Suchergebnisse

Zusammenfassung: I krig er sannheten alltid det første offeret. Slik var det også i Norge under andre verdenskrig, men har vi tatt inn over oss den rollen nordmenn selv spilte i spredningen av antisemittisk propaganda under krigen? Det var ikke bare de tyske okkupantene som tok kontroll over norske medier - mindre omtalt er i hvor stor grad Nasjonal Samling presset avisene til å trykke jødefiendtlige artikler fra partiets eget pressebyrå, Norsk Artikkeltjeneste. Det norske jødehatet viser hvordan Nasjonal Samling utnyttet den tyske okkupasjonen til politisk å endre norske aviser og påvirke dets lesere. Innholdet i tekstene har vært lite omtalt i vår okkupasjonshistorie og viser hvor utbredt antisemittisme var i norske aviser under krigen. Forfatter Bjørn Westlie kobler denne propagandaen til tyskernes aksjoner mot de norske jødene. Kunne norske redaktører handlet annerledes enn de gjorde? Og hvorfor ble det ikke tatt et oppgjør med denne hatretorikken i krigsoppgjøret?

In the 1990s, American public diplomacy was built down & neglected following its merits during the Cold War. After September 11, (2001), this field has, however, had a renaissance. But at present, the Cold War situation is inverted. In the struggle against communism, the US typically faced hostile regimes with populations yearning for Western ideology & values. Today a heavy reliance on mechanisms of marketing seems to have deteriorated US public diplomacy, whereas the Arab world is far from fertile soil for US public diplomacy. America's current enemies tend to be sub-national actors with hostile perceptions of the US, & larger populations show strong anti-American sentiments. Most activities that are labeled public diplomacy also belong in the realm of propaganda, but so-called white propaganda -- ie, the sender is known. But can public diplomacy work unless the state it originates from combines it with a policy that is saleable to the target audience? 1 Figure, 51 References. Adapted from the source document.

Etter at Tyrkia i 1999 fikk status som sokerland til EU og forhandlinger om medlemskap startet i 2005, har tyrkerne lovet a imotekomme EU-krav om demokratisering av landet og en losning av det 'kurdiske problemei'. En demokratiseringsprosess forutsetter imidlertid kritiske og frie medier. Men bade Tyrkias vestlige allierte og folk flest i landet er bekymret for dagens situasjon, der journalister, forfattere og folkevalgte politikere fengsles for sine ytringer som av myndighetene er oppfattet som formidling av propaganda som kommer den kurdiske frigjoringsbevegelse (PKK) til gode. Basert pa intervjuer med personer med ekspertkunnskap fra Tyrkia og et utvalg av avisartikler og kommentarer fra tyrkiske papiraviser, utforskes det hvordan tyrkiske medier styres i forhold til det kurdiske opproret i Tyrkia, samt hvorvidt det regierende Rettferdighets-og utviklingsparti (AKP) kan bidra til a demokratisere landet. Analysen viser at under Erdogan og hans AKP har medienes handlingsrom med hensyn til kurderkonflikten, og for orvrig ogsa generelt, ikke blitt saerlig bedre enn under hans forgjengere When Turkey was granted candidate status to EU membership in 1999 and negotiations started in 2005, hopes were high that the country would meet EU requirements for democratization and that a solution would be found to the so-called 'Kurdish problem'. However, a democratization process implies a critical and free media. Turkey's citizens and Western allies are now following recent developments with concern. Journalists, writers and elected politicians have been imprisoned for their work, some held on terror-related charges or propaganda and others for allegedly participating in antigovernment plots. With this as a backdrop, to what extent is Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) democratizing the country? My aim in this article is to answer the question and explore the extent to which media censorship and control is occurring, in particular regarding Kurdish insurgency in Turkey. I make use of primary and secondary data, including interviews with media experts in Turkey and a selection of newspaper articles from six Turkish newspapers. The Turkish government already exercises a tight hand over Turkey's traditional media, yet, as the analysis reveals, under Erdogan the government controls of freedom of expression and press (in particular concerning the Kurdish conflict) are tightening further. Adapted from the source document.

In Dec 1953 after Krushchev criticized the Soviet Press, a campaign was begun in the USSR which showed that the newspapers were generally offering nothing more to the reader than official communiques & were not sources of news. The reasons for this change in attitude toward the press were due, on the one hand, to the fact that the diminishing interest in the press was reducing its effectiveness as a weapon of the Party, & on the other, to the desire that the process of liberalization, thought to be inevitable, should be conducted within the framework of the party & not outside of it. Despite important developments in the way of news, the Party never relinquished control over the press, a fact which became obvious when no mention was made of the happenings in Hungary until long after those events had occurred. 2 obstacles oppose themselves to the development of newsworthy characteristics in the Soviet Press: all news must necessarily contribute to the improvement of the reader; the press was created in connection with admin've agencies, pol'al & union groups, & remains extremely specialized. This specialization led inevitably to uniformity since, outside its own field, the newspapers merely quoted the same articles verbatim. The reform took place while stating that neither the structure nor the objectives of the press needed to be modified. The change dealt mainly with those things which might be considered informative or dangerous. A certain number of problems were dealt with in the area of internat & internal problems & objectivity was increased. Furthermore, writers were no longer content to simply supply eulogies on the activities of their enterprises but engaged in criticisms. Finally, the number of letters from readers increased, & the tone of criticism became more apparent. An effort to improve the presentation of news & to introduce a wider variety of such news has been attempted, but so far is a long way from being greatly effective. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

The rise and fall of French Empires throughout a period of 400 years are outlined. Two central and parallel concepts in French political discourse, "grandeur" and "decadence", are used to analyze the French Empire. The article starts by commenting on the rise of the empire, including its geographical reach and direct and indirect political structures and systems. The French imperial policy of assimilation of colonies is examined as a political function to legitimize imperialism as a "mission civilisatrice"; to bring French civilization and liberty to the colonies. The article argues that French imperial rhetoric and propaganda to colonial populations were influenced by social Darwinism, racism, and military interests to display superiority of the French Empire. The article comments on the use of instruction and education in colonial administration and colonial history to maintain and develop the Empire once established. The article discusses the fall and decolonization of the French Empire, and concludes with lessons learned from the empire that applies to modern day France, including French exceptionalism. This article is one in a series of articles on the topic of empires. References. E. Sundby

Many changes, both internally & externally, have been felt during the 20 yrs that a Democratic majority governed the US. Since Eisenhower's election in 1952 & re-election in 1956, it would be interesting to know to what extent the Republican majority can be considered to be stable. In 1956, the Democrats won the elections, the presidential party having failed, for the 1st time since 1848, to carry a majority to Congress in a Presidential election yr. PO polls show that there are 3 Democrats for every 2 Republicans. Stevenson was defeated because the Republicans were better organized than the Democrats, many of whom voted for Eisenhower or did not vote at all. Finally, the Republicans control almost all of the press & the media of propaganda & information, & the SS of Republicanism is more a matter of prestige than one of soc pressure. The Wc, while still almost exclusively Democratic in 1948, is becoming more & more Republican, while the moderates are gradually drifting from the Democratic party. Cath's, Ru voters, & individuals living in small towns are tending toward Republicanism, while the younger age groups of the New Deal generation are remaining faithful to the Democratic Party. The qualities of the candidates in 1952 & 1956 certainly played a role in the division of the votes, but if the prestige of the General was a factor, Stevenson also had traits in his favor. Domestic issues, especially the Negro question, had their influence, but foreign affairs is the area in which the diff's in the parties is most apparent. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.