the characteristics of the preceding events, the policy of the first democratic governments and the original strategies developed by the argentine movement for human rights, which on the one hand aimed to combat with the impunity of the perpetrators, and on the other hand to counteract the social amnesia and to keep the memory about the tragic past events alive. ; Zapoczątkowany w 1983 r. proces transformacji ustrojowej w Argentynie zakończył okres rządów junty wojskowej, ale jednocześnie wiązał się z wieloma wyzwaniami zarówno dla pierwszych demokratycznych rządów, jak i całego argentyńskiego społeczeństwa. Jednymi z najbardziej problematycznych kwestii determinowanych koniecznością konfrontacji ze zbrodniami z lat 1976 – 1983 okazały się tzw. sprawiedliwość okresu transformacji oraz kwestia tożsamości i pamięci zbiorowej społeczeństwa wychodzącego z okresu traumy, charakteryzującego się wysokim stopniem polaryzacji ze względu na odmienne, często sprzeczne interpretacje i wyobrażenia na temat przeszłości. W niniejszym artykule dokonano próby analizy trudnego procesu rozliczania się z okresem tzw. brudnej wojny, z uwzględnieniem charakterystyki wydarzeń, które do niego doprowadziły, polityki pierwszych demokratycznych po dyktaturze rządów oraz oryginalnych strategii wypracowanych przez argentyński ruch praw człowieka, które z jednej strony służyły walce z bezkarnością winnych, z drugiej zaś miały na celu przeciwdziałać społecznej amnezji i podtrzymać pamięć na temat tragicznych wydarzeń z przeszłości.

The article aims to observe the purpose and subject of "public policy sciences" from the perspective of living space. The role of housing policy and settlement in this respect is at the core of the paper reasoning. It requires reflection on the relationships of social, housing and settlement policies, and their location on the background of other elements and disciplines of social sciences in the context of living. Public policy relations of a systemic, political, economic and social character, as well as of natural and ecological one, which complement the concept of sustainable development, are also discussed. This concept focused more than ever on a fair and decent habitation of successive generations, by substantially increasing the role of housing and settlement policy, highlights that the aim and subject of "the public policy sciences" is the living space.

Socio-economic conditions of refugees' settlement in Bulgaria in the 1920s.The influx of immigrants into Bulgaria during the first two decades of 20th century was aresult of the two lost armed conflicts and border shifts between 1913 and 1918. These changesin turn resulted in disruption of the socio-political and economic situation within the country.The government was unable to efficiently overcome the consequences of high immigration,which aggravated the already present social and economic difficulties and threatened the internal stability of the state. On the other hand, in spite of the grave political and economiccrisis, certain measures were undertaken to counter the negative tendencies, with state supportfor the agricultural settlement. The partial success of the above was possible due to theagriculture reform introduced in 1924 and financial credits from abroad (1926, 1928). Theoutcome was sufficient for the Bulgarian government to deem the settlement action a success, an enhancement of the country's internal stability and appeasement of the general public. Nevertheless, a number of pressing issues remained, resulting mostly from a lack of systemic support to the immigrants and their families. The refugee integration process was hindered bythe lack of a secure economic foundation and the differences among the particular socialgroups. ; The influx of immigrants into Bulgaria during the first two decades of 20th century was aresult of the two lost armed conflicts and border shifts between 1913 and 1918. These changesin turn resulted in disruption of the socio-political and economic situation within the country.The government was unable to efficiently overcome the consequences of high immigration,which aggravated the already present social and economic difficulties and threatened the internal stability of the state. On the other hand, in spite of the grave political and economiccrisis, certain measures were undertaken to counter the negative tendencies, with state supportfor the agricultural settlement. The partial success of the above was possible due to theagriculture reform introduced in 1924 and financial credits from abroad (1926, 1928). Theoutcome was sufficient for the Bulgarian government to deem the settlement action a success, an enhancement of the country's internal stability and appeasement of the general public. Nevertheless, a number of pressing issues remained, resulting mostly from a lack of systemic support to the immigrants and their families. The refugee integration process was hindered bythe lack of a secure economic foundation and the differences among the particular socialgroups.

The local governments of settlements fulfi ll not only their basic duties but also a great deal of other tasks as well that infl uence the communities' living conditions and quality of life, and through the way inhabitants feel also have an impact on the retention capacity of the settlements. The social policy of local governments is fulfi lled by the governments. Financing the tasks and their risks have a great effect on the realization of sustainable local governing. The aim of this study is to review the Hungarian local governmental system assessing some anomalies of the fi nancing of local governments and to draw attention to the risk of local governments, to the possibilities of how to reduce their operational risks highly considering the social political goals of the local governments, the role it has in developing and improving the people's quality of life.

Liquidation of neutral zone, existing from 1920, was the last stage of forming the Polish-Lithuanian border after World War I. Process of its liquidation began after incorporation of Vilnius into Poland in April 1922, when in Warsaw the question of the existing neutral zone become urgent. By contrast, completely different was the position of Lithuanian side. The incorporation of Vilnius to Poland was not recognized, and it was feared that the settlement of border can determine the belonging of this region to Republic of Poland. The seizure of Klaipeda by the Lithuanian on January 15, 1923, inspired Polish diplomacy to intensify efforts to eliminate the neutral zone. On the 22nd January the Polish Foreign Ministry has sent a note to the Powers demanding liquidation of neutral zone, accompanied by the project of division. On the 3rd of February this project was presented at the meeting of the League of Nations. Lithuanian delegates argued that it is not acceptable for Lithuania, because there is a danger of leaving Vilnius at the Polish side, however, it has had no effect and the Council of the League of Nations issued a resolution of the distribution of the neutral zone. It was assigned that the zone will be seized on February 15, 1923. The Poles were afraid of sneak attacks and the resistance of the Lithuanians. The Polish side very carefully prepared to accomplish this task. Before the action began, the Polish side had warned the Lithuanians. According to the Lithuanians, Poles, first began to attack the Lithuanian posts. After February 18 ceasefire, negotiations began to settle the dividing line. At the end of February, France presented the proposal of final settlement of the matter at the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors. The decision was made 15 March 1923, confirming the territorial decision taken on the 3rd of February 1923. This was equal with admission of Vilnius region to Poland. ; Liquidation of neutral zone, existing from 1920, was the last stage of forming the Polish-Lithuanian border after World War I. Process of its liquidation began after incorporation of Vilnius into Poland in April 1922, when in Warsaw the question of the existing neutral zone become urgent. By contrast, completely different was the position of Lithuanian side. The incorporation of Vilnius to Poland was not recognized, and it was feared that the settlement of border can determine the belonging of this region to Republic of Poland. The seizure of Klaipeda by the Lithuanian on January 15, 1923, inspired Polish diplomacy to intensify efforts to eliminate the neutral zone. On the 22nd January the Polish Foreign Ministry has sent a note to the Powers demanding liquidation of neutral zone, accompanied by the project of division. On the 3rd of February this project was presented at the meeting of the League of Nations. Lithuanian delegates argued that it is not acceptable for Lithuania, because there is a danger of leaving Vilnius at the Polish side, however, it has had no effect and the Council of the League of Nations issued a resolution of the distribution of the neutral zone. It was assigned that the zone will be seized on February 15, 1923. The Poles were afraid of sneak attacks and the resistance of the Lithuanians. The Polish side very carefully prepared to accomplish this task. Before the action began, the Polish side had warned the Lithuanians. According to the Lithuanians, Poles, first began to attack the Lithuanian posts. After February 18 ceasefire, negotiations began to settle the dividing line. At the end of February, France presented the proposal of final settlement of the matter at the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors. The decision was made 15 March 1923, confirming the territorial decision taken on the 3rd of February 1923. This was equal with admission of Vilnius region to Poland.

Liquidation of neutral zone, existing from 1920, was the last stage of forming the Polish-Lithuanian border after World War I. Process of its liquidation began after incorporation of Vilnius into Poland in April 1922, when in Warsaw the question of the existing neutral zone become urgent. By contrast, completely different was the position of Lithuanian side. The incorporation of Vilnius to Poland was not recognized, and it was feared that the settlement of border can determine the belonging of this region to Republic of Poland. The seizure of Klaipeda by the Lithuanian on January 15, 1923, inspired Polish diplomacy to intensify efforts to eliminate the neutral zone. On the 22nd January the Polish Foreign Ministry has sent a note to the Powers demanding liquidation of neutral zone, accompanied by the project of division. On the 3rd of February this project was presented at the meeting of the League of Nations. Lithuanian delegates argued that it is not acceptable for Lithuania, because there is a danger of leaving Vilnius at the Polish side, however, it has had no effect and the Council of the League of Nations issued a resolution of the distribution of the neutral zone. It was assigned that the zone will be seized on February 15, 1923. The Poles were afraid of sneak attacks and the resistance of the Lithuanians. The Polish side very carefully prepared to accomplish this task. Before the action began, the Polish side had warned the Lithuanians. According to the Lithuanians, Poles, first began to attack the Lithuanian posts. After February 18 ceasefire, negotiations began to settle the dividing line. At the end of February, France presented the proposal of final settlement of the matter at the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors. The decision was made 15 March 1923, confirming the territorial decision taken on the 3rd of February 1923. This was equal with admission of Vilnius region to Poland. ; Liquidation of neutral zone, existing from 1920, was the last stage of forming the Polish-Lithuanian border after World War I. Process of its liquidation began after incorporation of Vilnius into Poland in April 1922, when in Warsaw the question of the existing neutral zone become urgent. By contrast, completely different was the position of Lithuanian side. The incorporation of Vilnius to Poland was not recognized, and it was feared that the settlement of border can determine the belonging of this region to Republic of Poland. The seizure of Klaipeda by the Lithuanian on January 15, 1923, inspired Polish diplomacy to intensify efforts to eliminate the neutral zone. On the 22nd January the Polish Foreign Ministry has sent a note to the Powers demanding liquidation of neutral zone, accompanied by the project of division. On the 3rd of February this project was presented at the meeting of the League of Nations. Lithuanian delegates argued that it is not acceptable for Lithuania, because there is a danger of leaving Vilnius at the Polish side, however, it has had no effect and the Council of the League of Nations issued a resolution of the distribution of the neutral zone. It was assigned that the zone will be seized on February 15, 1923. The Poles were afraid of sneak attacks and the resistance of the Lithuanians. The Polish side very carefully prepared to accomplish this task. Before the action began, the Polish side had warned the Lithuanians. According to the Lithuanians, Poles, first began to attack the Lithuanian posts. After February 18 ceasefire, negotiations began to settle the dividing line. At the end of February, France presented the proposal of final settlement of the matter at the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors. The decision was made 15 March 1923, confirming the territorial decision taken on the 3rd of February 1923. This was equal with admission of Vilnius region to Poland.

Liquidation of neutral zone, existing from 1920, was the last stage of forming the Polish-Lithuanian border after World War I. Process of its liquidation began after incorporation of Vilnius into Poland in April 1922, when in Warsaw the question of the existing neutral zone become urgent. By contrast, completely different was the position of Lithuanian side. The incorporation of Vilnius to Poland was not recognized, and it was feared that the settlement of border can determine the belonging of this region to Republic of Poland. The seizure of Klaipeda by the Lithuanian on January 15, 1923, inspired Polish diplomacy to intensify efforts to eliminate the neutral zone. On the 22nd January the Polish Foreign Ministry has sent a note to the Powers demanding liquidation of neutral zone, accompanied by the project of division. On the 3rd of February this project was presented at the meeting of the League of Nations. Lithuanian delegates argued that it is not acceptable for Lithuania, because there is a danger of leaving Vilnius at the Polish side, however, it has had no effect and the Council of the League of Nations issued a resolution of the distribution of the neutral zone. It was assigned that the zone will be seized on February 15, 1923. The Poles were afraid of sneak attacks and the resistance of the Lithuanians. The Polish side very carefully prepared to accomplish this task. Before the action began, the Polish side had warned the Lithuanians. According to the Lithuanians, Poles, first began to attack the Lithuanian posts. After February 18 ceasefire, negotiations began to settle the dividing line. At the end of February, France presented the proposal of final settlement of the matter at the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors. The decision was made 15 March 1923, confirming the territorial decision taken on the 3rd of February 1923. This was equal with admission of Vilnius region to Poland. ; Liquidation of neutral zone, existing from 1920, was the last stage of forming the Polish-Lithuanian border after World War I. Process of its liquidation began after incorporation of Vilnius into Poland in April 1922, when in Warsaw the question of the existing neutral zone become urgent. By contrast, completely different was the position of Lithuanian side. The incorporation of Vilnius to Poland was not recognized, and it was feared that the settlement of border can determine the belonging of this region to Republic of Poland. The seizure of Klaipeda by the Lithuanian on January 15, 1923, inspired Polish diplomacy to intensify efforts to eliminate the neutral zone. On the 22nd January the Polish Foreign Ministry has sent a note to the Powers demanding liquidation of neutral zone, accompanied by the project of division. On the 3rd of February this project was presented at the meeting of the League of Nations. Lithuanian delegates argued that it is not acceptable for Lithuania, because there is a danger of leaving Vilnius at the Polish side, however, it has had no effect and the Council of the League of Nations issued a resolution of the distribution of the neutral zone. It was assigned that the zone will be seized on February 15, 1923. The Poles were afraid of sneak attacks and the resistance of the Lithuanians. The Polish side very carefully prepared to accomplish this task. Before the action began, the Polish side had warned the Lithuanians. According to the Lithuanians, Poles, first began to attack the Lithuanian posts. After February 18 ceasefire, negotiations began to settle the dividing line. At the end of February, France presented the proposal of final settlement of the matter at the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors. The decision was made 15 March 1923, confirming the territorial decision taken on the 3rd of February 1923. This was equal with admission of Vilnius region to Poland.

ill., 24 cm ; A cemetery of more than 100 barrows is located at Świelubie, near the 9th c. stronghold of Bardy lying south of Kołobrzeg in Western Pomerania. In six of the 36 graves that were explored, containing both male and female burials, the grave goods consisted of typically Scandinavian objects. For a long time the discovery posed a problem that was also political in its nature. Author revisits the Scandinavian finds from Świelubie and discusses their cultural attribution and chronology. A close study of the artifacts identified the burials as of Swedes with ties to the trade emporium of Birka on Mälaren lake in central Sweden; the dating of the finds points to the 2nd half of the 9th c. ; il., 24 cm ; W pobliżu dziewiątowiecznego grodu w Bardach, na południe od Kołobrzegu, na Pomorzu Zachodnim, w miejscowości Świelubie, znajduje się cmentarzysko składające się z ponad stu kurhanów, spośród których zbadano trzydzieści sześć. W sześciu z nich, kobiecych i męskich, były przedmioty typowe dla Skandynawów. Znaleziska te przez długi czas stanowiły problem nie tylko badawczy, ale i polityczny. Artykuł jest poświęcony skandynawskim przedmiotom ze Świelubia, ich przynależności kulturowej i chronologii. Studium pozwoliło ustalić, że pochowani byli Szwedami, mającymi związek z handlowym emporium Birka na jeziorze Mälaren w środkowej Szwecji; datowanie grobów wskazuje na 2 poł. IX w.

The author makes an attempt at explaining the process of shaping of political identity of metropolitan areas that are regarded as a sign of "new territorialities", emerging due to globalization as well as metropolization of modern states. Also, the author emphasizes that following by democratic institutions (and thus political identity and subjectivity) the reforms of territorial structure sanctioning new areas of shaping social reality plays an important role in proper functioning of the democratic country. Modern France, as well as territorial reforms undertaken in 2010—2014, constitutes the area of analyses and inquiries. Using a constructivist concept of political identity, the author advances a thesis that citizens' political identity is the aftermath of the emergence of political market — a space for debate, competition and rivalry, whose settlement comes with the political power. The emergence of autonomic public space in metropolitan areas must therefore be the result of the political power being located on this level. Since the "power of the metropolis" in France still remains incomplete, the metropolitan identity is at an early state of development. Nonetheless, the reform effected in 2014 by the MAPTAM act, as well as the transformation of the Metropolis of Lyon into a fully-fledged unit of territorial government prove that the empowerment of major urban and metropolitan areas has already become a constant vector of transformations within the French system of territorial organization, which will be accompanied with new territorial political identities in the future.

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Poland has repeatedly acted as a reliable ally in promoting Ukraine's activity on the international stage and during internal political turmoil. Polish leadership played the exceptional role during the Revolution of dignity. Having regard to the aggravation of confrontation, especially Poland's activity enabled to approve a common position of the EU concerning the events on the Maidan and force Yanukovych to sign the Agreement on settlement of political crisis in Ukraine. From the beginning of Russian aggression on the territory of Ukraine, Poland stressed the inviolability of Ukrainian borders and encourage to the implementation of sanctions against Russia at the various international forums. Since a Poland's representative has not been involved at the negotiating group on normalization of the situation in Ukraine, intensity of Ukrainian-Polish dialogue on the highest level slightly reduced during 2014–2015. Direct contacts of Ukraine's leadership with the leaders of Germany and France, which having signifi cant impact on making decisions within the EU and being eligible as partners in the negotiations for Russia, have positive effects. However, they have not allowed to fully using great potential of Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership.

The aim of this article is to analyse the international legal and political process of reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo in terms of its impact on the scope of development directions and strategies of the European Union countries as well as Russia and the USA. Particular emphasis was placed on the treatment of these issues in the light of the activities of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office. The main theses assumed for the purposes of this article are as follows: firstly, that the policy of reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo is multidimensional, including the necessity of the process of international criminal liability for the crimes committed by both states, while at the same time influencing the dilemmas of the development directions of individual European countries, but also of the European Union and the United States. In addition, the legal and political stabilization of the Balkan region, especially in the context of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and the possibility of cooperation with these states as part of intergovernmental international organizations, is strategically extremely important for the EU, the USA, as well as for Russia. The Author critically analyses issues using polemics with the standpoint presented in the doctrine of the subject as well as interpreting selected instruments of international law and Kosovo's national law. The deliberations resulted in conclusions as to the determinants in terms of the directions of the legal and political development of the EU and Russia resulting from the complicated process of reconciliation and mutual settlement of sins by Serbia and Kosovo.

The European Union's competition policy is one of the most important elements in the functioning of the entire European Community (EC), as its issues oscillate around the shared market. The economic aspect is key to understanding the actions taken around the founding of the European Communities (European Economic Community of 1957). Initially, the EC was predominantly economic in nature, and only after the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1993 did the European Union reorient itself into a political community. This paper juxtaposes the impact of the European Union's and the United States' economic powers on global economic relations, with a particular explanation of the specifics of how the EU and the US conduct their trade policies, and how this implies mutual trade relations. Then, the European Union's competition policy and its specific features are discussed, which have a decisive impact on the emergence of economic conflicts between the partners from both sides of the Atlantic. An important role is also played here by the issue of ISDS (investor-state dispute settlement) mechanism and differences in the understanding of labor rights in the United States and the European Union. ; Polityka konkurencji Unii Europejskiej stanowi jeden z najważniejszych elementów funkcjonowania całej Wspólnoty Europejskiej (WE), ponieważ jej zagadnienia oscylują wokół wspólnego rynku. Aspekt gospodarczy jest zasadniczy, żeby zrozumieć działania podejmowane wokół założenia Wspólnot Europejskich (Europejska Wspólnota Gospodarcza z 1957 r.). Początkowo WE miała charakter w dominującej części gospodarczy, dopiero po wejściu w życie traktatu z Maastricht w 1993 r. Unia Europejska przeorientowała się na wspólnotę polityczną. W niniejszej pracy zostanie zestawiony wpływ siły gospodarczej Unii Europejskiej i Stanów Zjednoczonych na światowe związki gospodarcze, ze szczególnym wyjaśnieniem specyfiki prowadzenia polityki handlowej przez UE i USA, a także sposobu, w jaki oddziałuje ona na wzajemne relacje handlowe. Następnie omówiona ...

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie genezy, historii, struktury i funkcji Gwardii Narodowej Stanów Zjednoczonych, i jej znaczenia w strukturze komponentów rezerwowych Sił Zbrojnych Stanów Zjednoczonych oraz dla całego systemu militarnego państwa – na poziomie federalnym, stanowym i lokalnym. Gwardia Narodowa buduje swoją tożsamość odwołując się do tradycji milicji kolonialnych, zbrojnych oddziałów oddolnie organizowanych przez kolonistów na terenie pierwszych trzynastu kolonii brytyjskich przed ogłoszeniem Deklaracji Niepodległości w celu utrzymania pokoju wewnątrz osad, jak również odparcia zagrożeń zewnętrznych. Dualny charakter Gwardii Narodowej jest konsekwencją dwóch przeciwstawnych procesów: oddolnej inicjatywy obywateli oraz ambicji kontrolnych rządu federalnego. Dualny, stanowo-federalny charakter Gwardii Narodowej wynika z zapisu ustawy z 1933 roku – National Guard Mobilization Act, wprowadzającym zasadę podwójnej przynależności: wszyscy żołnierze finansowani z funduszy federalnych mieli znajdować się zarówno na listach Gwardii Narodowej danego stanu, jak i Gwardii Narodowej Stanów Zjednoczonych. Dualizm amerykańskiej Gwardii Narodowej uwidacznia się w jej funkcjach i działaniach, sporach kompetencyjnych, ocenach społecznych oraz sposobach wykorzystania tej formacji przez polityków, nie zawsze akceptowanych przez większość społeczeństwa. Ma on również wpływ na kształtowanie własnej tożsamości przez członków Gwardii Narodowej i na ewolucję jej społecznego statusu, zależną od przemian rozumienia idei patriotyzmu. ; This article is aimed at the presentation of the origins, structure and functions, as well as the dynamics of the United States National Guard as an element of the reserve components of the United States Armed Forces, a vital part of the country's military system on all levels: federal, state and local. The National Guard's identity can be traced back to the traditions of the colonial militia, i.e. locally organized armed units of colonists, established in the first thirteen colonies prior to the adoption of the Declaration of Independence to keep peace within the settlements and to protect them from the outside threats. The dual character of the National Guard stems from two opposite processes: the grassroots initiative of the citizens and the controlling urges of the federal government. The dual, state-federal nature of the National Guard is a consequence of the 1933 National Guard Mobilization Act which introduced the rule of double belonging: the soldiers financed from federal funds were to be signed up both on the National Guard lists of a given state as well as the lists of the United States National Guard. The dual nature of the National Guard is apparent in its functions and actions, in the competence disputes, social opinions and the various political modes of use, not always condoned by the nation's majority. It also affects the National Guard members' identity as well as the evolution of the formation's social status, dependent on the perception of the ever-changing idea of patriotism.

Since condemnation of operation Vistula by the Senate, we have conducted a "strategic partnership" policy towards Ukraine, expecting at most symbols, not calling for the memory of thousands of victims murdered in Volyn and Cherven Cities. Driven mainly by Russophobia, we supported the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. On the latter, our politicians didn't hesitate to join banderite shouts in front of portraits of Bandera and Shukhevych. We should not be surprised then that two hours after the address of the President of Poland Bronislaw Komorowski, The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted without discussion four Acts, which aim were: the recognition of the OUN and the UPA as fi ghters for Samostijna Ukraine, erasing from the collective memory shared 70-year history of the Ukrainian nation and increase of divisions in Ukrainian society. In Poland, the Acts have been passed over by the mass media (except for "Przegląd" and "Nie"). Neither the issue have been raised by the Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz in talks with the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Groysman, nor by the Interior Minister Grezgorz Schetyna during his parliamentary speech on Polish foreign policy and it is even quite carefully sidestepped in the presidential campaign by all parties. Answering the question posed by "Przegląd" – "How Poland should react to the decisions of the authorities of Ukraine regarding members of the OUN and the UPA?" – advisor to the President of Poland, Professor Tomasz Nałęcz, stated, among others, "Let us remember that Ukraine is our neighbour and friend, therefore we should talk to it. I do not think the best way of conversation with a friend is to send a note of protest". In 2010, we had the courage to raise the question of granting a title of Hero of Ukraine to Bandera and Shukhevych by W. Yushchenko and to persuade the European Parliament to express deep indignation (initiator: Paweł Zalewski from PO) and withdraw this Act. Now, all indications are that we lack this courage. It is very diffi cult to speak now about the future of Ukraine and Polish – Ukrainian relations. There are only very few groups, which speak now about the need to change of our eastern policy. The borderland communities haven't obtained in our country organizations which would have an impact on foreign or even economic policy. It can therefore be assumed that regardless of who wins the presidential and parliamentary elections, Poland will continue to pursue a realistic and pragmatic policy, although resulting from Russophobia of Polish political elites and conducted by them historical policy. Previous actions of the Ukrainian authorities suggest that there may occur a scenario known to us from the period after the Orange Revolution. The current Ukrainian authorities do not seek to unite his people for a common goal, but they increase divisions in society. Ukrainian nation needs an agreement and consensus, not creation of new barriers. Polish experience shows that the actual legal, economic and political transformation needs a national consensus rather than replacing it with settlements with the past and nationalism. It seems that Poland irretrievably lost its positions of expert on East. As correctly pointed out Professor Andrzej Walicki "the prestige of Poland asa supposed export on Russia ceased to exist, because our position in Russian affairs is predictable and does not help to solve real problems". Poland should act in order to end the conflict in Ukraine, at the same time attempting to understand both sides of the conflict. Different economic and geopolitic interests causes that the positions of various countries on the events in Ukraine are and will remain diverse. Louis Stomma wrote that "the sudden and incredible love of Poles for modern Ukraine is a sad love without reciprocity". In the interest of Poland is striving for consensus and sensible mediation rather than setting up as a front-line state. A compromise is always possible, but if interest is not mixed with morals and national resentments. Preventing from compromise would reflect on the fate of the whole region and Ukraine would be harmed the most.

The fall of ZSRR in 1991 year caused the disintegration of polity-economic system, which was found in 20. years last century. Almost seventy year of function of union state had on structure of economies of republics of the principle influence entering in his composition. The arrangement of strong economic correlations was developed. Therefore the fall of ZSRR made up for smaller republics serious problem in creation of bases' of national economy. Every of them aimed to consolidation her State under political regard, but first of all economic. Found in year 1991 the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had to be the organization of co-operation all post-soviet states. However the differences of interests and search in global polity - economic arrangement the own place the first foundations of re - integration verified in frames of CIS fundamentally. In practice, after twenty years, many smaller organizations in CIS were found and assembling after several countries which join around common aims. The ambitious plans creation of common market in CIS they be put aside and seem unreal now. However real progress (though more also modest than mutual settlements) was reached in building the union between Belarus and Russian. The question about role and place of this regional formation arisen in global economy. The elevation the level of development of national economies, competitiveness of CIS stands up with next important matter to decision. It the Commonwealth of Independent States hugs 16,4% the world territory which lives 4,4% the population of globe. It on countries of CIS falls 20% world supplies of petroleum, 40% earth gas, 25% carbon, 10% production of electrical energy, 25% world forest supplies, about 11% world renewed water supplies, 13% the ground arable. In 2007 year in CIS countries was produced 3,1% the world PKB, export of goods with states of CIS was stay 3,6% world export ; Upadek ZSRR w 1991 roku spowodował dezintegrację systemu polityczno-gospodarczego, który powstał w latach 20. ubiegłego wieku. Prawie siedemdziesięcioletni okres funkcjonowania państwa związkowego miał zasadniczy wpływ na strukturę gospodarek republik wchodzących w jego skład. Rozwinął się układ silnych współzależności gospodarczych. Dlatego upadek ZSRR stanowił dla mniejszych republik poważny problem w stworzeniu podstaw gospodarki narodowej. Każda z nich dążyła do umocnienia swojej państwowości pod względem politycznym, ale przede wszystkim gospodarczym. Powołana w roku 1991 Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw miała być organizacją współpracy wszystkich państw postradzieckich. Jednak różnice interesów i poszukiwania własnego miejsca w globalnym układzie polityczno-gospodarczym zasadniczo zweryfikowały pierwotne założenia reintegracji w ramach Wspólnoty Niepodległych Państw. W praktyce, po dwudziestu latach funkcjonowania, w WNP powstało wiele mniejszych organizacji grupujących po kilka krajów, które łączą się wokół wspólnych celów. Ambitne plany utworzenia wspólnego rynku w WNP były odkładane i obecnie wydają się nierealne. Natomiast realny postęp (choć też skromniejszy niż wzajemne ustalenia) został osiągnięty w budowaniu Związku Białorusi i Rosji. Przed WNP ostro powstaje pytanie o roli i miejscu ugrupowania regionalnego w gospodarce globalnej. Podniesienie poziomu rozwoju gospodarek narodowych, konkurencyjności całej Wspólnoty staje nie mniej ważną kwestią do rozstrzygnięcia. Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw obejmuje 16,4% światowego terytorium, które zamieszkuje 4,4% populacji globu. Na kraje WNP przypada 20% światowych zasobów ropy naftowej, 40% gazu ziemnego, 25% węgla, 10% produkcji energii elektrycznej, 25% światowych zasobów leśnych, około 11% światowych odnawianych zasobów wodnych, 13% ziemi ornych. W 2007 roku w krajach WNP wyprodukowano 3,1% światowego PKB, eksport dóbr z państw WNP wynosił 3,6% eksportu światowego