Suchergebnisse

Domestic violence or Intimate partner violence (IPV) is the form of violence against women (VAW) that is most reported to the police in Liberia. This violence cuts across class, ethnic, religious, and age lines (Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services, et al. 2008) and results in psychological trauma, physical injuries, and, in some cases, death. Societal beliefs that frame domestic violence as a regular part of life serve to legitimize and foster the problem in Liberia (Allen and Devitt 2012; LISGIS et al. 2008) and pose a challenge to the state and to international organizations (IOs) and women's nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have introduced measures to combat domestic violence since the end of the country's 14-year civil war in 2003. One such effort is the Women and Children Protection Section (WACPS) of the Liberian National Police (LNP), established by the government in collaboration with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and other international partners in 2005. Although the section was established primarily to address rape, its officers are mandated to investigate all forms of VAW, including domestic violence.

A short history of the Cambodian conflict and peace process -- The social structure of the insurgency -- Leadership -- Mid-ranking operators -- Rank-and-file soldiers -- Blank pages, symbolic reconstruction -- Note on female combatants of the Khmer Rouge -- The diaspora

Why do some postconflict states return to violence, while others remain at peace? Analysts increasingly credit postconflict justice institutions—such as truth commissions, amnesties, reparations, and trials—with contributing to the prevention of conflict recurrence following civil wars. But scholars remain divided about the overall effectiveness of these varied institutions. In this article, we directly engage this debate. We seek to overcome theoretical and data limitations that make it difficult to address the relationship between justice institutions and the likelihood that conflict will recur. We find that only postconflict justice processes that lessen conflict-induced grievances, and thus address individual motivations to rebel, are successful at keeping the peace. In a series of statistical tests using new data on postconflict justice from 1946 to 2006, we find strong support for the role of motivation-addressing processes in reducing conflict recurrence.

AbstractWhy are civil society organizations so often unable to make a difference during the transition to peace? I argue that the contributions of local civil society organizations and women's organizations to postconflict peacebuilding should be understood in terms of the networks that emerge during the peacebuilding process. Horizontal network conditions are essential for successful postconflict reconstruction. Yet external actors often implement policies that strengthen hierarchical links at the expense of such horizontal networks. To explore the types of networks that emerge in postconflict reconstruction, I use semistructured interviews conducted in Liberia. The evidence suggests that emerging horizontal networks are more robust in areas where local communities and women have a tradition of organizing. However, these networks remain fairly unstable. The assistance is mostly channeled centrally, strengthening hierarchical ties and leading to distortions in the distribution of resources.

This article critically examines the notion that wealth sharing in the aftermath of internal armed conflicts can bring about long-lasting peace. While wealth sharing is increasingly considered a crucial element of peacebuilding, the evidence concerning its success is inconclusive. Previous studies unfortunately suffer from weak theoretical and empirical definitions of wealth sharing and from examining only a subset of postconflict societies. This article improves the research by disaggregating the concept of wealth sharing to concrete policy relevant natural resource management tools and by introducing new and better data on wealth sharing and including more postconflict peace periods than previous studies. This article examines the relationships between armed conflict, wealth sharing and peace by studying two independent but interlinked research questions: In which postconflict societies is wealth sharing most likely to be adopted? And can wealth sharing bring stable peace in postconflict societies? The analyses show that wealth sharing is more likely to be implemented after natural resource conflicts. Nonetheless, the article does not find that wealth sharing is successful in bringing postconflict peace after these conflicts. Reasons for this can be that (1) other factors than wealth sharing explain the outcome better, and (2) the wealth sharing policies are poorly designed and implemented. The article concludes that wealth sharing can only be a suitable path for societies recovering from armed conflict if such policies are carefully designed to fit the specific context and take into account the challenges that will arrive.

After more than a decade of experience and research on financing arrangements in post conflict countries and fragile states, a consensus has emerged on at least one matter. The core objective is to build effective and legitimate governance structures that secure public confidence through provision of personal security, equal justice and the rule of law, economic well-being, and essential social services including education and health. These governance structures are necessary to ensure that countries do not turn, or turn back, to violence as a means of negotiating state-societal relations. This paper discusses a number of the weaknesses in current financing arrangements for post conflict countries and fragile states, with a focus on Official Development Assistance (ODA). We argue that tensions persist between business-as-usual development policies on the one hand and policies responsive to the demands of peace building on the other. The preferential allocation of aid to 'good performers,' in the name of maximizing its payoff in terms of economic growth, militates against aid to fragile and conflict-affected states. If the aim of aid is redefined to include durable peace, the conventional performance criteria for aid allocation lose much of their force. Compelling arguments can be made for assistance to 'poor performers' if this can help to prevent conflict. Yet the difficulties that initially prompted donors to become more selective in aid allocation remain all too real. Experience has shown that aid can exacerbate problems rather than solving them.

The ability of the proposed mechanisms to achieve post-conflict justice in present-day Burundi is investigated. An overview of the persistence of conflict in Burundi from the late 1960s to the early 2000s is presented, indicating how violence in neighboring countries frequently spilled over to Burundi & how the prevalence of military coups was gradually replaced by democratic transition. Attention is subsequently directed toward analyzing the Arusha Accords, particularly the consensual agreement that permitted involvement from the United Nations Security Council & called for the establishment of a National Truth and Reconciliation Committee as a means of realizing post-conflict justice. The capacity of previous similar mechanisms in producing post-conflict justice, eg, the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Committee, is then addressed. Three issues that require emphasis to ensure the achievement of post-conflict justice in Burundi are highlighted: sharing information between institutions while protecting accused peoples rights; pressuring guilty individuals to tell the truth about their criminal activities; & ascertaining the temporal jurisdiction of the truth & reconciliation mechanisms. J. W. Parker