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We find ourselves in a time that has brought significant changes to the way we communicate. The technological progress and rise of social media have shaped both the news media and the contemporary political landscape, impacting and altering political discourse. As a result, the role of social media in political communication has become pervasive, and politicians now tend to communicate more directly with the public without the intermediary of traditional media. The position of the mainstream media as a neutral actor in reporting the news has also been tainted as the media has become increasingly dependent on advertising and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of corporate or state sponsors. Combined, we find ourselves situated in an era where more people are turning to social media for their news, while terms such as disinformation, fake news, post-truth, hate speech and conspiracy theory have become commonplace. In this new public square of communication, it often happens that one person's conspiracy theory is another person's truth, one person's facts are another's fake news, and one person's hate speech is someone else's freedom of speech. ; We find ourselves in a time that has brought significant changes to the way we communicate. The technological progress and rise of social media have shaped both the news media and the contemporary political landscape, impacting and altering political discourse. As a result, the role of social media in political communication has become pervasive, and politicians now tend to communicate more directly with the public without the intermediary of traditional media. The position of the mainstream media as a neutral actor in reporting the news has also been tainted as the media has become increasingly dependent on advertising and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of corporate or state sponsors. Combined, we find ourselves situated in an era where more people are turning to social media for their news, while terms such as disinformation, fake news, post-truth, hate speech and conspiracy theory have become commonplace. In this new public square of communication, it often happens that one person's conspiracy theory is another person's truth, one person's facts are another's fake news, and one person's hate speech is someone else's freedom of speech. ; We find ourselves in a time that has brought significant changes to the way we communicate. The technological progress and rise of social media have shaped both the news media and the contemporary political landscape, impacting and altering political discourse. As a result, the role of social media in political communication has become pervasive, and politicians now tend to communicate more directly with the public without the intermediary of traditional media. The position of the mainstream media as a neutral actor in reporting the news has also been tainted as the media has become increasingly dependent on advertising and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of corporate or state sponsors. Combined, we find ourselves situated in an era where more people are turning to social media for their news, while terms such as disinformation, fake news, post-truth, hate speech and conspiracy theory have become commonplace. In this new public square of communication, it often happens that one person's conspiracy theory is another person's truth, one person's facts are another's fake news, and one person's hate speech is someone else's freedom of speech. ; We find ourselves in a time that has brought significant changes to the way we communicate. The technological progress and rise of social media have shaped both the news media and the contemporary political landscape, impacting and altering political discourse. As a result, the role of social media in political communication has become pervasive, and politicians now tend to communicate more directly with the public without the intermediary of traditional media. The position of the mainstream media as a neutral actor in reporting the news has also been tainted as the media has become increasingly dependent on advertising and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of corporate or state sponsors. Combined, we find ourselves situated in an era where more people are turning to social media for their news, while terms such as disinformation, fake news, post-truth, hate speech and conspiracy theory have become commonplace. In this new public square of communication, it often happens that one person's conspiracy theory is another person's truth, one person's facts are another's fake news, and one person's hate speech is someone else's freedom of speech. ; We find ourselves in a time that has brought significant changes to the way we communicate. The technological progress and rise of social media have shaped both the news media and the contemporary political landscape, impacting and altering political discourse. As a result, the role of social media in political communication has become pervasive, and politicians now tend to communicate more directly with the public without the intermediary of traditional media. The position of the mainstream media as a neutral actor in reporting the news has also been tainted as the media has become increasingly dependent on advertising and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of corporate or state sponsors. Combined, we find ourselves situated in an era where more people are turning to social media for their news, while terms such as disinformation, fake news, post-truth, hate speech and conspiracy theory have become commonplace. In this new public square of communication, it often happens that one person's conspiracy theory is another person's truth, one person's facts are another's fake news, and one person's hate speech is someone else's freedom of speech. ; Današnji čas je prinesel pomembne spremembe v načinu, kako komuniciramo drug z drugim. Tehnološki napredek in razmah družbenih medijev sta vplivala tako na informativne medije kot na sodobni politični prostor, kar ima pomembne posledice za politični govor. Vloga družbenih medijev v politični komunikaciji se je povečala, saj politiki čedalje bolj neposredno komunicirajo z javnostjo brez posredništva tradicionalnih medijev. Poleg tega je čedalje bolj pod vprašajem nevtralnost osrednjih medijev pri poročanju, saj so vedno bolj odvisni od oglaševanja in tako pod posrednim ali neposrednim vplivom različnih korporativnih ali državnih sponzorjev. Tako smo se znašli v času, ko vse več ljudi informacije pridobi v družbenih medijih, medtem ko so izrazi dezinformacija, lažne novice, postresničnost, sovražni govor in teorije zarote postali vsakdanji del govora. V novem javnem prostoru komunikacije se pogosto zgodi, da je to, kar kdo dojema kot teorijo zarote, za koga drugega resničnost, da so to, kar kdo dojema kot dejstva, za koga drugega lažne novice, in da je to, kar kdo dojema kot sovražni govor, za koga drugega svoboda govora.

Paragraphs in the Slovene constitution, decisions by the Constitutional Court, & local self-government statutes are examined to determine if there is an inherent conflict of interest when mayors of municipalities are also elected & serve as representatives to this country's national assembly. Comparative references are made to other European countries, mostly France, where a similar performance of parliamentary & mayoral functions by the same person is permitted under certain conditions. After analyzing the conflicting scenarios in which the parliamentarian mandate influence the mayoral one, & vice versa, & recognizing the unusually high incidence of dual-mandate cases in Slovenia, a relatively small country, constitutional & legislative actions are suggested to remedy the current situation & minimize the incompatibility of functions & duties at state & local levels. The triple mandate of deputy mayors in Slovenia is also examined, pointing out his/her burden & responsibility in performing duties of mayor & local council & national assembly member. It is concluded that although neither unconstitutional nor unlawful, dual & triple mandates are potentially harmful to democracy, open doors to political corruption & abuse of power, & pose a danger of further damaging the image of an honest politician. Adapted from the source document.

V članku je prikazan poskus ureditve mednacionalnih odnosov na istrskem polotoku v letih pred prvo svetovno vojno v širšem kontekstu reševanja nacionalnih konfliktov v avstrijski polovici Habsburške monarhije. Poseben poudarek je na predstavitvi in analizi moravskega kompromisa leta 1905, ki je temeljil na osebnem načelu in je postal nekakšen model za urejanje mednacionalnih odnosov v Cislajtaniji ter na analizi istrskega kompromisa leta 1908, ki je temeljil na teritorialnem načelu. ; The Habsburg monarchy was an absolutist monarchy before 1848, and from the Theresian-Josephine period there was a tendency to introduce a centralised unitary state. However, this was resisted by Hungary, which was able to maintain its special position under constitutional law. In 1867, the Habsurg Monarchy accepted the Austro-Hungarian compromise to be organized as a dual monarchy, as a personal and real union of two equal and more or less centralized states. The Monarchy was renamed to Austro-Hungary, however, in both parts of the states, this caused various national groups to experience a sense of discomfort and threat and consequently revoked their historical rights and national law. After the establishment of the Dual monarchy, the Wienna governments first favoured the correctional measures plans leading to federalism, after the affirmation of the dualism and the centralization, however, the idea of compromises became the central focus of solving the national disputes in Cisleithania. In 1905, German and Czech politicians in Moravia managed to reach an agreement on how to regulate the national situation in the country. The Moravian Agreement, which was conceived by the Regional Committee, was not based on territorial but on personal principles and became a model for the regulation of international relations in Cislaitania. The Istrian peninsula was also a focal point of national conflict, where Slavic deputies, especially after 1883, strongly advocated the realisation of linguistic equality in the country. The Italian majority in the Istrian Regional Assembly consistently rejected linguistic equality in the Regional Assembly. The Italian side became more receptive to Slavic demands only after the introduction of universal male suffrage for the National Assembly (1907), when it became clear that the process of political democratisation was working in favour of the emancipation of the majority Slavic population. In 1908, the Istrian Agreement, or the Regional Electoral Reform, was signed. The Slavs on the Istrian peninsula have thus won a victory. The Istria Agreement was based on the territorial division of electoral districts according to the principle of nationality and ensured that neither side majorised the other.

Ko slišimo za pojem korupcija, takoj pomislimo na zlorabo javne službe za doseganje lastnih koristi. Posamezniki in podjetja podkupujejo administrativne uslužbence, da le-ti uredijo zadeve, ki morajo biti rešene. Gre torej za izsiljevanje rent od gospodarskih udeležencev in posledično od ekonomije same izključno za zasebne koristi politikov in uradnikov. Tovrsten pristop k obravnavanju pojava je v zadnjih letih začrtal popolnoma novo smer analiziranja in merjenja korupcije. Korupcija se predstavi v popolnoma novi podobi, v kateri posamezniki, skupine oziroma podjetja vplivajo na formulacijo zakonov, ali celo spreobračajo že oblikovana pravila igre, da bi si s tem zagotovili pomembne ugodnosti. Korupcija je in vedno bo obstajala v svetu, edina razlika je v tem, da se z razvojem družb spreminja, prevzema bolj prefinjene oblike, zaradi katerih jo je težje odkrivati in preprečevati. Vse bolj razsežne in destruktivne posledice, ki jih ima korupcija na gospodarsko rast in družbeno stabilnost, nujno zahtevajo praktične strategije omejevanja korupcije. Problem korupcije se ne omejuje na določeno regijo, kajti z njenimi grožnjami se ubadajo tako razvite države kot tudi države v razvoju in tranzitne države. V postsocialističnih državah so sočasni procesi razvijanja tržne ekonomije, oblikovanja novih političnih in socialnih institucij ter prerazporejanje družbene lastnine ustvarili rodna tla za pojav korupcije. Zaradi kompleksnosti fenomena in predvsem zaradi vse večjega zavedanja, da vzroki za prevzem države presegajo golo neučinkovitost in šibkost državne uprave, je potrebno za razumevanje in odpravljanje state capture razsvetliti problem širših strukturalnih povezav, kot so interna organizacija političnega sistema, odnosi in zveze med ključnimi državnimi institucijami, interakcije med podjetji in državo ter povezave med državo in civilno družbo. ; When we think about corruption, an image quickly comes to mind of abuse of public office for private gains. Individuals and firms are bribing bureaucrats to »get things done«. Behind this view lies an understanding of the state extracting rents from the economy for the exclusive benefit of politicians and bureaucrats. Such an aprroach has had a powerful impact on the way corruption has been analyzed and measured in recent years. Corruption has taken on a new image – that of individuals, groups, or firms manipulating policy formation and even shaping the emerging rules of the game to their own, very substantional advantage. Corruption has always existed across the world and it will never disappear, the difference is that has become more sophisticated and thus more difficult and costly to detect. With the increasing recognition across the globe of the damaging effects of corruption on economic growth and social stability, the demand for practical strategies to reduce corruption has grown dramatically. The problem is not confined to any particular region, and developed, developing and transition countries alike are confronting these challenges. In postcommunist states the simultaneous processes of developing a market economy, designing new political and social institutions and redistributing social assets have created fertile ground for corruption. With regard to complexity of phenomena and with increasing recognition that the roots of state capture extend far beyond weaknesses in the capacity of government, we need to be aware of factors underlying the persistence of corruption that is broader structural relationships, including the internal organization of the political system, relationships among core state institutions, the interactions between the state and firms, and the relationship between the sate and civil society.

Demokratični deficit je že več desetletji stalnica akademskih razprav o Evropski uniji. Vsebina raziskovanj se je skozi čas bistveno spremenila, ohranja pa se temeljna misel, da se demokracija v Evropski uniji sooča z velikimi težavami. Zaupanje Evropejcev v Evropsko unijo je nizko, podobno velja tudi za občutek povezanosti z njenimi organi, zato je očitno, da so spremembe nujno potrebne. Z vsako večjo reformo pride do sprememb, ki bistveno vplivajo na razmerja moči med evropskimi institucijami in na njihov odnos do Evropejcev. Najvidnejše spremembe v zadnjih desetletjih so krepitev moči Evropskega parlamenta, ki se je razvil v vplivno institucijo, uvajanje institutov neposredne demokracije in druge reforme, ki jih je prinesla Lizbonska pogodba. Napredek pa je, žal, na drugi strani uravnotežen s pojavom mehanizmov in institutov, ki demokratična varovala zaobidejo. To so na primer ukrepi, ki so bili sprejeti kot odziv na dolžniško krizo evroobmočja in v velikem delu sploh ne spadajo med formalne pristojnosti Evropske unije. V svojem magistrskem delu sem analiziral in kritično ovrednotil procese, ki so bistveno vplivali na ključne organe Evropske unije, njihove spreminjajoče se medsebojne odnose ter predvidene učinke aktualnih reform. Pregledal sem širok izbor literature preteklih desetletji in predstavil različna teoretska izhodišča, na podlagi katerih avtorji skušajo opredeliti in analizirati demokratični deficit in z njim povezane tematike. Ključna ugotovitev mojega magistrskega mojega dela ni le, da so aktualne reforme premalo ambiciozne in demokratičnega deficita ne morejo odpraviti, ampak predvsem da demokratični deficit ni le kategorija akademskih razprav, temveč je zelo močno politično orodje in odločilno usmerja razvoj Evropske unije. Demokratični deficit je zato stalnica evropske demokracije in ne more nikoli biti povsem odpravljen, saj se ob razvoju Evropske unije vedno znova pojavlja v drugačnih oblikah, ki terjajo nove reforme in kritične analize akademikov, intelektualcev, državljanov, politikov in vseh drugih zainteresiranih strani. ; The democratic deficit has been a constant of all academic research on the European Union for the past few decades. While the scope of the research has changed considerably, the basic idea remains the same – democracy in the European Union is in serious trouble. Europeans' trust in the EU is low and the same goes for their connection with European institutions, therefore it is clear that changes are required. Every major reform alters the balance of power between European institutions and their relationship with European citizens. The most visible changes of the past decades are: the empowerment of the European parliament that has been transformed into an influential institution, the introduction of instruments of direct democracy and other reforms brought upon by the Treaty of Lisbon. Unfortunately, progress is balanced out by the emergence of various mechanisms and instruments that surpass all democratic checks and balances. For example, the measures that were adopted as a response to the European debt crisis were mostly not based on formal competencies of the EU. In my Master's thesis I analysed and critically evaluated the processes that crucially influenced the most significant European institutions, their ever-changing relationships and the anticipated effects of the current reforms. I examined a substantial body of literature from past decades and presented diverse theoretical starting points that the authors use to define and analyse the democratic deficit and related topics. The most significant finding of my Master's thesis is not only that the current reforms lack ambition and cannot eliminate the democratic deficit, but also that the democratic deficit is more than just a category of academic research and can often act as a strong political tool that decisively influences the development of the European Union. Therefore, the democratic deficit is a permanent element of European democracy and can never be fully eliminated as it always reappears in new forms that require constant reforms and critical analysis by academia, intellectuals, citizens, politicians and other stakeholders.