Contratos Financieros Principal-Agente (Principal-Agent Financial Contracts)
In: Monografías de Juan Mascareñas sobre Finanzas Corporativas, ISSN: 1988-1878, 2007
In: Monografías de Juan Mascareñas sobre Finanzas Corporativas, ISSN: 1988-1878, 2007
SSRN
In: Die deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie, S. 63-82
In: Science and public policy: journal of the Science Policy Foundation, Band 30, Heft 5, S. 337-346
ISSN: 1471-5430
One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, of which the principal-agent theory is a part. In this article a principal-agent model of corruption is presented, in which there are two principals (one of which is corrupting), and one agent (who is corrupted). The behaviour of these principals and agent is analysed in terms of the costs and benefits associated with different actions. The model is applied to political corruption in representative democracies, showing that, contrary to common belief, the use of principal-agent models is not limited to bureaucratic corruption.
BASE
We consider a moral hazard problem with multiple principals in a continuous-time model. The agent can only work exclusively for one principal at a given time, so faces an optimal switching problem. Using a randomized formulation, we manage to represent the agent's value function and his optimal effort by an Itô process. This representation further helps to solve the principals' problem in case we have infinite number of principals in the sense of mean field game. Finally the mean field formulation is justified by an argument of propagation of chaos.
BASE
In: CFA Institute Research Foundation L2014-1
SSRN
In: British journal of political science, Band 44, Heft 3, S. 605-630
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article argues that human rights could be improved by motivating politicians and bureaucrats to put more effort into protecting human rights. It conceptualizes the production of human rights practices as the outcome of two principal-agent relationships that constrain politicians and bureaucrats. Reliance on taxes is a non-electoral, fiscal factor that makes politicians more willing to protect human rights. Increased government revenue, no matter the source, raises bureaucratic compensation and helps create a more accountable bureaucracy. Thus both a higher reliance on taxes and larger state revenues lead to the better protection of human rights. Each fiscal factor promotes a different type of accountability, both of which independently contribute to good human rights practices. Adapted from the source document.
In: European political science: EPS ; serving the political science community ; a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 481-487
ISSN: 1680-4333
A review essay on a book by Jan-Erik Lane, Comparative Politics: The Principle-Agent Perspective (London: Routledge, 2007).
In: European political science: EPS, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 481-487
ISSN: 1682-0983
In: British journal of political science, Band 44, Heft 3, S. 605-630
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article argues that human rights could be improved by motivating politicians and bureaucrats to put more effort into protecting human rights. It conceptualizes the production of human rights practices as the outcome of two principal-agent relationships that constrain politicians and bureaucrats. Reliance on taxes is a non-electoral, fiscal factor that makes politicians more willing to protect human rights. Increased government revenue, no matter the source, raises bureaucratic compensation and helps create a more accountable bureaucracy. Thus both a higher reliance on taxes and larger state revenues lead to the better protection of human rights. Each fiscal factor promotes a different type of accountability, both of which independently contribute to good human rights practices.
In: FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 628
SSRN
Working paper
In: Investitions-Controlling in dezentralen Unternehmen, S. 202-254
In: Science and public policy: journal of the Science Policy Foundation, Band 30, Heft 5, S. 371-381
ISSN: 1471-5430
In: Crime, law and social change: an interdisciplinary journal, Band 27, Heft 3-4, S. 207
ISSN: 0925-4994
In: Journal of international development, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 483-495
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