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Session 3: Military & Constitutional Politics in Sea - Slot 4 ; The Conference program & abstracts' website is located at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CEoQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.euroseas.org%2Fplatform%2Ffiles%2Ffile%2FProceedings.pdf&ei=2xfOUuOCJ9GXiAeRl4DYCQ&usg=AFQjCNFMK7mKfnD7lGQTpv2ob5LHLik2rw&bvm=bv.59026428,d.aGc ; This paper explores the evolving political role of the Myanmar armed forces since the adoption of the 2008 Constitution and the subsequent military/civil transition engaged in 2011. It moves beyond transition and democratization studies and rediscovers theories of the "praetorian state" to apply them to the post-junta constitutional politics in Myanmar. Armed forces in transitional polities, the literature on praetorianism informs us, still aim to keep an eye on policymaking – mostly thanks to military-sanctioned Constitutions or through more subtle ways of political, social and corporate intervention. This paper therefore demonstrates how the Myanmar army still enjoys in a post-SPDC context the legal instruments, networks and political leverage to intrude as a "praetorian ruler" into state affairs, notably through the provisions of the 2008 Constitution. It argues that, instead of a direct military rule (as observed until 2011), "praetorian" practices will be rediscovered in the 2010s thanks to the constitutional prerogatives the Myanmar military institution has secured after a decade-long Constitution-drafting process. Indeed, whilst keeping vested interests in the newly formed post-junta and civilian-led executive and legislative powers, the Myanmar army seems however willing to now stay away from day-to-day politics. Gradually tolerating a greater policy role for civilians, it will nonetheless continue to shape, through various types of praetorian interventions, Myanmar's foreign and domestic policies, as well as influence future reforms. ; postprint

"Madagascar: The Military in Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.

This essay reconsiders not so much the forms taken by the cult of Bolivar within its official expression as the way it became a theory for thought and political action in the long term. We will consider civil-military relations –the cornerstone of Hugo Chávez' Bolivarian Project– the representations linked to Bolivarian ideology both inside and outside the academic world, and finally the recent and biased memorial rewriting of the present day in Venezuela. ; Este ensayo reconsidera no tanto las modalidades del culto a Bolívar en su vertiente oficialista sino la manera como se convirtió en teoría para el pensamiento y la acción política en el tiempo largo. Con este fin, insistiremos en la problemática de las relaciones cívico- militares, piedra de toque del proyecto bolivariano de Hugo Chávez. Asimismo contemplaremos las representaciones ligadas al ideario bolivariano tanto dentro como fuera del mundo académico y del gremio de los historiadores, incluyendo las recientes y tendenciosas reescrituras memoriales del tiempo presente venezolano.

Turkey's quest for EU accession is considered in terms of the relative decline of praetorianism, weakening public support for EU membership, & the state's effort to redefine itself at the regional & international levels. D. Edelman

Why would politicians recruit soldiers for military coups d'état? The civil–military relations literature assumes politicians aspire to supremacy over the military; enabling praetorianism would risk their future rule. While civil–military relations widely recognizes the empirical fact of civilian participation in military takeovers, no study specifies or theorizes the topic. This essay examines the conditions in which politicians recruit soldiers to seize power by investigating the understudied processes of military takeovers. Using British Foreign Office documents, Arabic language memoirs, and Polity data, I find that civilian statesmen in Iraq (1936) and Syria (1951) could not tolerate their civilian rivals' incumbency but were unable to challenge them peacefully, so they recruited like-minded officers for coups. This suggests that while politicians do not necessarily want the army in the chambers, they sometimes favor praetorianism to the continued rule of their civilian opponents.

Why would politicians recruit soldiers for military coups d'état? The civil–military relations literature assumes politicians aspire to supremacy over the military; enabling praetorianism would risk their future rule. While civil–military relations widely recognizes the empirical fact of civilian participation in military takeovers, no study specifies or theorizes the topic. This essay examines the conditions in which politicians recruit soldiers to seize power by investigating the understudied processes of military takeovers. Using British Foreign Office documents, Arabic language memoirs, and Polity data, I find that civilian statesmen in Iraq (1936) and Syria (1951) could not tolerate their civilian rivals' incumbency but were unable to challenge them peacefully, so they recruited like-minded officers for coups. This suggests that while politicians do not necessarily want the army in the chambers, they sometimes favor praetorianism to the continued rule of their civilian opponents.

1. Conceptualizing the state -- 2. The state in historical perspective -- 3. Islamic models of the state -- 4. A homeland for Muslims -- 5. Constitutional dilemmas -- 6. Toward an Islamic state -- 7. Praetorianism -- 8. The Islamic state and international relations -- 9. The Islamic state in the twenty-first century.

Based on the example of the Turkish military's involvement in the country's economy, this article seeks to complement the concept of praetorionism and to highlight the mechanisms of indirect praetorionism. The Turkish army plays an important role in the country's economy, while the military pension fund OYAK is considered one of the country's business giants. It provides an opportunity to maintain disproportionate institutional autonomy and weakens civilian control mechanisms. This provides the military with additional instruments of political influence and encourages the emergence of hidden mechanisms of praetorianism. The article seeks to understand new phenomena and trends in the interaction between the society and the military, as the involvement of the Turkish army in the country's economy changes the concept of praetorianism and provides new, indirect ways of intervening in public policy. Because of how the Turkish military controls business companies using a privileged position in the country's economy, corruption mechanisms that influence the mechanisms of the redistribution of economic resources and the pursuit of rents have an indirect impact on the political system of the state. In this way, military entrepreneurship has transformed the conceptual structure of praetorians and complemented interventions with indirect forms of influence, such as corruption, economic dominance, and the distortion of economic reforms. ; Remiantis Turkijos kariuomenės dalyvavimo šalies ekonomikoje pavyzdžiu, straipsnyje siekiama papildyti pretorionizmo koncepciją ir išryškinti netiesioginio pretorionizmo mechanizmus. Turkijos kariuomenė vaidina svarbų vaidmenį šalies ekonomikoje, o kariuomenės pensijų fondas OYAK laikomas vienu iš šalies verslo gigantų. Ekonominė veikla atveria galimybę išlaikyti neproporcingą kariuomenės autonomiją, silpnina civilinę kontrolę, užtikrina papildomą kariuomenės įtaką politikoje ir skatina pretorionizmo mechanizmų atsiradimą. Straipsnyje siekiama suvokti naujus visuomenės ir kariuomenės sąveikos reiškinius ir tendencijas, kai dėl kariuomenės dalyvavimo šalies ekonomikoje keičiasi pretorionizmo koncepcija, atsiranda naujų netiesioginių intervencijos į valstybės politiką būdų, nes Turkijos kariuomenės kontroliuojami verslo subjektai, naudodamiesi privilegijuota pozicija šalies ekonomikoje, korupciniais mechanizmais, daro netiesioginį poveikį politinei valstybės sistemai. Šitaip kariuomenės verslumas transformuoja pretorionizmo koncepcinę struktūrą, papildo tiesioginius intervencinius veiksmus netiesioginėmis formomis, tokiomis kaip korupcija, ekonominis dominavimas, ekonominių reformų iškraipymas.

"Mauritania: The Institutionalization of Military Supremacy" published on by Oxford University Press.

Based on the example of the Turkish military's involvement in the country's economy, this article seeks to complement the concept of praetorionism and to highlight the mechanisms of indirect praetorionism. The Turkish army plays an important role in the country's economy, while the military pension fund OYAK is considered one of the country's business giants. It provides an opportunity to maintain disproportionate institutional autonomy and weakens civilian control mechanisms. This provides the military with additional instruments of political influence and encourages the emergence of hidden mechanisms of praetorianism. The article seeks to understand new phenomena and trends in the interaction between the society and the military, as the involvement of the Turkish army in the country's economy changes the concept of praetorianism and provides new, indirect ways of intervening in public policy. Because of how the Turkish military controls business companies using a privileged position in the country's economy, corruption mechanisms that influence the mechanisms of the redistribution of economic resources and the pursuit of rents have an indirect impact on the political system of the state. In this way, military entrepreneurship has transformed the conceptual structure of praetorians and complemented interventions with indirect forms of influence, such as corruption, economic dominance, and the distortion of economic reforms.