This paper argues that politicians are overprotected. The costs of political assassination differ systematically depending on whether a private or a public point of view is taken. A politician attributes a very high (if not infinite) cost to his or her survival. The social cost of political assassination is much smaller as politicians are replaceable. Conversely, the private cost of the security measures is low for politicians, its bulk - including time loss and inconvenience - is imposed on taxpayers and the general public. The extent of overprotection is larger in dictatorial than in democratic countries.
This paper argues that politicians are overprotected. The costs of political assassination differ systematically depending on whether a private or a public point of view is taken. A politician attributes a very high (if not infinite) cost to his or her survival. The social cost of political assassination is much smaller as politicians are replaceable. Conversely, the private cost of the security measures is low for politicians, its bulk - including time loss and inconvenience - is imposed on taxpayers and the general public. The extent of overprotection is larger in dictatorial than in democratic countries.
We study a political system in which voters can optimally pick between political platforms,but cannot screen the quality of individual politicians associated with these platforms.A bad individual achievement can correspond to either incompetence (adverse selection) orcorruption (moral hazard). Information could improve, if independent experts assess achievementsas compared to commitments, allowing independent judges to investigate possible corruption.We find that while good experts are always beneficial as they increase transparency,the impact of the quality of judges is ambiguous. Above a threshold, with risk-averse socialplanners, good judges increase the incentive-compatible punishment of politicians, at the costof possible judiciary mistakes. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
SUMMARYAre beautiful politicians more likely to be elected? To test this, we use evidence from Australia, a country in which voting is compulsory, and in which voters are given 'How‐to‐Vote' cards, depicting photos of the major party candidates, as they arrive to vote. Using raters chosen to be representative of the electorate, we assess the beauty of political candidates from major political parties, and then estimate the effect of beauty on voteshare for candidates in the 2004 federal election. Beautiful candidates are indeed more likely to be elected, with a one standard deviation increase in beauty associated with a 1 ½– 2 percentage point increase in voteshare. Our results are robust to several specification checks: adding party fixed effects, dropping well‐known politicians, using non‐Australian beauty raters, omitting candidates of non‐Anglo appearance, controlling for age, and analyzing the 'beauty gap' between candidates running in the same electorate. The marginal effect of beauty is larger for male candidates than for female candidates, and appears to be approximately linear. Consistent with the theory that returns to beauty reflect discrimination, we find suggestive evidence that beauty matters more in electorates with a higher share of apathetic voters.
We develop a model of policymaking in which a politician decides how much expertise to acquire or how informed to become about issues before interest groups engage in monetary lobbying. For a range of issues, the policymaker prefers to remain clueless about the merits of reform, even when acquiring expertise or better information is costless. Such a strategy leads to intense lobbying competition and larger political contributions. We identify a novel benefit of campaign finance reform, showing how contribution limits decrease the incentives that policymakers have to remain uninformed or ignorant of the issues on which they vote.
Weeks before the the federaI election was called Refuge contacted three political figures who have subsequently been returned to Parliament, Minister of Employment and Immigration Barbara McDougall, Opposition Critic on Immigration and Multiculturalism Sergio Marchi, and NDP Critic on Immigration Dan Heap, to question them about their refugee agendas. Eventually all three found time amid some frantic canvassing to grant us brief but revealing interviews, which are printed below in the order in which they occurred.
In Politicians Don't Pander, Lawrence Jacobs & Robert Shapiro show that politicians follow public opinion much less slavishly than conventional wisdom suggests. However, the case studies they themselves rely on show that public opinion constrains policymakers more than they claim. Conversely, to the extent that political leaders are able to ignore the public's wishes, Jacobs & Shapiro do not adequately consider the possibility that this is due in large part to severe voter ignorance of public policy. In urging greater obedience to the popular will, the authors also overlook the danger that increased adherence to the often internally contradictory wishes of the electorate may be impossible or undesirable. 30 References. Adapted from the source document.
