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This book sets out and examines the law governing criminal procedure in Canada. It explains the body of rules and principles that govern the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of any offence enacted by Parliament for which an accused person would have a criminal record if found guilty by a court exercising jurisdiction under the Criminal Code. These include such things as the rules by which police powers are exercised, the right to counsel, search warrants, interim release, and procuring attendance of witnesses.This third edition updates the law in all areas of criminal procedure. The chapter on powers of search and seizure has been completely rewritten to take into account significant new decisions, including, among others, Spencer, on internet anonymity; Vu, on searches of computers; TELUS Communications, on text messaging and wiretap authorizations; MacDonald, on safety searches; and Fearon, on search of cell phones incident to arrest. It also covers the various statutory changes made to search powers by the Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act.

This article summarizes significant legislative changes, decisions of the United States and Virginia Supreme Courts, and decisions of the Virginia Court of Appeals. A more extensive consideration of this material as well as recent decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and federal district courts is contained in R. Bacigal, Virginia Criminal Procedure (Supp. 1987).

This report discusses the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 1997 (H.R. 1122). The report summarizes the legislation and why President Clinton vetoed it. Moreover, the report includes President Clinton's recommendation to amend the bill for him to pass. The report also suggests that little data has been created on the issue, but that it utilizes what data has been created.

The author surveys and discusses recent decisions, rule changes and legislation concerning various aspects of Florida Civil Procedure. The topics dealt with include jurisdiction, venue, class actions, parties, discovery, judgments, summary judgment, jury trials, jury instructions and dismissal.

In 1980 the Supreme Court of Florida adopted comprehensive amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The author critically examines these amendments and discusses their probable impact on civil practice in Florida. The author also surveys and discusses the 1980 legislation and court decisions that have affected or construed the unamended rules.

A "global" civil procedure has emerged and found its way into debates over procedural reform in both international and domestic arenas. Global civil procedure includes the procedural rules, practices, and social understandings that govern transnational litigation and arbitration. A global civil procedure norm is a norm adopted across courts or arbitration providers with the purpose of making that jurisdiction or provider more competitive in attracting transnational litigation or arbitration. Global civil procedure norms are at stake in multiple present trends and debates, including model laws in commercial arbitration, the procedure of international tribunals, the debate over investment dispute resolution, the rise of courts oriented towards international litigation, and sprawling litigation spanning multiple jurisdictions and fora. On a surface level, the values reflected in global civil procedure seem to be roughly the same across jurisdictions. A common language has emerged around competition for litigation business and procedure values such as efficiency, certainty, and impartiality. Yet different legal systems do not necessarily agree on the purpose of various shared elements of global civil procedure. For democracies, for instance, the purpose of procedural reforms might be to facilitate access to justice. Other countries may favor the same reforms because they facilitate top-down administrative control of judges. Surface agreement can submerge divergent logics that may ultimately lead to very different applications of harmonized rules. This Article begins by introducing the concept of global civil procedure, who uses it, and how. Next, it considers several examples of the phenomenon including conflicts of interest rules for adjudicators, aggregation, and discovery or disclosure rules. Finally, it considers the limits of global civil procedure. Although the rhetoric of procedural competition can be heard across systems, procedural values do not necessarily translate both in terms of enduring divisions between legal traditions and in terms of applications by current political regimes.

Political rhetoric about the one percent is pervasive, as those with the greatest concentrated wealth prosper and the remaining population stagnates. Because of their affluence, the one percent exercise disproportionate control over political and economic systems. This Article argues that federal civil procedure is similarly a one percent regime. The crème de la crème of the bench and bar, along with equally exclusive litigants, often engage in high-stakes, complex civil litigation. It is this type of litigation that dominates both the elite experience and the public perception of what civil litigation is. This litigation is not particularly common, however; while expensive and well known, it is in the minority. Yet this litigation and the individuals engaged in it have an incongruent influence on how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and procedural doctrine develop. They create one percent procedure. This Article interrogates and connects disparate phenomena related to civil litigation, including the recent discovery amendments and the rise of multidistrict litigation. It demonstrates that the elite—those who are deeply steeped in complex, high-stakes litigation—are setting the agenda and determining the rules for how the entire civil litigation game is played. It further argues that the benefits of a one percent procedure system—notably expertise of the participants—are not worth the costs; indeed, that expertise can be detrimental to the design of a civil litigation system. As in politics and economics, a system that gives too much control to the one percent risks undervaluing and underserving the remaining ninety-nine percent. Using social and political science, the Article argues that the homogeneous policymaking of one percent procedure creates suboptimal results. The Article concludes that the structures giving rise to one percent procedure must be modified and proposes a set of reforms intended to allow the ninety-nine percent representation in, and access to, the process of constructing our shared ...

Political rhetoric about the one percent is pervasive, as those with the greatest concentrated wealth prosper and the remaining population stagnates. Because of their affluence, the one percent exercise disproportionate control over political and economic systems. This Article argues that federal civil procedure is similarly a one percent regime. The crème de la crème of the bench and bar, along with equally exclusive litigants, often engage in high-stakes, complex civil litigation. It is this type of litigation that dominates both the elite experience and the public perception of what civil litigation is. This litigation is not particularly common, however; while expensive and well known, it is in the minority. Yet this litigation and the individuals engaged in it have an incongruent influence on how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and procedural doctrine develop. They create one percent procedure. This Article interrogates and connects disparate phenomena related to civil litigation, including the recent discovery amendments and the rise of multidistrict litigation. It demonstrates that the elite—those who are deeply steeped in complex, high-stakes litigation—are setting the agenda and determining the rules for how the entire civil litigation game is played. It further argues that the benefits of a one percent procedure system—notably expertise of the participants—are not worth the costs; indeed, that expertise can be detrimental to the design of a civil litigation system. As in politics and economics, a system that gives too much control to the one percent risks undervaluing and underserving the remaining ninety-nine percent. Using social and political science, the Article argues that the homogeneous policymaking of one percent procedure creates suboptimal results. The Article concludes that the structures giving rise to one percent procedure must be modified and proposes a set of reforms intended to allow the ninety-nine percent representation in, and access to, the process of constructing our shared ...

This Article argues that the current era of U.S. civil procedure is defined by its neoliberalism. The Supreme Court has over the past few decades reinterpreted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in ways that have made it more difficult for citizens to bring and maintain civil claims. The major decisions of this new era—in areas as diverse as summary judgment, pleading, class actions, and arbitration—exhibit neoliberal hallmarks. They display neoliberalism's tendency to naturalize existing market arrangements, its focus on efficiency and obscuring questions of power, its reduction of citizens to consumers, and its attempt to analyze government through the lens of market-modeled concepts. As the Court's procedural decisions make it increasingly difficult for citizens to bring claims enforcing regulatory law—including antitrust, antidiscrimination, consumer protection, and worker protection laws—the Court's neoliberal orientation lurks in the background and helps to explain procedure's modern progression. In order to fully appreciate, critique, and potentially move beyond the current era of U.S. civil procedure, it is important to understand the neoliberal logic that drives it, as well as the logics and values it obscures and sidelines.

The civil justice system has been in a constant flux in the past decades due to changes in society and litigants' behaviour, as well as the increased factual and legal complexity of cases. The number of cases has been steadily increasing in many countries while the available budget required for more judicial staff, improving judicial case management, digitalisation of processes, and the required specialisation, has not in all instances increased at the same pace. This was worsened as a result of the recent financial crisis that affected many countries around the globe and has prompted governments to cut back on public expenditure. Austerity further challenges the demands of effective justice within a reasonable time,1 as is in the European context notably enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The financial crisis also led to a decrease in the funding of legal aid by the government in a number of countries, challenging access to justice for more vulnerable litigants in particular.

The demand for and availability of civil justice procedures for small claims can neither be disentangled nor extricated from the health of the economic climate of the relevant country concerned. In this article, it is argued that despite not being a developed country, Ghana was not completely insulated from the hardships or implementation of austerity measures that were triggered by the global economic meltdown. The inevitability of behavioural changes on the part of the Government of Ghana as lawmaker and provider of the machinery for civil justice on the one hand and small claims litigants as users of the civil procedure on the other hand are also explored in the article. After properly situating the exploration in the relevant economic context, the article makes recommendations regarding how to minimise the impact of the austerity measures on small claims litigants.

Constitutional criminal procedural rights are familiar to contemporary criminal law scholars and practitioners alike. But today, U.S. criminal justice may diverge substantially from its centuries-old framework when all three branches recognize only a core set of inviolable rights, implicitly or explicitly discarding others. This criminal procedural line drawing takes place when the U.S. criminal justice system engages in law enforcement cooperation with foreign criminal justice systems in order to advance criminal cases. This Article describes the two forms of this criminal procedural line drawing. The first is a "core criminal procedure" approach, rooted in fundamental rights, that arises in the exchange of electronic evidence but is related to two prior eras' cross-sovereign criminal procedural articulation—the Warren Court incorporation of the Bill of Rights' criminal procedural protections and engagement with international human rights instruments. Alternatively, courts today may use an ad hoc "outlier" approach, only excluding foreign evidence, convictions, or extradition requests in extreme circumstances that "shock the conscience." This Article argues that the former approach is superior to the latter, and argues for a methodology—rooted in constitutional law, international human rights, and comparative legal functionalism—for evaluating foreign legal systems. To support this argument, this Article draws on political theory concerned with global justice. This Article concludes by considering how core criminal procedure informs U.S. engagement with international criminal tribunals and investigative mechanisms.

State agencies are required to promulgate as rules any "statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy that describes the organization, procedure or practice requirements of any agency. Proposed orders of rulemaking are published by the Secretary of State in the Missouri Register. There is a comment period of at least 30 days for each proposed rule or revision and the proposing department may order a hearing on the rule. The final order of rulemaking must be filed within 90 days of the later of the 30 day comment period or the hearing on the rule and becomes effective 30 days after it is distributed in the Code of State Regulations (CSR). Consequently, most rules become effective approximately 6 months after their initial publication. ; Missouri Legislative Academy

Political rhetoric about the one percent is pervasive, as those with the greatest concentrated wealth prosper and the remaining population stagnates. Because of their affluence, the one percent exercise disproportionate control over political and economic systems. This Article argues that federal civil procedure is similarly a one percent regime. The creme de la creme of the bench and bar, along with equally exclusive litigants, often engage in high-stakes, complex civil litigation. It is this type of litigation that dominates both the elite experience and the public perception of what civil litigation is. This litigation is not particularly common, however; while expensive and well known, it is in the minority. Yet this litigation and the individuals engaged in it have an incongruent influence on how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and procedural doctrine develop. They create one percent procedure. This Article interrogates and connects disparate phenomena related to civil litigation, including the recent discovery amendments and the rise of multidistrict litigation. It demonstrates that the elite-those who are deeply steeped in complex, high-stakes litigation-are setting the agenda and determining the rules for how the entire civil litigation game is played. It further argues that the benefits of a one percent procedure systemnotably expertise of the participants-are not worth the costs; indeed, that expertise can be detrimental to the design of a civil litigation system. As in politics and economics, a system that gives too much control to the one percent risks undervaluing and underserving the remaining ninety-nine percent. Using social and political science, the Article argues that the homogeneous policymaking of one percent procedure creates suboptimal results. The Article concludes that the structures giving rise to one percent procedure must be modified and proposes a set of reforms intended to allow the ninety-nine percent representation in, and access to, the process of constructing our shared ...

Corporate litigation is in crisis. At the state level, shareholder lawsuits challenging mergers and other corporate decisions are ubiquitous but rarely end with meaningful relief for shareholders. At the federal level, securities class actions are rife with ethical challenges and low-value settlements. Over the last several decades, multiple groups — including judges, legislatures, and corporate boards — have tried to solve this problem, but all have come up short. This Article argues that the solution lies in rewriting the procedural rules that govern corporate lawsuits. New standing requirements would lead to better screening of these claims. Discovery limits and heightened pleading requirements would give defendants better tools to fight frivolous claims. All of these new procedures, if incorporated into corporate bylaws, would apply wherever the corporation is sued to address forum shopping, a common feature in these suits. Just as importantly, institutional investors should take the lead in crafting these procedures. They stand on both sides of these lawsuits and are therefore financially invested in ensuring that corporate lawsuits live up to their potential. It is their money on the line if corporate managers breach their fiduciary duties, but also their money on the line if corporations have to pay to defend against meritless litigation. The time has come for shareholders to invest in procedure to solve the enduring problems in corporate litigation.