At least to some extent migration behavior is the outcome of a preference for migration. The pattern of migration as an outcome of a preference for migration depends on two key factors: imitation technology and migration feasibility. We show that these factors jointly determine the outcome of a preference for migration and we provide examples that illustrate how the prevalence and transmission of a migration-forming preference yield distinct migration patterns. In particular, the imitation of a migrationfavoring preference yields migration scenarios that would not have taken place absent the imitation.
In recent decades, many U.S. state and local governments have enacted preference policies. These policies mandate that preferential treatment be given to firms, citizens, or resources within the political jurisdiction. These preference policies distort interstate commerce and despite the potential negative long term consequences of enacting these policies, politicians may find it rational to implement such policies. This paper analyzes several political economy explanations for the adoption of preference policies, including political preferences and short-sightedness, sticky political response functions, and sticky capital. Further, the determinants of local preference policies are analyzed at the state level and compared with results from larger-scale tariff literature. The data show state-level preference through state preference policies does not mirror the pattern of trade protection received at the federal level.
The question how voter preferences relate to preferences of representatives under different electoral rules has attracted scholarly attention for some time. Although theoretical work suggests that proportional rule leads to more dispersion of representatives than plurality rule, empirical studies of this nexus have not yet reached a consensus. We argue that this is because they are plagued by serious problems as they rely on measures that differ for both sets of actors. We use behavioral data to estimate ideal points of voters and representatives on a common scale by taking advantage of the high frequency of referendums in Switzerland. We find that members of parliament elected in proportional representation systems are more widely dispersed around the median voter. Probing at what stage this difference in dispersion occurs, we also demonstrate this is the voters' doing, as it only applies to candidates who are elected.
This paper discusses what determines the preferences of individuals for redistribution. We review the theoretical literature and provide a framework to incorporate various effects previously studied separately in the literature. We then examine empirical evidence for the US, using the General Social Survey, and for a large set of countries, using the World Values Survey. The paper reviews previously found results and provides several new ones. We emphasize, in particular, the role of historical experiences, cultural factors and personal history as determinants of preferences for equality or tolerance for inequality.