The Political Transition
In: Towards Capitalist Restoration?, S. 8-23
In: Towards Capitalist Restoration?, S. 8-23
In: New Zealand international review, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 17-21
ISSN: 0110-0262
In: Journal of democracy, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 166-169
ISSN: 1086-3214
In: Strategic analysis: a monthly journal of the IDSA, Band 7, Heft 7, S. 500-507
ISSN: 1754-0054
We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find that the anticipation of receiving new loan programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.
BASE
In: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11889/4787
The debate on political transitions as applied to the Arab world (see volumes one and two of this series) is ongoing, and the applicability of one or the other of the extant models to this region is a lively one, as the present set of studies demonstrates. Most of the arguments advanced below are based on historical and descriptive data, but theoretical considerations are not absent, in particular those that tend to call into question the universality of democratic transitions while stressing their importance as guides to analysis and even to behavior. It is in this spirit that the authors, in addition to the first chapter dealing with the key political transition in the Arab Mashreq during the late Ottoman period, examine the cases of Egypt, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority
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We analyze the in uence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to 2002 that the anticipation of receiving new programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.
BASE
We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to 2002 that the anticipation of receiving new programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.
BASE
We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from in-ternational financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to 2002 that the anticipation of receiving new programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.
BASE
In this paper we analyze the role of the IMF and the World Bank in triggering changes in the political regime, i.e., democracy and autocracy. We develop a theoretical model which predicts that anticipation of financial flows from international financial institutions may trigger political regime changes which would not take place otherwise. We test the implications of our model empirically and find support both for the role of perfectly foreseen IMF and World Bank programs and of the history of previous World Bank programs. The magnitude of this effects is quite substantial.
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In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 465-496
I address the role of social mobility in political transitions. I develop a political economy model of regime transitions that incorporates social mobility as a key feature of the economy capturing the political attitudes toward redistribution. I show that social mobility facilitates democratization by reducing the conflict over redistribution between the rich and the poor. Furthermore, it facilitates democratic consolidation by reducing the likelihood of a coup under democracy. On the other hand, social mobility helps to keep an authoritarian regime stable by reducing the likelihood of mass movements against political elites. 3 Figures, 1 Appendix, 43 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2005.]
In: Review of African political economy, Band 22, Heft 64, S. 183-197
ISSN: 0305-6244
Der Beitrag entwickelt aus einer Kritik der bisherigen Forschung und Theoriebildung in der Frage der Demokratisierung und des politischen Umbruchs einen eigenen theorieorientierten Rahmen zur Analyse der Übergangsprozesse in Afrika. Für die künftige Forschung verlangt der Autor u.a., diese Übergangsprozesse als historische Entwicklungen zu begreifen, die traditionellen Dimensionen der spezifisch afrikanischen Zivilgesellschaft zu erkennen und einen interdisziplinären Analyseansatz zu verwenden. (DÜI-Kör)
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of communist studies and transition politics, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 1-12
ISSN: 1352-3279
THE AUTHORS ASSESS HUNGARY'S TRANSITION FROM COMMUNISM TO DEMOCRACY AND NOTE RELATIVE SUCCESS CHARACTERIZED BY MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS, A PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WITH A CLEAR DIVISION OF POLITICAL FUNCTIONS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PRIVATE SECTOR. THEY ATTRIBUTE THIS SUCCESS, IN PART, TO THE REFORM EXPERIENCE OF THE COMMUNIST ERA. THEY CONCLUDE THAT FURTHER PROGRESS IS DEPENDENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, AS WELL AS ON THE SUCCESS WITH WHICH NEW GOVERNMENTS TACKLE PROBLEMS OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP, POPULAR CONSULTATION, AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT.