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The article deals, at various levels, with the limits and scope of the media activity, on the example of the latest Balkan war. On the theoretical level, there are three basic modalities in political communication: the positive propaganda (the so called carrot system), the negative propaganda (hard propaganda, aimed at destroying the enemy and its institutions) and, finally, the military propaganda with the military action, i.e. the system of communicating with a "stick". All these modes have been used in the war for Kosovo: Serbia had been positively conditioned for at least the entire decade, then a somewhat stricter model of the negative propaganda was used, and when this led nowhere, in 1999, Milosevic felt the full force of the state-of-the-art military equipment and the communication with a "stick". The author concludes that the media are powerful, but not all- powerful i.e. that they are eclipsed by the military communication, wars and victories or defeats. (SOI : S. 119)

The Kosovo crisis once again brought the powerful, unscrupulous and destructive Milosevic media apparatus into the spotlight. This is nothing new nor surprising for all those who have been covering his political ascent from the very beginning, but this time he used his heaviest artillery, never mincing words nor flinching from using all possible means to achieve his ends: to justify the genocidal policy and rallying Serbs once again around the well-known platform of national unity and Greater Serbia rhetoric. On one side, we had a well-oiled media machine that mercilessly rolled over everything on its way, not respecting any basic journalistic principles, not to mention ethics. On the other side, there were the most powerful world media, aggressive, assertive, equipped with the state-of-the-art technology, but with one major flaw: these are mass media, not a propaganda machinery. Two completely different structures clashed head-on. Thus, the media in war turned into the war of the media, a totally unfair war between a powerful propaganda machine and democratic media. (SOI : S. 113)

Predgovor: Uvod u Zbornik radova -- Spomeničko nasleđe -- Zamena narativa u cilju ideološke propagande: Studija slučaja Spomenika borcima revolucije u Valjevu / Vladimir Krivošejev i Željko Bjeljac -- Memorijalni kompleks "Kadinjača": ideološki potencijal, inicijativa za izgradnju i odlike arhitektonsko-skulptoralne celine / Katarina Dogandžić-Mićunović -- Javne ustanove -- Bioskopska kultura u Novom Pazaru u periodu socijalizma / Nina Aksić -- Muzejski narativi u diskursu jugoslovenskog socijalizma: Stalna postavka Muzeja ustanka 1941. u Titovom Užicu / Bojana Bogdanović -- Štampani mediji -- Štampa u službi KPJ na teritoriji Vojvodine posle Drugog svetskog rata (1944-1953) / Ivana Petrović -- Rečnik tehnologije: pogled izvan "ogledala" / Ivana Bašić i Milan Tomašević --Svakodnevica i praznici -- Socijalistički narativ i tradicionalna kultura / Milina Ivanović Barišić -- Sremačke proslave Julskih svečanosti 1945-1989 / Bojan Arbutina.

Using the most recent archive sources, the author describes the organization of the judiciary and the courts in Zadar and Dalmatia after the Italian occupation in 1918. In violation of the Ceasefire agreement, the Italian occupational authorities reorganized the judiciary institutions, defined the new territorial jurisdiction of courts in order to establish judiciary control over both the occupied and the unoccupied parts of Dalmatia. The purpose of this new organization of the courts and the constant propaganda was to prove that Zadar and Dalmatia belonged to Italy - culturally, civilisationally, and politically. (SOI : S. 222)

В работе анализируются процессы преобразования идентичности в межвоенное время в Советской России на примере мифологизации образа Василия Ивановича Чапаева, командира дивизии в Граждан- ской войне 1917–1923 гг. В начале рассматриваются основные этапы биографии Чапаева как реальной исторической личности, а также различные оценки его деятельности в трудах ведущих историков Граж- данской войны в России. Основная часть работы посвящена проблеме мифотворчества и мифологизации личности Чапаева, с помощью чего сторонники новой власти в Советской России пытались создать своеобразный противовес образу офицера как символу имперской власти. В статье прослеживается процесс отрыва образа Чапаева от контекста политической идеологии и его трансформации в практи- чески фольклорный анекдотич- ный персонаж как свидетельство профанации коммунистической идеологии. В конце анализирует- ся литературно-художественный образ Чапаева, связанный со всеми перечисленными мифологически- ми образами, но одновременно отличающийся от них. ; This paper analyzes the process of identity transformation of the interwar period in Soviet Russia on the example of mythologization of Vasily Ivanovich Chapaev, division commander in the Russian Civil War of 1917–1923. In the beginning of the work main stages of Chapaev's biography as a real historical figure are considered, as well as various assessments of his activity in the works of leading historians of Civil War in Russia. The main segment of this paper is devoted to the problem of myth creation and mythologization of Chapaev's personality, with the help of which supporters of the new government in Soviet Russia tried to create a kind of counterbalance to the figure of officer as a symbol of earlier imperial power. The article also traces the process of separation of Chapaev's figure from the context of political ideology, and its transformation into a practically folklore anecdotical hero as evidence of the profanation of communist ideology. In the conclusion of the article an artistic and literary figure of Chapaev, related to all above mentioned mythological figures, but simultaneously different from them, is analyzed.

Das vorliegende Werk hat in erster Linie den Wert einer Quelle zu den gegenüber dem Islam mit einem radikalen serbischen Nationalimus verbundenen Bedrohungsvorstellungen, Feindbildern und Expansionszielen. Insbesondere der erste, von Miroljub Jevtic (einem Professor der Politologie an der Universität Belgrad) verfaßte Teil zu den angeblichen geopolitischen Ambitionen der bosnischen und albanischen Muslime auf dem Balkan und zur Bedrohung der serbischen Kultur durch die den Muslimen inhärente Tendenz zum Gottesstaat ist unter diesem Aspekt zu sehen. Jevtic wird in den serbischen Medien oft als renommierter Islamkundler gehandelt. Er entwickelt hier Vorstellungen von einer islamischen Bedrohung des beim Zerfall Jugoslawiens um sein Selbstbestimmungsrecht betrogenen serbischen Volkes, von den bosnischen Muslimen als islamisierten Serben u. ä., die allesamt als klassische nationalistische Momente der aktuellen serbischen politischen Propaganda gelten können. Etwas wissenschaftlicher ist der von Milovan Pecelj verfaßte Teil, der die internationalen Vorschläge zur Konfliktlösung in Bosnien in den Jahren 1993 und 1994 behandelt. Auch bei seinen Interpretationen ist freilich der nationalistische Standpunkt unübersehbar. (SOI-Clw)

Hladni rat je predstavljao rat ideologija bez presedana u istoriji. Nijedan drugi rat, ni pre ni posle ovog višedecenijskog hladnog sukoba između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Saveza Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika, nije bio rat koji se vodio u tolikoj meri u sferi meke moći kao Hladni rat. Odsustvo neposrednog oružanog sukoba između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Sovjetskog Saveza učinilo je da se Hladni rat odvija kao takmičenje u sferi ekonomije, tehnologije i nauke, kao trka u nuklearnom i konvencionalnom naoružanju i kao svemirsko nadmetanje. Pored takmičenja u sferi tvrde moći, Sjedinjene Američke Države i Sovjetski Savez vodili su intenzivnu bitku u oblasti meke moći. Ovo je bio sukob između američke liberalno-demokratske ideologije i sovjetske marksističke ideologije. Svaka od ove dve zemlje težila je tome da ubedi građane one druge zemlje da je njen društveni i ekonomski sistem idealan i da je bolji i pravedniji od sistema njenog glavnog suparnika. Uzrok propasti Sovjetskog Saveza i komunizma u istočnoj Evropi nikada sa sgurnošću neće moći da bude određen. Okolnosti koje su dovele do raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, pada Berlinskog zida 1989. godine i urušavanja komunizma u Evropi ne mogu se svesti na skup vojnih, političkih, ekonomskih i društvenih činilaca koji su, nezavisno jedni od drugih, doveli do tektonskih promena u međunarodnim odnosima. Svi ovi činioci zajedno, isprepletani u kompleksnu mrežu poluga, učinili su da se Sovjetski Savez uruši i da Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama prepusti ulogu pobednika u Hladnom ratu. Pritom, Amerika nije bila samo vojni i ekonomski pobednik. Amerika je iz Hladnog rata izašla kao moralni i ideološki pobednik. Hladni rat predstavlja temu izuzetno velikog broja radova, ali mali broj tih radova se bavi analizom američko-sovjetskog sukoba u sferi meke moći. Stoga je cilj ovog istraživanja i rada rasvetljavanje, objašnjene i tumačenje poluga meke moći koje su Sjedinjene Američke Države institucionalizovale, pokrenule i upotrebile u ideološkoj borbi protiv Sovjetskog Saveza u vreme Hladnog rata. Međutim, Sjedinjene Američke Države nisu od svog nastanka u drugoj polovini 18. veka do Hladnog rata osmišljeno primenjivale svoju meku moć. Do Hladnog rata upotreba poluga meke moći bila praksa kojom su se Sjedinjene Američke Države bavile isključivo u vreme učešća u oružanim sukobima. Tek sa Hladnim ratom u Americi se javlja potreba za namenskom i osmišljenom upotrebom poluga meke moći. Odmah nakon Drugog svetskog rata Sovjetski Savez je počeo da vrši uticaj na druge zemlje šireći marksističku ideologiju i komunističke ideje. Osim širenja marksističke ideologije Sovjetski Savez je vodio i dobro osmišljenu kampanju protiv Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i američkog načina života. Američka administracija je kao odgovor na sovjetsku spoljnu politiku u periodu od 1946. do 1950. godine stvorila politiku obuzdavanja Sovjetskog Saveza i sovjetskog uticaja u svetu svim sredstvima. Ovo je podrazumevalo kako upotrebu poluga tvrde moći tako i primenu poluga meke moći. U to vreme u američkom društvu postojao je konsenzus o upotrebi političkih, vojnih i ekonomskih oruđa u borbi protiv Sovjetskog Saveza, ali je upotreba poluga meke moći bila predmet duge javne rasprave. Jedna od izuzetno važnih poluga meke moći su državni programi informisanja, odnosno ono što se u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama smatra propagandom, a propaganda se od nastanka Sjedinjenih Američkih Država do danas smatra nečasnom delatnošću autokratskih režima. Sjedinjene Američke Države su u periodu neposredno nakon Drugog svetskog rata sprovele zakonske, institucionalne i strukturalne promene koje su omogućile trajno ustanovljavanje poluga meke moći zarad širenja američkih vrednosti, ideja i kulture i zarad ideološke borbe protiv Sovjetskog Saveza i sovjetske marksističke ideologije. Zakoni doneti u to vreme su na snazi i danas i pružaju okvir za mnogobrojne programe i aktivnosti na polju primene poluga meke moći po celom svetu. ; The Cold War was a war without precedent in the history. No war before this prolonged cold conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was waged that much in the realm of soft power as the Cold War. In the absence of an immediate armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cold War was conducted as a competition in the areas of economy, technology and science, nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as the space race. Besides the competition in the realm of hard power, the United States and the Soviet Union pursued an intensive battle in the realm of soft power. This was a conflict between the American ideology of a liberal democracy and the Soviet Marxist ideology. Each of the two attempted to persuade the citizens of the other country that its social and economic practice was an ideal one, better and more just than the other one. The source of the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe will never be fully determined. The circumstances that brought about the break-up of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the fall down of communism in Europe cannot be summarized as an aggregation of military, political, economic and social factors that independently from each other led to the colossal changes in the world order. All of these factors, entangled together in a complex net, caused the implosion of the Soviet Union which left the United States as the winner in the Cold War. Yet, the United States was not only a military and economic victor, it resurfaced as a moral and ideological champion, as well. The Cold Was has been a theme of numerous papers but only a handful of these papers tackled the American-Soviet conflict in the realm of soft power. Thus, the objective of this research and dissertation is to shed the light, explain and construe the instruments of soft power that the United States institutionalized, put into motion and deployed in the ideological battle against Soviet Union in the Cold War. However, since its birth in the 18th century until the Cold War, the United States had not wielded its soft power strategically. Up to the Cold War, the soft power instruments were used exclusively during the times when the United States was involved in an armed conflict. Only in the Cold War, the need for intentional and thoughtful use of soft power instruments emerged. Soon after the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union got set off to exert its influence by diffusing its Marxist ideology and communist values. In addition to spreading its ideology, the Soviet Union led a well-planned campaign against the United States and the American way of life. From 1946 to 1950, in response to the Soviet policy towards the United States, the American administration coined the policy of containment of the Soviet Union and the Soviet influence in the world. The policy of containment included both the use of the instruments of hard power and of soft power. At that time, there was a consensus in the American society on the use of political, military and economic means in fighting the Soviet Union, while the use of soft power instruments was a subject of a prolonged public discourse. Government information programs, perceived as propaganda in the United States, have always been a very important soft power instrument, and propaganda has been considered by Americans to be a dishonest activity of autocratic governments. In the period right after the Second World War, the United States implemented legislative, institutional and structural changes that allowed for permanent establishment of the soft power instruments. These foreign policy instruments made it possible for the United States government to diffuse American values, ideas and culture and to wage an ideological war against the Soviet Union and its Marxist principles. The acts adopted at that time are in place nowadays, and provide a legal framework for numerous programs and activities in the realm of soft power.

The number of killed and perished is often for political expediency raised and multiplied. Much lesser publications deal with the internal structure and operation of the camp and with those who operated it. Among those who ran the camp. two names are of particular interest: Ljubo Milos and Miroslav Filipovic Majstorovic, who were its commanders for a period. Because Majstorovic was a former Catholic priest who was expelled from the Franciscan order, the anti-Catholic propaganda used and is still using that circumstance, to accuse the Catholic Church for participation in crimes. (SOI : CSP: S. 112)