Suchergebnisse

A poll on political tolerance was conducted using a 772-subject sample. Because of the long-lasting totalitarian system & the short period of democracy, a rather low level of political tolerance was expected. However, the results of the poll showed a high level of political tolerance instead. Similar findings have been obtained by an American survey conducted in several European countries, including Croatia. This means that political tolerance in Croatia has not been shaped by the totalitarian system but by the pluralist traits of the Croatian culture, ensuing from numerous contacts with a plethora of different cultures. If the pluralist democracy in Croatia is to function democratically, appropriate legal prerequisites & institutions do not suffice; the people who are in line with the principles of pluralist democracy are central to this as well. Pluralist democracy legalizes various political options & enables citizens to organize themselves & act in accordance with the embraced option. All this, however, is a moot point if people are not willing to accept the existence & activism of different political options. That is why the concept of political tolerance always goes hand in hand with the concept of pluralist democracy. The essence of political is not tolerance & patience but non-restriction of political freedoms & political pluralism. Those who accept political pluralism must acknowledge the existence of various political options, even those of which they do not approve. They more readily accept the existence of various political options & nurture a less intensive feeling of intolerance & bigotry. So, tolerance means accepting, not just tolerating, different political options. 12 Tables, 2 Graphs, 19 References. Adapted from the source document.

Two stages in the conceptualization of & research on political tolerance are addressed: the studies of Stouffer (1955), Prothro & Grigg, & others; & the work of J. Sullivan (1979) & his collaborators. In relation to earlier research, Sullivan & his collaborators have established a "contentual control" of tolerance by precisely distinguishing political attitudes toward generally unpopular groups in society from tolerance itself or from the readiness to put up with those groups with which individuals otherwise do not agree. We believe, however, that this does not sufficiently define political tolerance. We therefore define tolerance as the readiness to put up with certain groups with which individuals do not otherwise agree -- in correspondence with the ensemble of universal political liberties (ie, the general norms of democracy) -- but only up to certain limits. Tolerance can reach certain limits because political liberties are not absolute values but are restricted by other relevant values of society. This complicates also the methodology of the study of this very complex phenomenon. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.

In a response to Vladimir Vujcic's earlier review of the author's (2003) book, Politicka i medijska kultura u Hrvatskoj (Political and Media Culture in Croatia), which charged that the author had trod on research that Vujcic himself was preparing in his own recently published Politicka tolerancija (Political Tolerance), & also failed fully to account for a conclusion that intolerance of fascists, Yugoslavists, communists, & Ustashe in contemporary Croatia is not indicative of a culture of political intolerance. In response, the author points out that much of his research was carried out in 1992-1993, & that the author himself acknowledged the difficulty of adequately defining "tolerance." In conclusion Vujcic is accused of sophistry. A. Siegel

Tolerance is among the most crucial social & political values in the theory of liberal virtues. There are two basic ways of exploring political tolerance, as tolerance of the generally unpopular groups in the society (see S. Stouffer, 1955), & of the personally objectionable (least respected) groups (see J. Sullivan, 1979). We look into the tolerance of generally unpopular groups -- fascists, communists & "Yugoslavs." The results of the poll showed that among young Croatians (secondary-school students & university students), there is a high level of tolerance of communists & fascists (generally unpopular groups), since the percentage is higher than the so called democratic majority (50+%), while the percentage of tolerance for "Yugoslavs" is somewhat lower, below the said democratic majority. It is worth noting that tolerance of the same groups was lower when the poll participants themselves chose these groups as personally objectionable (ie, least respected). Education (regarding the tolerance of communists) & sex (regarding the tolerance of fascists) proved to have had a significant influence on the results of the poll. 9 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

The author presents a thesis about the difference between cultural/historical & political identity by distinguishing the cultural/historical majorities & minorities from the political winners & losers. He points to the democratic paradox according to which states are not ruled by the losers' political majorities but by the winners' political minorities. According to the author, in multiethnic societies, it is necessary to equally develop the popular & the political culture -- that is both cultural & political tolerance. Adapted from the source document.

Describes the study of the evolution of the awareness (understanding) & the practice (activities, participation) of citizenship among Croatian high school students (the first new generation of full-age citizens). The research was conducted in line with similar models in relevant international studies, which enabled a comparative analysis. The analysis of the concept (basic theory) of citizenship was followed by a comparative analysis of the development & the distribution of the citizenship awareness & the yardsticks of the practice of citizenship among Croatian high school students. A number of indicators of the awareness of citizenship (civic identity, the model & the type of citizenship, the concept of the "good citizen," & the concept of the rights & duties of citizens in democracy), & several measures of the practice of citizenship (political interest, discussing politics, following news in the media, the expected conventional & protest political activism, political tolerance) have been used. The comparative analysis has shown that the Croatian students are in some aspects of citizenship at the level of students in many of the comparison nations, but that in others there are significant differences; eg, their level of political interest is significantly lower. The analysis has shown that there is a high awareness of the rights, but relatively a low awareness of the duties, which may be the main problem in the development of political culture of Croatian students & citizens. The expected conventional & protest participation among the Croatian students is significantly lower than among students from other countries. The research also shows that among Croatian students (that phenomenon has also been noticed in other countries) there is a significant discrepancy between, for example, the awareness of the rights & duties of citizens in democracy & the level of political tolerance: the high level of awareness of one's rights (freedom of speech, association, etc) coexists with a relatively low level of tolerance. Thus, it can be said that various inconsistencies tag & "burden" the evolution of citizenship among Croatian high school students. 13 Tables, 40 References. Adapted from the source document.

In a reply to Vujevic's response to his earlier review of the latter's FTRPoliticka i medijska kultura u HrvatskojR ([Political and Media Culture in Croatia] 3PLMS 2003 1), the author points out the polemical nature of invoking fascism, communism, etc, to make rhetorical points; also notes that Vujevic fails to grasp his own nuanced thought, & that he also fails to distinguish between tolerance as a virtue of the civil society & tolerating in the sense of tacitly accepting the odious. The author takes issue with Vujevic's definition of tolerance as embracing difference rather than supporting it, & also asserts his claim that Vujevic does not analyze his own data correctly, claiming that a 38% sector of the population in favor of legally protecting political parties of various ideological stripes is a majority. 1 Table. A. Siegel

In a response to Vujcic's reply to the earlier polemics regarding the review of the author's Politicka i medijska kultura u Hrvatskoj (Political and Media Culture in Croatia), the question of how to define tolerance, & whether this should imply support for the minority instead of just acceptance is taken up once again. The author defends himself against Vujcic's charge that he has not analyzed his own data correctly, pointing out that public opinion & media polling show a broad & general correlation for tolerance of minority viewpoints. Disagreements over the semantics of "tolerance" continue, as Voltaire's definition is once again held up as a model. 1 Table. A. Siegel

The impact of the thought of political scientist/philosopher John Rawls on Croatian political science in general, & the department of political science at the U of Zagreb in particular, is commemorated with this overview of the significance of Rawls's writings on justice, tolerance, & the spirit of pluralism as part of a conference held at the university on 7-8 Mar 2003. The effect of Rawls's Theory of Justice on Croatian political philosophy is as great as that of Hobbes's Leviathan & Rousseau's Social Contract. Rawls is commended for his wisdom & call for tolerance, a value in short supply both in recent Eastern European & American history. A. Siegel

In the last in a series of polemics the author despairs at the pointlessness of further argument with Vujevic over his review of the latter's Politicka i medijska kultura u Hrvatskoj (Political and Media Culture in Croatia). The sticking point is the question of how to interpret a survey result showing that 38% of those surveyed in Croatia were in favor of legally protecting political parties of non-mainstream viewpoints as indicating a majority of Croatians are "tolerant." Cited is international political science research that indicates the relative consistency of such views & their percentages in both Europe & the US. A. Siegel

Modern states display a pluralism of ethical, religious, & philosophical convictions that brings into question the possibility of a strong identification of citizens with the political community. Due to these centrifugal tendencies, as well as to the disintegration of the traditional ties, modern political communities need more solidarity to be able to efficiently solve the complex problems of modern society. The burden of political decision making in modern societies is constantly growing, while its space is, at the same time, getting more confined due to the tendency of differentiation & separation of the administrative & economic sphere of power from the disposition of politics. How can modern societies surmount these challenges by linking tolerance & solidarity, democracy & social complexity? What are the cultural prerequisites for this & which institutional rules are necessary to overcome these difficulties? How is it possible in such a situation to achieve political unity & ensure the legitimation of activities necessary for a normal functioning of a political community? Here, the author outlines Rawls's answer regarding the pluralism of modern societies & the solutions he offered. First, he focuses on the changes in Rawls's original position that occurred after his book A Theory of Justice; then he highlights several themes contained in the criticisms that prompted Rawls to change his original position; next he analyzes the concept of justice as fairness from the point of view of pluralism; & finally, he outlines Rawls's concepts that are, according to him, conducive to political unity & legitimacy. 8 References. Adapted from the source document.

This note introduces contributions delivered at the international conference "Ustav kao simbol i instrument" (The Constitution as a Symbol and Instrument), held in Zagreb, 7-8 Dec 2001. The symbolic & regulating functions of the constitution are noted as very much distinct objectives. Excerpts from the preambles of the American & French constitutions are quoted to illustrate that this document not only spells out the fundamental laws by which a nation is to be governed but also states the people's basic values, views on self-determination, equality, tolerance, or liberty, & ethical principles that it holds dear. The constitution is an instrument regulating a political process while at the same time functioning as a symbol of political culture. The people do not only state in it their sovereignty but also a conception of the republic's order. Z. Dubiel

The author thinks that liberalism, as a political doctrine, is eminently contradictory, the contradiction being embodied in its two variants. The perfectionist doctrines by William Galston & Joseph Raz advocate liberal forms of good life (autonomy, tolerance, openness to the world), while the antiperfectionist doctrine of John Rawls limits itself to defining the procedural foundations of justice. Raz's & Galston's liberal perfectionism is in danger, in the name of liberal values & virtues, of violating the principle of neutrality of political authority in relation to individual choice of values, while Rawls's concept of procedural justice cannot steer clear of the danger that the total permissiveness regarding individual value options eventually undermines the foundations of liberal society. The author concludes that the balance between perfectionism & anti perfectionism is essential for the defense of liberalism. Such argumentational strategy has to take into consideration the liberal notion of justice, the necessity of a liberating democratic politics, & the concept of a citizen as a subject who, by practicing active tolerance, accepts the responsibility for the community. Adapted from the source document.

The author thinks that liberalism, as a political doctrine, is eminently contradictory, the contradiction being embodied in its two variants. The perfectionist doctrines by William Galston & Joseph Raz advocate liberal forms of good life (autonomy, tolerance, openness to the world), while the antiperfectionist doctrine of John Rawls limits itself to defining the procedural foundations of justice. Raz's & Galston's liberal perfectionism is in danger, in the name of liberal values & virtues, of violating the principle of neutrality of political authority in relation to individual choice of values, while Rawls's concept of procedural justice cannot steer clear of the danger that the total permissiveness regarding individual value options eventually undermines the foundations of liberal society. The author concludes that the balance between perfectionism & anti perfectionism is essential for the defense of liberalism. Such argumentational strategy has to take into consideration the liberal notion of justice, the necessity of a liberating democratic politics, & the concept of a citizen as a subject who, by practicing active tolerance, accepts the responsibility for the community. Adapted from the source document.

Like other landmark historic events, the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia has been explained by three types of theories: mythological, scientific, & commonsensical -- the latter making use of certain pseudoscientific arguments. The author claims that the theory blaming the media in all six republics of former Yugoslavia for the outbreak of the war belongs to the latter type. The empirical findings gathered on the eve of the war show that ethnic tolerance was highest in the republics that were later struck by the war: Bosnia & Herzegovina & Croatia. The author provides an alternative explanation of the role of the media in paving the way for the war. Only in Serbia did mass media, in the circumstances of the prevailing authoritarian orientation of the population before the war, serve the aggressive nationalist leadership as a means for political mobilization, which aroused in the Serbian people both a feeling of imperilment & a sense of omnipotence. After the outbreak of the war in Croatia & Bosnia & Herzegovina, the media became only one of several elements in an ever-expanding spiral of hatred & violence. 2 Tables, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.