We study how policymakers play public goods games, and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods games more cooperatively and more consistently than the undergraduates. Legislators are also less responsive to treatments that involve social elements but are more likely to respond to additional information that they receive. Further, legislators' fixed characteristics explain much of the variation in how legislators play the game. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how institutions affect the provision of public goods.
Many United States cities function without regular problems. They have well-kept roads, sewers that never overflow, and public parks with swing sets and restrooms. Others struggle to maintain balanced budgets, fail to adequately equip or staff their police forces, and offer little assistance to residents of limited means. What explains these differences? I argue that segregation along racial lines contributes to public goods inequalities. Racially segregated cities are also politically polarized cities, making collective investment more challenging and public goods expenditures lower. I provide evidence for this argument using election data from 25 large cities and demographic data matched to city finances in more than 2,600 places. To handle the problem of endogeneity I instrument for segregation using the number of waterways in a city. I find that segregated municipalities are more politically polarized and spend less on a wide range of public goods. Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/4LZXTY
Higher education (HE) is usually seen as serving the public good, especially when funded directly by the state, and because of potential social effects such as a reduction in inequality and an increase in social mobility. Public support for higher education is conditional; however, on its capacity, capability and willingness to educate citizens, and to create and disseminate knowledge. But what is the public good and what defines it? Recent years have seen many governments adopt the format of a national strategy or development plan for higher education—setting out national objectives. Similarly, many governments (e.g. Ireland, Netherlands, Hong Kong, Finland and New Zealand) are adopting the policy tool of performance agreements or compacts to better align higher education institutions (HEI) with the national objectives, involving identification of appropriate performance management and indicators. The process by which national objectives are determined varies but may involve a group comprising national and international 'experts', sometimes using consultation mechanisms (open or limited). The concept of public good has played a significant role in (re)positioning higher education over recent years. This is especially so in response to growing demands for greater accountability for all public organisations, but also, specific concerns regarding growing higher education access/participation, costs/debt, graduate employability/unemployment, and social/economic impact. This paper takes a practical approach—by asking 'what is the public good' and 'who defines it' and looking at how different countries are approaching the issue.
Higher education in the United States faces a loss of trust. Much of the response to the public's decreasing confidence has been through the accountability movement's focus on individual, private benefits. Public trust, however, will require proactive societal engagement that provides a compelling case for the contributions that higher education makes to the public good. While these challenges are discussed from a US perspective, there are global implications.
Borders are not definite, they can change over time. Recent examples are the disintegration of the Soviet Union and of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. Within countries, borders between municipalities can change as well. Border changes can be relatively peaceful, like it was the case in Czechoslovakia, but they can also go together with violence, like it was the case with Eastern Timor. This book contains a study of the incentives individuals have to form jurisdictions, using throughout a microeconomic approach. Consecutively, the roles of public good provision, of intergovernmental transfers and of violence are discussed. The analysis argues that individuals have incentives to form jurisdictions that are smaller than optimal from a social welfare point of view, but that intergovernmental transfers can alleviate this. The discussion on violence sheds some light on the incentives for the use of violence and how this affects political outcomes.
Metadata only record ; NGO's are linked to environmental objectives for good reason: non-profit NGO's provide a flexible, private-sector answer to the provision of international environmental public goods. The non-profit sector can link for profit, non-profit, and public-sector objectives in complex contracts. This article examines how, for the case of the National Biodiversity Institute (INBio) in Costa Rica, such complex contracts with both domestic and international parties provide partial solutions to public goods problems in the absence of private property rights over genetic resources. INBio's 'monopoly' position, legitimized by the local government, brings in rents from genetic resources which are reinvested in the production of public goods.
We set out and solve a static neoclassical model with a labor/leisure choice for agents and a government sector producing a Samuelsonian public good. Numerical solutions vary considerably with the elasticity of substitution for commodities in an agent's utility function. We focus on solutions with an income tax rate set by the government (second best solutions). Government revenue varies with the rate of income tax (expressed in a Laffer Curve) and we observe that such curves generally peak "internally" only for case of "high" elasticity values in the utility function of a representative agent. Inelastic substitution possibilities involve the peaking of the Laffer Curve at a corner with the rate of income tax tending to unity. We report on welfare analysis for small changes in the rate of income tax and on first best outcomes (agents charged Samuelson "prices" for the public good).
This volume brings together 8 previously unpublished papers dealing with various modes of allocating jointly consumable goods (i.e. public goods). The issues covered range from voluntary contributions and price exclusion (market allocation) to positive and normative analyses of different political allocation procedures for public goods. Given this wide spectrum of allocative schemes for public goods there does not seem to be an easy and clear-cut message from modern public-goods theory to public allocation policy.
As Americans, we expect and take for granted an ever increasing supply and choices of quality, affordable food while also generating a positive balance in international trade. We also expect that this can be achieved with decreasing use of pesticides, all the while accepting the transfer of agricultural land to roads, housing and recreation as well as the transfer of some of it back to nature. To meet these expectations, agriculture must convert from a resource-based to a knowledge-based enterprise. The new tools of biotechnology offer the latest means to this increase this knowledge base while meeting the many expectations of agriculture.
We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: There is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the 'mixed' region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer ower is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.
This note reports a modification of one use of the translog production function reported by Binswanger (1973, 1978). The method employed in this study recognizes that changes in factor shares over time are affected by a variety of decision variables including research and extension. In addition, some of the changes attributed to technical change may in fact be due to a change in the resource environment the individual decision maker faces, including the stock of public goods infrastructure. The study also investigates shifts in technological change which may be attributed to changes in the political climate." -- Author's Abstract ; ISI; IFPRI3 ; PR
We analyze a simple model of local public good provision in a country consisting of a large number of heterogeneous regions, each comprising two districts, a city and a village. When districts remain autonomous and local public goods have positive spillover effects on the neighbouring district, there is underprovision of public goods in both the city and the village. When districts unite, underprovision persists in the village (and may even become more severe), whereas overprovision of public goods arises in the city as urbanites use their political power to exploit the villagers. From a social welfare point of view, inhabitants of the village have insufficient incentives to vote for unification. We examine how national transfers to local governments can resolve these problems.
I investigate if, how, and why the effect of a contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally imposed. The rule prescribes full contributions to the public good backed by a nondeterrent sanction for those who do not comply. My experimental design allows me to disentangle to what extent the effect of the contribution rule under democracy is driven by self-selection of treatments, information transmitted via the outcome of the referendum, and democracy per se. In case treatments are endogenously chosen via a democratic decision-making process, the contribution rule significantly increases contributions to the public good. However, democratic participation does not affect participants' contribution behavior directly, after controlling for self-selection of treatments and the information transmitted by voting.
I investigate if, how, and why the effect of a contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally imposed. The rule prescribes full contributions to the public good backed by a nondeterrent sanction for those who do not comply. My experimental design allows me to disentangle to what extent the effect of the contribution rule under democracy is driven by self-selection of treatments, information transmitted via the outcome of the referendum, and democracy per se. In case treatments are endogenously chosen via a democratic decision-making process, the contribution rule significantly increases contributions to the public good. However, democratic participation does not affect participants' contribution behavior directly, after controlling for self-selection of treatments and the information transmitted by voting.