In: Mallinder , L 2019 , Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements . PA-X Report: Transitional Justice Series , Global Justice Academy, University of Edinburgh , Edinburgh .
This research report explores when and how amnesties are used during conflict and transitions towards peace. In particular, it examines how the context in which amnesties are adopted can shape decisions on whether to limit the material or personal scope of amnesties or to attach conditions to the grant of amnesty; or on their range of legal effects. The report argues that these aspects of amnesty design can have significant implications for the extent to which amnesty can contribute to inclusive political settlements or conversely to excluding some individuals or groups from the post-conflict political contract. The report draws on the new Amnesties, Conflict, and Peace Agreement (ACPA) dataset to conduct a large-scale comparative analysis of trends in state practice on conflict and peace-related amnesties. The findings of this report contribute significantly to the fledgling literature on the role of amnesties in resolving armed conflicts by documenting and analysing the specific forms and functions of amnesties enacted during conflict and peace and exploring how they are tied to the negotiation and implementation of peace processes.
Past and present attempts to stabilize war-torn Somalia through military, diplomatic and humanitarian interventions highlight the entanglements and interplay between local and foreign elites in policies and practices that have frequently and effectively undermined statebuilding in south-central Somalia. Existing analyses have focused predominantly on local actors and internal dynamics to account for the continuous political disorder in the former Somali Democratic Republic since 1991. In contrast, this study highlights the role of external aid in dysfunctional statebuilding efforts in Somalia. Rather than assuming that foreign actors are outside the local and national political settlements, such actors should rather be seen as an integral part of these processes. Consequently, the power and interests of both Somali and international actors must be taken into consideration in order to understand the shortcomings of stabilization policies. Persistent tactics by Somali elites—mobilizing, appropriating and redirecting foreign resources and agendas—have been at the core of failed statebuilding. Such tactics form part of what French Africanist Jean-François Bayart has described as 'extraversion'. Because Somali elites have regularly turned their participation in transitional governments into a resource appropriation tactic, statebuilding has become an end in itself rather than the outcome of a more profound process of actual state formation that would have entailed the centralization of coercion, the generation of public revenue or the building up of popular support. ; Past and present attempts to stabilize war-torn Somalia through military, diplomatic and humanitarian interventions highlight the entanglements and interplay between local and foreign elites in policies and practices that have frequently and effectively undermined statebuilding in south-central Somalia. Existing analyses have focused predominantly on local actors and internal dynamics to account for the continuous political disorder in the former Somali Democratic Republic since 1991. In contrast, this study highlights the role of external aid in dysfunctional statebuilding efforts in Somalia. Rather than assuming that foreign actors are outside the local and national political settlements, such actors should rather be seen as an integral part of these processes. Consequently, the power and interests of both Somali and international actors must be taken into consideration in order to understand the shortcomings of stabilization policies. Persistent tactics by Somali elites—mobilizing, appropriating and redirecting foreign resources and agendas—have been at the core of failed statebuilding. Such tactics form part of what French Africanist Jean-François Bayart has described as 'extraversion'. Because Somali elites have regularly turned their participation in transitional governments into a resource appropriation tactic, statebuilding has become an end in itself rather than the outcome of a more profound process of actual state formation that would have entailed the centralization of coercion, the generation of public revenue or the building up of popular support.
Political Settlements are often identified with post-conflict conditions. Basically the main idea of political settlements is a shared understanding among the elites in the context of power distribution. Common understanding is interpreted as an agreement on the negotiations carried out, which is intended for the continuity of the overall system after the conflict. Thus the study of political settlements will show how the elites, both the formal elite and the informal elite, as well as other institutions in the community carry out strategies or strategies to establish legitimacy. The political agreement also negotiates the distribution of available resources. Thus the power relations that occur will restore the classic concept of power from Laswell namely Who Gets What, When and How, showing who has power in the agreement. As political agreements emerge as a strategy for cooperation rather than competition, in order to secure their interests, it takes days or even centuries, to be renewed continuously. Those who agree would continue to contest and are subject to renegotiation. The result would be new regulations or policies in the context of maintaining the status quo. Therefore, the political settlement framework did not state that the emergence of each policy reflects the balance of power in a country. Although in reality political agreement occurs in every political action, but in concept not many people use it in political analysis. This paper tried to describe the development of the concept of political agreement by examining the level of reality.
This Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development explores the relationship between political settlements and violence. While there is an emerging body of scholarship on political settlements, its relationship to violence has been under-theorised and has not been systematically examined through comparative country case studies. This Special Issue is the result of a DFID-funded research programme on addressing and mitigating violence co- ordinated by the Institute of Development Studies. A workshop was organised in Goodenough College in London in 2015 to discuss the research findings with representatives from DFID and the FCO, regional experts as well as leading academics who have contributed to the development of the concept of political settlement.
In a dramatic few years, South Africa shifted from being trapped in an apparently intractable conflict between a dominant white minority and an oppressed black majority to being a democratic state with an outstanding progressive liberal constitution. It moved from being the epitome of racial conflict to a model of peaceful transition. And yet, twenty years later, the cracks in the settlement are all too clear and the risks of internal conflict are growing. The transition is truncated. ; The paper was prepared under the umbrella of the DFID-funded and University of Manchester-led global comparative Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) research program – South Africa is one of the countries targeted for comparative ESID research -- as an analytical platform for more in-depth, targeted research. The ESID program has provided funding for in-depth research on the politics and governance of basic education in South Africa, and for research on business-state relations in South Africa (both part of a broader multi-country comparative study); and for some initial case studies on the politics and governance of infrastructural state-owned enterprises. We thank Anthony Black, Dave Kaplan and Nicoli Nattrass for their helpful comments.
This paper looks at practice-research methods used by Conciliation Resources (CR), an international peacebuilding organisation, as part of the Political Settlements Research Project. Between 2015 and 2017, Conciliation Resources and its partners convened three learning workshops in Nepal, Colombia, and Bougainville. The workshops 'tested' understandings of political settlements in conflict-affected contexts, with a specific focus on gender, through participatory practice-based research. The paper explores how co-learning approaches were developed and designed between CR and its partners: including how questions of inclusion, gender and political settlements were adapted to specific contexts; the approaches and methods developed; and the challenges and potential for research to influence peacebuilding practice. It also provides a critical reflection on the processes and outcomes of co-learning between international and local partners.
Technical approaches to institutional reform and development following liberal-democratic and market economy blueprints have generally had disappointing outcomes. Recent years have seen a growing acknowledgement among development actors of the need for a much better understanding of how power, structure and agency combine to shape, constrain and compromise the workings of (formal and informal) institutions, with a view to facilitating more successful development outcomes in recipient countries. The new catch-cry of "thinking and working politically" has been accompanied by growing investment in political economy analyses and other analytical tools. As a concept, "political settlements" provides a potentially valuable instrument for enhancing understanding of the organisation and exercise of power in particular local contexts and for enabling the crafting of more appropriate and effective development interventions. In this session, we will examine the concept in the specific contexts of Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands with a view to considering its broader value to development theory and practice.
The characteristics of a political settlement allow us to analyse the dynamics of institutional and policy evolution and their associated developmental outcomes. Four phases in the evolution of the political settlement in Bangladesh are identified, corresponding to the periods of military government in Pakistan from 1958 to 1971, the dominant party rule of the Awami League from 1971 to 1975, authoritarian clientelism under military rulers operating formally multi-party democracies from 1975 to 1990 and competitive clientelist democracy from 1990 onwards. For each period, we look at the dominant institutional and policy characteristics and the ways in which the political settlement constrained or enabled development outcomes. The framework is then used to analyse the dynamics of three sectors that have played a critical role in driving or constraining development in the growth acceleration after 1980. The first is the garments and textile industry, which emerged during the clientelistic authoritarian period of the 1980s and has driven growth in exports since then. Growth in the sector took off when financing instruments emerged that could finance the 'learning' of the appropriate technological and organizational capabilities for achieving competitiveness. The financing was partly based on the rents created by the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), and partly on a private financing arrangement between Desh and Daewoo, with institutional support from the government. The package created strong incentives and compulsions for high levels of learning effort. As the political settlement evolved, technological upgrading has become more difficult though it is happening at the level of individual firms. Second, we look at the electronics sector whose takeoff in the 2000s took place under a competitive clientelist political settlement. The external financing support available to the sector was much less significant and the takeoff depended on the leading role played by a nationalist enterprise that absorbed the risks of investing in learning-by-doing. Progress has been much slower compared to garments. The development of supportive policy for these sectors requires an understanding of both the importance of supporting learning with appropriate financing instruments and the requirement that these instruments should create strong incentives for putting in high levels of effort given the enforcement capabilities of the contemporary political settlement. Finally power generation is an example of an infrastructure sector where poor investment has constrained development. The problem here is not learning-by-doing but adverse incentives for investment that can be traced to an excessive reliance on private sector financing in a political settlement where long-term investments face significant political risks. This combination has resulted in only a few politically connected players bidding for projects with a focus on immediate 'procurement rents' rather than on the profits from future production. Conventional reform strategies focusing on transparency, competition and anti-corruption have not achieved results and the political settlement analysis can explain why. However, a strategy focusing on a long-term financing agency with a dedicated governance structure could change incentives sufficiently to enable improvements in power generation to be achieved even in the context of a competitive clientelist political settlement.
Over the past five years, several major international development policy statements and declarations have adopted 'political settlement' as a framing concept to guide statebuilding practice in fragile and conflict-affected states, and encouraged efforts towards achieving an inclusive, or inclusive enough, political settlement in order to underpin stability. Despite the policy enthusiasm, the concept itself remains elusive.1 This discussion paper explores how the concept 'political settlement' arose and where it came from, identifies its essential elements and the level of consensus around them and tests out some of its normative content. Finally it considers where the concept might go from here.
Over the past five years, several major international development policy statements and declarations have adopted 'political settlement' as a framing concept to guide statebuilding practice in fragile and conflict-affected states, and encouraged efforts towards achieving an inclusive, or inclusive enough, political settlement in order to underpin stability. Despite the policy enthusiasm, the concept itself remains elusive.1 This discussion paper explores how the concept 'political settlement' arose and where it came from, identifies its essential elements and the level of consensus around them and tests out some of its normative content. Finally it considers where the concept might go from here.
This Editorial introduces the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP) at the University of Edinburgh, and this Special Issue on Engendering Political Settlements which draws together findings and analysis from the gender theme of the PSRP.
After more than two decades of ongoing violent conflict, armed groups—however fleeting their existence—have become an integral feature of the eastern Congo's social-political order. They are not a temporary aberration in what is otherwise a normal society. They are at the heart of the way power is exercised and experienced. Moreover, armed groups do not stand apart from either society or the state apparatus. They are deeply embedded in social networks that regroup state and non-state actors and that stretch from the very local to the national and sometimes the sub-regional (Great Lakes area) and international levels. This report analyses the stability, inclusivity and levels of violence of both the political settlement of the Congo as a whole and of political settlements in the conflict-ridden east. It shows that in each of these political arenas, armed groups and violence play a different role, and examines how these arenas mutually influence each other. The relative importance of armed groups as either resources or threats to the power of the presidential patronage network shapes its policies towards the east, such as initiatives for military operations or negotiations. These policies influence the role that armed groups play locally. This role, in turn, shapes to what extent and how national politicians engage with armed groups; for instance, whether they support their mobilization or demobilization.
This article first comments on three aspects of the peace process, namely: its outcomes and impacts; thee tri-tripartite partnership in the process established by Bougainville groups, the PNG Government and the international community (government of countries of the region and the United Nations); and the centrality of the political settlement to the process. The second part summarises and comments on the implementation of the main features of the settlement. The final part comments on the prospects that the settlement will lay the foundations for sustainable peace for Bougainville. The suggestion is made that a continuation of the tripartite partnership may be required, in particular, are to meet expectations in Bougainville.
Since the Fourth Republic was inaugurated in 1993, politics in Ghana has been increasingly characterized by competitive clientelism. Ruling coalitions are characterized by a high degree of vulnerability in power due to a strong opposition party, by strong lower-level factions within the ruling coalition due to their importance in winning elections, and by a high degree of fragmentation among the ruling elite. These characteristics, combined with a weak domestic capitalist class and high inflows of foreign aid, have led the ruling elites across political parties to pursue and implement policies that have a short time horizon, that do not significantly shift the allocation of resources towards building productive sectors, and which are often plagued by problems of enforcement. The results have led to growth without economic transformation. In particular, the country has witnessed recurrent macroeconomic instability, a haphazard process of privatization of state-owned enterprises, and no serious attempt to build up productive sectors outside of cocoa and gold.
