Suchergebnisse

Power Sharing umfasst ein weites Spektrum verschiedener politischer Arrangements, die den wichtigsten Segmenten der Gesellschaft eine Vertretung und einen Einfluss bezüglich des Regierens sichern. Dabei handelt es sich darum, politische Institutionen zu schaffen, die sicherstellen, dass alle wichtigen gesellschaftlichen Interessen, die sich an unterschiedlichen (ethnischen, nationalen oder religiösen) Gruppen festmachen lassen, innerhalb der Strukturen und der Entscheidungsprozesse des Regierens einen Platz finden. Diese Lösungsvorschläge zielen darauf ab, die demokratischen Prinzipien mit den Erfordernissen des Konfliktmanagements in tief zerklüfteten Gesellschaften zu verbinden. Vor dem Hintergrund der jüngsten Erfahrungen werden die Erfolgsaussichten von Power Sharing-Arrangements als Möglichkeit des friedlichen Zusammenlebens nach ethnischen Konflikten analysiert. Dabei werden die unterschiedlichen Ansätze und die Probleme ihrer Anwendung thematisiert. (ICG)

In this article, the author analyzes the term "power-sharing" in the context of power exercised within a state. He first examines the term in the very general sense, in which it can be applied to all types and dimensions of sharing of power between various groups and institutional entities. Second, the author examines the meaning of the term in the narrow sense, that is, the phenomenon of systemic sharing of power by groups (segments) whose membership is based on ascribed criteria such as common ancestors, relatives, or racial background, and (or) cultural ones such as a common language, religion, or celebrations. The basic segmental units in this sense are nations (understood in the sociological sense), ethnic groups, or religious and denominational communities that form part of divided societies. Third, the article shows the differences between the principal models (types) of power-sharing in the narrow sense: consociationalism, centripetalism, and hybrid power-sharing. The article has been published in "Studia Polityczne" (2018, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 9-30).

A recent call by some feminist conflict mediation practitioners proposes to rename power-sharing: either by prioritizing sharing over power or by replacing 'power' with the word 'responsibility'. The purpose of these discursive reformulations is to move beyond just adding women to power-sharing institutions; instead, these proposals signal a desire to promote inclusion through a feminist emphasis on sharing in power-sharing systems above a masculinist emphasis on power. Inspired by these proposals and reflecting on the experiences of gender mediation experts, I work through critical feminist theories of intersectionality and feminist empowerment to show how power-sharing theory can be reimagined so that power is not just understood as coercive or as a finite resource that can only be divided between a limited number of privileged groups; rather, power can also be productive, as well as a central feature of all hierarchical relationships. I also explore how a feminist care ethic can offer alternative ways of conceiving of sharing in governance. My objective is to demonstrate how feminist approaches can provide a new language of both power and sharing to illuminate pathways through the 'exclusion amid inclusion' dilemma in power-sharing theory.

The aim of this study is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis that in Indonesia one can find institutions that characterize two power-sharing models which are considered opposites of one another in political theory – centripetalism and consociationalism. In consequence, the Indonesian power-sharing system should be viewed as a hybrid, or mixed, system, and not a typically centripetal system as is usually the case in the literature. At the beginning of this article, a short analysis of Indonesia's political situation is given for the purpose of defining the factors which determined the introduction of inter-segmental power-sharing arrangements in that country. This is followed by a description of the specificity of consociationalism and centripetalism. The article goes on to discuss specific institutions of both power-sharing models that exist in Indonesia and ends with some concluding remarks on the thesis advanced at the outset. The article has been published in "Polish Political Science Yearbook" 2017, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 168–185. For more on combining institutions of different models of power-sharing see: Krzysztof Trzcinski, Hybrid Power Sharing: On How to Stabilize the Political Situation in Multi-Segmental Societies, "Politeja" 2018, vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 86-107

This article focuses on power-sharing's 'exit dilemma'. While power-sharing may be a necessary transitional device to manage deep divisions, it also allegedly obstructs the long-term goals of peacebuilding and democratisation in divided societies. Three countervailing perspectives are considered here: (1) power-sharing is a transitional device unable to transition to more 'normal' political arrangements, creating instability; (2) power-sharing is a transitional device that can be designed for stability and adaptability; and (3) power-sharing is a lasting institutional fixture that facilitates peace and democratisation. The article presents a typology of pathways from power-sharing, arguing that the exit dilemma is real but not insurmountable.

'Trotz aller Zweifel am konkordanzdemokratischen Charakters Südafrikas nach der Apartheid stellen nur wenige Autoren in Frage, dass die Übergangsverfassung Elemente des power-sharing umfasste. Die permanente Verfassung und das Ausscheiden der National Party (NP) aus der Regierung der nationalen Einheit im Jahre 1996 haben die Aussichten eines politischen Ausgleichs in dieser pluralen Gesellschaft geschwächt. Nachdem der African National Congress (ANC) zur dominanten Partei wurde, setzten manche Beobachter ihre Hoffnungen darauf, dass der ANC zu einer inklusiveren und partizipatorischeren Partei werde. Diese Entwicklung lässt sich als Übergang von einer Standardform der Konkordanzdemokratie zwischen (segmentierten) Parteien zur Konkordanz innerhalb einer (Konkordanz) Partei beschreiben. Der Aufsatz untersucht die Chancen bzw. Aussichten bezüglich einer solchen Entwicklung für den ANC und richtet sein Augenmerk vor allem auf die Organisation der Partei, die innerparteiliche Repräsentation, und den internen Ausgleich sozialer Konflikte. Die Analyse bezieht vergleichende Erkenntnisse über andere Konkordanzparteien wie die Congress Party in Indien, Alliance Party/National Front in Malaysia und die Kenya African National Union (KANU) mit ein. Es wird gezeigt, dass der ANC eine noch negativere Auffassung partei-interner Konkordanz besitzt als von klassischer Konkordanzdemokratie. Diese Tatsache weist auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer dauerhaften politischen Marginalisierung der Minderheiteninteressen in Südafrika hin.' (Autorenreferat)

The aim of this study is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis that in Indonesia one can find institutions that characterize two power-sharing models which are considered opposites of one another in political theory – centripetalism and consociationalism. In consequence, the Indonesian power-sharing system should be viewed as a hybrid, or mixed, system, and not a typically centripetal system as is usually the case in the literature. At the beginning of this article, a short analysis of Indonesia's political situation is given for the purpose of defining the factors which determined the introduction of inter-segmental power-sharing solutions in that country. This is followed by a description of the specificity of consociationalism and centripetalism. The article goes on to discuss specific institutions of both power-sharing models which exist in Indonesia and ends with some concluding remarks on the thesis advanced at the outset.

Differences in electoral rules and/or legislative, executive or legal institutions across countries induce different mappings from election outcomes to distributions of power. We explore how these different mappings affect voters' participation in a democracy. Assuming heterogeneity in the cost of voting, the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters' preferences for the parties: when the two parties have similar support, turnout is higher in a winner-take-all system than in a power sharing system; the result is reversed when one side has a larger base. Moreover, the winner-take-all system has higher welfare if and only if the support is uneven. We compare the 'size effect' and the 'underdog compensation effect' under different systems. All systems induce an underdog compensation which is partial. Namely, unlike other costly voting models, the side with the larger support almost surely wins the majority of the votes. The results obtained in the rational voter model, characterized by the voter free-riding problem, continue to hold in other models of turnout such as ethical voter models and voter mobilization models.

This innovative volume marks the debut of an exhaustive political science typology of European power-sharing systems. It covers the EU as well as federal and quasi-federal regional states, such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, but also asymmetric cases from other European states with "constitutional" regions. A detailed and systematic focus is laid on the models and structures related to how powers are allocated, on the tensions between the centre and the periphery, on practical problems and power conflicts in selected policy areas as well as on reform proposals. An international team of authors analyses current developments at the European and national levels and draws lessons from comparative political science.The editors are members of the Research Centre on Federalism at the University of Innsbruck.With contributions by:Dr. Maria Ackrén, Prof. Dr. Marco Brunazzo, Prof. Dr. César Colino, Prof. Dr. Srdjan Djordjevic, Dr. Malcolm Harvey, Prof. Ayudante Dr. Angustias Hombrado, ao. Univ.-Prof. Dr.Ferdinand Karlhofer, Dr. Soeren Keil, MMag Dr.Manfred Kohler, Dr. Sean Müller, Univ.-Prof. DDr. Günter Pallaver, Dr. Bettina Petersohn, Univ.-Prof. Dr.Simona Piattoni, Mag. Marija Radosavljevic, Prof. Dr.Roland Sturm, Prof. Dr. Adrian Vatter, Prof. Dr. Jens Woelk

Executive power sharing has been practiced widely in the Asia-Pacific region, in both formal and informal ways. This paper examines the theory and practice of these various approaches to the sharing or dividing of governing power across the region. I look first at the broad issues of executive structure and the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems across the region, at the divergent approaches taken to both formal and informal practices of executive inclusion, and at the empirical relationship between these variables and broader goals of political stability. Following this, I construct an "index of power sharing" to compare the horizontal sharing of powers across the region over time. Finally, I look at the experience of vertical power sharing via measures such as federalism, devolution, and autonomy.