Preferences
In: Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie 19
In: Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie 19
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In: A Primer on Environmental Decision-Making, S. 109-122
ISSN: 2449-9064
In: Working paper series 9106
In: Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 43-2012
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Working paper
In: Journal of elections, public opinion and parties, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 172-191
ISSN: 1745-7297
In: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 22-02
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In: Behavioural public policy: BPP, S. 1-21
ISSN: 2398-0648
Abstract
Since the publication of the seminal book Nudge by Thaler and Sunstein, several critics have highlighted preference endogeneity as a serious obstacle to nudging. When individuals hold preferences that are dynamic and endogenous to the nudge frame, it is unclear what the normative benchmark for libertarian paternalistic policies should be. While acknowledging this issue, the pro-nudging camp has not yet sufficiently addressed it. This article aims to fill this void by presenting a conditional defence of nudging when preferences are endogenous. We explain the learning process through which individuals establish 'agentic' preferences: preferences that are sufficiently stable, reasonable, autonomous and associated with organismic well-being to ground the 'welfare' principle of libertarian paternalism. To describe this process, we draw on theories from psychological science, in particular self-discrepancy theory and self-determination theory. We argue that agentic preferences are not only welfare-relevant and thus appropriate to libertarian paternalism but can also be identified by choice architects.
In: Annual review of political science, Band 3, S. 1-24
ISSN: 1094-2939
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 26, Heft 5, S. 619-627
ISSN: 1460-3683
The question how voter preferences relate to preferences of representatives under different electoral rules has attracted scholarly attention for some time. Although theoretical work suggests that proportional rule leads to more dispersion of representatives than plurality rule, empirical studies of this nexus have not yet reached a consensus. We argue that this is because they are plagued by serious problems as they rely on measures that differ for both sets of actors. We use behavioral data to estimate ideal points of voters and representatives on a common scale by taking advantage of the high frequency of referendums in Switzerland. We find that members of parliament elected in proportional representation systems are more widely dispersed around the median voter. Probing at what stage this difference in dispersion occurs, we also demonstrate this is the voters' doing, as it only applies to candidates who are elected.
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Working paper
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Working paper