The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 74, Heft 2, S. 558-570
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 74, Heft 2, S. 558-570
ISSN: 1468-2508
SSRN
Working paper
In: Puti k miru i bezopasnosti, Heft 2, S. 285-287
ISSN: 2311-5238
Gusic I. Contesting Peace in the Postwar City: Belfast, Mitrovica and Mostar. – New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. 311 p.
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1. Studying Postconflict Violence: Approaches and Methods -- 2. Explaining Postconflict Violence: Evidence, Theories, and Arguments -- 3. Violence and Indonesia's Democratic Transition -- 4. Large Episodic Violence in Postconflict Maluku -- 5. North Maluku's Peace -- 6. Small Episodic Violence in Postconflict Aceh -- 7. Why Has Extended Violent Conflict Not Recurred? -- Conclusions -- Glossary -- Appendix. The National Violence Monitoring System Dataset -- Notes -- References -- Index
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 53, Heft 1, S. 3-29
ISSN: 1552-8766
Increasingly, scholars studying civil conflicts believe that the pace of postconflict economic recovery is crucial to a return to peaceful politics. But why do some countries' economies recover more quickly than others'? The authors argue that the inability of politicians to commit credibly to postconflict peace inhibits investment and, hence, slows recovery. In turn, the ability of political actors to eschew further violence credibly depends on postconflict political institutions. The authors test this framework with duration analysis of an original data set of economic recovery, with two key results. First, they find that postconflict democratization retards recovery. Second, outright military victory sets the stage for a longer peace than negotiated settlements do. This research deepens the understanding of the bases of economic recovery and conflict recidivism in postconflict countries and points to future research that can augment this knowledge further still. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright.]
In: Peace & change: PC ; a journal of peace research, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 244-252
ISSN: 1468-0130
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 53, Heft 1, S. 3-29
ISSN: 1552-8766
Increasingly, scholars studying civil conflicts believe that the pace of postconflict economic recovery is crucial to a return to peaceful politics. But why do some countries' economies recover more quickly than others'? The authors argue that the inability of politicians to commit credibly to postconflict peace inhibits investment and, hence, slows recovery. In turn, the ability of political actors to eschew further violence credibly depends on postconflict political institutions. The authors test this framework with duration analysis of an original data set of economic recovery, with two key results. First, they find that postconflict democratization retards recovery. Second, outright military victory sets the stage for a longer peace than negotiated settlements do. This research deepens the understanding of the bases of economic recovery and conflict recidivism in postconflict countries and points to future research that can augment this knowledge further still.
In the two to five years immediately following end of conflicts, UN peacekeeping operations have succeeded in maintaining peace, while income and consumption growth rates have been higher than normal and recovery on key education and health indicators has been possible. Aid also has been super-effective in promoting recovery, not only by financing physical infrastructure but also by helping in the monetary reconstruction of postconflict economies. However, sustaining these short-term gains was met with two difficult challenges. First, long-term sustainability of peace and growth hinges primarily on the ability of postconflict societies to develop institutions for the delivery of public goods, which, in turn, depends on the capacity of post-conflict elites to overcome an entrenched culture of political fragmentation and form stable national coalitions, beyond their immediate ethnic or regional power bases. Second, after catch-up growth runs its course, high levels of aid could lead to overvalued real currencies, at a time when growth requires a competitive exchange rate and economic diversification. Successful peace-building would, therefore, require that these political and economic imperatives of postconflict transitions be accounted for in the design of UN peacekeeping operations as well as the aid regime.
BASE
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 56, Heft 6, S. 982-1016
ISSN: 1552-8766
Which components of power sharing contribute to the duration of peace and what explains the linkages between institutional design and stability? The authors argue that certain types of political power sharing are associated with more durable peace than others, primarily through their positive effects on governance and public service delivery. In particular, closed-list proportional representation (PR) electoral systems stand out among power-sharing arrangements, due to their ability to deliver superior governance outcomes which, in turn, can promote stability by undercutting the initial motivations for conflict or by reducing the feasibility of rebellion. The authors argue that these positive outcomes result from closed-list PR's ability to increase party discipline and checks on executive power, while reducing incentives for personalistic voting. The introduction of political institutions in postconflict negotiated settlements allows us to test the independent effects of institutions on governance and stability using survival analysis and a case study.
In: Bezbednosni dijalozi: Security dialogues, Band 1, S. 107-116
ISSN: 1857-8055
In: Annual Review of Anthropology, Band 39, S. 261-274
SSRN
In: The Washington quarterly, Band 26, Heft 4, S. 195-210
ISSN: 1530-9177
In: Politics & gender, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 478-498
ISSN: 1743-9248
Domestic violence or Intimate partner violence (IPV) is the form of violence against women (VAW) that is most reported to the police in Liberia. This violence cuts across class, ethnic, religious, and age lines (Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services, et al. 2008) and results in psychological trauma, physical injuries, and, in some cases, death. Societal beliefs that frame domestic violence as a regular part of life serve to legitimize and foster the problem in Liberia (Allen and Devitt 2012; LISGIS et al. 2008) and pose a challenge to the state and to international organizations (IOs) and women's nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have introduced measures to combat domestic violence since the end of the country's 14-year civil war in 2003. One such effort is the Women and Children Protection Section (WACPS) of the Liberian National Police (LNP), established by the government in collaboration with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and other international partners in 2005. Although the section was established primarily to address rape, its officers are mandated to investigate all forms of VAW, including domestic violence.
In: Nationalism & ethnic politics, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 43-64
ISSN: 1557-2986
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 29, Heft 5, S. 547-566
ISSN: 1549-9219
This article critically examines the notion that wealth sharing in the aftermath of internal armed conflicts can bring about long-lasting peace. While wealth sharing is increasingly considered a crucial element of peacebuilding, the evidence concerning its success is inconclusive. Previous studies unfortunately suffer from weak theoretical and empirical definitions of wealth sharing and from examining only a subset of postconflict societies. This article improves the research by disaggregating the concept of wealth sharing to concrete policy relevant natural resource management tools and by introducing new and better data on wealth sharing and including more postconflict peace periods than previous studies. This article examines the relationships between armed conflict, wealth sharing and peace by studying two independent but interlinked research questions: In which postconflict societies is wealth sharing most likely to be adopted? And can wealth sharing bring stable peace in postconflict societies? The analyses show that wealth sharing is more likely to be implemented after natural resource conflicts. Nonetheless, the article does not find that wealth sharing is successful in bringing postconflict peace after these conflicts. Reasons for this can be that (1) other factors than wealth sharing explain the outcome better, and (2) the wealth sharing policies are poorly designed and implemented. The article concludes that wealth sharing can only be a suitable path for societies recovering from armed conflict if such policies are carefully designed to fit the specific context and take into account the challenges that will arrive.