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Following Robert Elgie, Skach defines a semi-presidential constitution as a dual executive system, in which the head of state is a popularly elected president with a fixed term of office and the head of government is a prime minister who is responsible to the legislature Robert Elgie, 'The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism,' in Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, ed.

AbstractThere is a long-standing and widespread consensus that semi-presidentialism is bad for democratic performance. This article examines whether there is empirical evidence to support the arguments against semi-presidentialism. Examining countries that are incompletely consolidated and yet are not autocratic, we identify the relationship between democratic performance and the three main arguments against semi-presidentialism – the strength of the presidency, cohabitation, and divided minority government. We find that there is a strong and negative association between presidential power and democratic performance, but that cohabitation and divided minority government do not have the negative consequences that the literature predicts.

'Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America' edited by Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart is reviewed.

The author first lists standard theoretical arguments used in debates about parliamentarism & presidentialism & points up the ways of their contextualizations & instrumentalizations in Eastern Europe as a transitional region of unconsolidated democracies. Addressed next are approaches & difficulties in the classification of empirical constitutional systems in Eastern Europe. The conclusion highlights several sources of real & potential institutional & political conflicts that are caused by certain constitutional designs in some countries. 1 Table, 35 References. Adapted from the source document.

In the first part of the text, the author lists standard theoretical arguments used in the debates about parliamentarism and presidentialism and points up the ways of their contextualisations and instrumentalisations in Eastern Europe as a transitional region of unconsolidated democracies. In the second part she deals with the approaches and difficulties in the classification of empirical constitutional systems in Eastern Europe. In the third part she highlights several sources of real and potential institutional and political conflicts which are caused by certain constitutional designs in some countries. (SOI : PM: S. 120)

AbstractInter-institutional cooperation between the congress and the presidency may be the best way to promote good governance in a regime of separation of powers. In order to evaluate the performance of different political institutions, especially the different frameworks associated with 'presidentialism' and 'parliamentarism', we adopt the criterion that policy outcomes coinciding with the median voter's preference can produce the highest satisfaction or social utility. From this perspective, proportional representation in congress can be very appropriate since it tends to establish a close correspondence between the median party's and the median voter's preferences. Likewise, cooperation – rather than conflict or mutual checks – between the median party in congress and the presidency for both legislative decisions and cabinet formation can favour socially efficient outcomes. A survey of some recent institutional reforms in democratic presidential regimes in Latin America shows that 'parliamentarization' of presidentialism is gaining acceptance, although intermediate formulae may be more conflictual than a global, more coherent institutional reform.

AbstractWhen the Soviet Union fell in 1990, three of its 15 components, the Baltic States, joined the European Union, and a fourth, Moldova, may well join in the future. The other 11 quickly became presidential republics, following the lead given by Boris Yeltsin, the president of the largest among them, Russia. By 1994, all 11 were headed by a president elected by universal suffrage. These ex-Soviet countries contribute significantly to the number of presidential republics in the world. Presidential republics form a clear majority, being predominant in Latin America and Africa, alongside the ex-Soviet Union. They are rare in Europe, the main cases being France, Romania, and, though seemingly temporarily, some Balkan states; in Asia, outside the ex-Soviet Union, they are a small minority.Like many presidential republics elsewhere, those in the ex-Soviet Union are mostly authoritarian, but with variations: this is primarily so in Central Asia, as well as in Azerbaijan and Belarus. These presidencies have been very stable, with some of their leaders, especially in Central Asia, being repeatedly re-elected, often without opposition. There has been a regular turnover in Armenia (but less so in Georgia) and in Ukraine (but not in Belarus). The Russian case is peculiar, as is well known: Putin became prime minister because he could no longer be constitutionally re-elected as president, at least without a break. The power of these presidents has varied over time: outside Central Asia (except Kyrgyzstan) and Azerbaijan, where they have been uniformly strong, their strength has declined in Georgia, increased in Russia and Belarus, and had ups and downs in Armenia and Ukraine.