In this paper, populism is regarded as a kind of ideological map that facilitates to the citizens their coping in the political space, as well as a "thin-centered ideology" which has at his center the idea that politics should be a reflection of the will of the people, the idea that a clean and moral nation confronts a corrupt elite and "out groups", "out groups" which actions endanger or impair the rights and values of the nation. The paper focuses on some fundamental theoretical considerations on populism and empirical determination of the elements of populism in the public opinion in Serbia. Based on opinion polls in Serbia it has been shown what is the relationship of citizens to the people, political elites, democracy and its institutions, as well as the attitude towards "out groups". Empirical research conducted in Serbia in 2017 confirms the hypothesis that the gap between citizens and their elected representatives is deep, and it marks also that conventional politics increasingly faces the difficulties to reach citizens, and that lack of trust in political parties is generated in all spheres of representative democracy. In the political life, "out groups" are instrumentally ranked by political actors according to the necessities of the moment, and the empirical research of attitudes shows that they are in the same way as "out groups experienced by the citizens.
This paper analyses the connection of interests and corruption, especially corruption and political interests. It first considers the notion of interest, i.e. its meanings and significance, both for an individual and for a society. It presents the classification if interests by Albion Woodbury Small. A special emphasis is given to the encounter of different interests as the beginning of clash between humans. The paper analyses individual, special and general interests, as well as their relations. The paper also analyses two levels of conflict of interest: the conflict between public and private interest and the conflict between interests within the public offices. The relation of interests in society and politics is solved in the best way by adopting laws, i.e. by introducing the rule of law into political order. Without that the interest orientation of politicians can easily end up in abuse and illegality. In turn, abuses and illegalities open the possibilities for various kinds of corruptive acts.
In this article Dr Pribicevic analyses the impact of Kosovo crises on Serbian EU integrations and shaping of political scene of Serbia. Dr Pribicevic pointed out how crises started in spring 2011 when idea of split of Kosovo appeared again in Serbia and then continued with the clashes between KFOR and Serbs from north of Kosovo in order to get the control of administrative crossing Jarinje and Brnjak. During the summer 2011 German chancellor Merkel visited Serbia and asked government in Belgrade to normalize its relations with Kosovo and dissolve "parallel institutions" of Serbs in the north of Kosovo. Following this visit Serbian government continue its negotiations with Pristina and find out solutions for administrative crossings. On the other side, Belgrade and Pristina didn't find solution for the problem of presentation of Kosovo on the regional gatherings after what European council, under the German influence, decided to postpone the decision to give Serbia the status of candidate for the EU. Therefore, Serbia remains without EU candidaturein December 2011 in spite of the fact that government in Belgrade handedover general Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic to Hague Tribunal as well as conducted a number of successful reforms which got very high marks from EU commission. In this article Dr Pribicevic is trying to answer several questions. Why Washington and Berlin imposed such a strong pressure on Serbia in this moment? Is split of Kosovo possible solution? Could Serbian government continue with current politics of EU and Kosovo or it should take one of these politics as a priority? How Kosovo crises influenced Serbian political scene? At the end, Kosovo crises opened the crucial question: could Serbia enter EU without "recognition of territorial integrity of Kosovo"as described by German foreign minister Westervele. Having in mind forthcoming elections in spring time 2012 author thinks that ruling Democratic Party as well as leading opposition party Sebian Progresive Party will continue with current politics "both EU and Kosovo". Such politics will be in accordance with the public mood in Serbia which shows that support for EU integrations is declining with the growing pressure of US and Germany on Serbian Kosovo's politics. On the other side, Serbian politics "both EU and Kosovo" is not sustainable on the long run and Serbia has to face difficult decisions in future. Also, according to the author opinion Kosovo crises showed weakness of Serbian international position. It is without important allies among key Western powers which has dominant influence in this part of Europe. Serbia has support of Russia but key influence on Kosovo has US, GB, France and Germany. These powers connected Serbia's further progress towards EU with normalization its relations with Kosovo, knowing in advance that the time when Serbia is seeking for the EU candidature is the best time to ask Belgrade to make concessions in its Kosovo's politics. Western powers do not expect Serbia to recognize Kosovo but they expect Serbia to accept " territorial integrity of Kosovo", including its north part. Why Kosovo become so important for leading Western powers? Author thinks that several reasons influenced such tough behavior of Western power towards Serbia. First, after helping them to create an independent state, US perceived Albanians as the most reliable ally in this part of Europe. Second, Germany and other big powers in Europe wants to prevent creation of new frozen conflict in Europe similar to Cyprus one, Third, all big Western powers has reserves towards Serbian foreign policy and its orientation on EU but as well as on Russia, nonalignment world, China which quite often is described in the West as sitting on the two chairs, Last but not the least, Germany as well as France is not very eager of politics of enlargement of EU in the eve of forthcoming elections in these countries scheduled for 2012 and 2013. Therefore its hesitation in this moment towards further enlargement with US pro Albanian politics creates tough dillemas for Serbian politics in foreseeable future.
When researching multiculturalism and the process of Europeanisation in Serbia and countries of the region, one must first examine the status of multiculturality and multiculturalism, from the normative framework to states' policies which decidedly determine the nature and functioning of a political community. Starting from the fact that the context, nature and structure of a political community determines the essence of rights and freedoms stipulated by the constitution and laws, as well as that a synergy of good laws and sound policies enables an effective policy of multiculturality, integration and interlacing of cultures of diverse national communities in a society, the proclaimed multiculturalism was studied in this paper, with a view to ascertain whether such constitutional and legislative framework and policies exist, and if they did, whether there was concerted action between them. The key finding was that the states of the region support a civil state in principle, that they are exclusively or predominantly nationally legitimised by the highest legislative acts and that the factual state is marked by various national cultural identities that are not integrated into the model of plural citizenship. The paper shows that there is a lack of political will to transform the declared support for a pluralistic civil state into public policies affirming the values of multiculturalism, as well as that there is a lack of strong institutions to support such policy. Creating civil awareness, strengthening civil values and virtues are not priorities for state institutions or media controlled by governments. Rather than that, their priority is to strengthen national identities. Hence, based on the above, we can affirm that civil states, civil values and civil identities are only at initial stages, i.e. that they are still, only occasionally, at the level of general programme orientation and set aims. The necessary ingredient for their firm establishment is a consolidated democracy and acceptance of universal values of developed democracies, such as the rule of law and protection of human rights and freedoms.
The relations with Russia rank among the most important and most complex issues in the US and UK foreign policy. The years after the Second World War have been marked by an exhausting arms race between the Western and Eastern bloc that ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the victory of the United States and its Western allies. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relations between the US and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, during the mandate of President Trump and after Brexit and point to possible directions that these relations may take in the aftermath of Biden's victory in the 2020 US Presidential elections. The author proceeds from a hypothesis that the efforts of President Trump, who, contrary to his predecessors, felt that the relations with Russia should be based on interests rather than ideology, have failed. He has not been successful primarily due to the huge resistance mounted by the state structures, mainstream media and anti-Russian coalition forged by the Republican and Democratic parties. The relations between the UK and Russia remain cold after Brexit as well due to the severe problems between the two countries. The first part will deal with the strained relations between the United States and Russia following the West's victory in the Cold War, the efforts of President Trump to improve these relations and his failure to do so. The second part of the paper will address the relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia, which is in many respects even more complicated than that between Russia and the US. After Brexit, the relations between the two countries continue to be plagued by the activities of the Russian agents in Great Britain, the crisis in Ukraine and different views on the war in Syria. In the third part, the concluding part of the paper, the author tried to answer the question of how the relations between the US and Russia will develop after Joseph Biden won the 2020 US Presidential elections. According to him, the new President will continue to pursue the traditional policy towards Russia agreed upon by both US parties. It can be expected that Biden will, despite the policy of sanctions pursued by his predecessors, Obama and Trump, engage more in supporting the opposition and civilian sector in Russia. Given the cold and strained relations between these two states, it may be assumed that Great Britain will readily follow a new, tougher course of action pursued by President Biden towards Russia and Putin. It is especially important for UK politics that Biden returns to the ideas of liberalism because, as we have seen on previous pages, in London, in addition to the actions of Russian agents on the UK territory, Putin is most resented precisely for his activities to overthrow the ruling liberal order. Despite the good ties between Prime Minister Johnson and the former US President who supported Brexit, Biden's victory will bring relief to the UK because of his commitment, as opposed to Trump, to bring back America to the world political stage, where London is likely to expect to find space for its new global role after leaving the EU. On the other hand, Moscow will probably continue with its past foreign policy strategy in anticipation of the moves to be taken by the new US President without high expectations regarding the future relations between the two countries. Russia has even fewer expectations when it comes to relations with the UK, given the gravity of the problems that burden the relations between the two countries.
This article analyses the weaknesses of contemporary democratic orders which stem from the use of modern manipulation techniques employed by those who manage to win the trust for making the government in democratic elections. Contemporary democracies are under the threat of populist promises which are most often unrealistic. The combination of populism and democracy is usually a product of the powerlessness of political elites, i.e. political parties, in states to solve citizenry's most important problems – to increase the growth and development of the economic system, to introduce the rule of law, and to rehabilitate political institutions so they could rationally and efficiently function within the political system. Contemporary democracies are not equally developed, nor do they have equal chances for developing. The facts demonstrate how in many societies and states – formally oriented towards establishing a democratic governance and towards starting the democratisation of societal and political life – democracy gets misused and diminished to democratic phraseology with the help of populism, while in the institutional aspect being diminished to creating a façade of democratic institutions. It has been demonstrated that the patterns of dominance follow and are characteristic for democratic governances to a larger or smaller degree. The essence of democratic governance are politically responsible decisions, rather than mass participation in making political decisions which are not realistic, while being dangerous in terms of their consequences. Democracy means making good decisions for the benefit and good of all citizens, while hierarchy must not be challenged when it is necessary that institutions function in a rational and efficient way. Introducing equality where professionalism, competence and accountability are needed is devastating for the functioning of institutions, therefore for the functioning of democracy as well. Democracy can be tricked with the help of authorities'populism, as was the case with Nazi Germany. After Nazis took power, not all institutions of the Weimar Republic were dismantled nor challenged, nor was the Weimar Constitution changed. However – parallel to state authorities, Constitution and laws – dozens of new orders and laws were enacted, creating an illusion that nothing is changed in German state. What Nazis did was developing a new mechanism, party mechanism, parallel to the state mechanism. The two functioned next to each other. Such patterns lead to the parallelism of power and democracy, which usually led to the totalitarianisation of democracy. In contemporary states – especially those in the process of democratic transition – such parallelism shows how party leaders do not forfeit party leadership once they get elected to state offices. In that way democracies become submissive and captured by political parties, especially their leaderships and leaders. The relation of freedom and democracy has also been analysed. Experiences show that democracy is founded more successfully in places where people managed to gain their liberties, rather than in those places where democracy is yet to provide liberties to citizens. Dangers for democracy tied with the abuse of democratic conditions are being discusses in the last part of the article. Each condition necessary for the functioning of a democratic order can be simulated through manipulative ways. A special danger for contemporary democracies comes from circumstances in which those who come to power do everything so that society and state are riled by anti-political principles: indifference, fear and trepidation, and powerlessness. Anti-political principles jeopardise democratic order, and those who use them demolish democracy. Democracy is facing constant challenges and temptations for scraping democracy in the name of democracy.
In this article Dr Pribicevic analyzes reasons for difficult and slow transition in Serbia. Twelve years after the breaking down of authoritarian regime the Serbian population is completely disappointed. New authorities was promising higher standard, lower unemployment, quicker enter in to the EU, tough fight with corruption and organized crime. When it didn't happen even after the ten years big expectations were changed with disappointment and dissatisfaction directed against the parties which ruled the country after the 2000. On the elections hold in May 2012 Democratic party and its leader Boris Tadic lost elections and new government was created by Serbian Progressive Party, Socialist party of Serbia and United Regions of Serbia. Three main political reasons caused difficult and slow transition in Serbia. First, complete preoccupation with Kosovo problem and constant conditioning of Serbian European road with so called normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina slower down reforms and dealing with all other problems in society, Second, constant conflicts between so- called democratic parties which ran Serbia after 2000 and Third, slow transformation of the parties which ruled the Serbia during the 90' produced situation in which ruling parties after 2000 didn't have normal incentive and corrective coming from opposition. Only after the Serbian Progressive Party, created after the split of extreme nationalistic Serbian Radical Party, adopted main postulates of democracy and main elements of Tadic's foreign policy, first real change occurred in Serbia, twelve years after the breaking down of previous authoritarian regime. Quicker approach to EU and solvation of Kosovo issue remains the main challenge for the new government. Better life of Serbian citizens is mainly related to the solvation of these issues.
For the last few years, the German foreign policy has been under constant temptations and substantial reconsideration. The key role in resolving the difficult economic and financial crises in the EU, the development of close economic ties with the Russian and other rising world economic powers, the decision to sustain in the UN Security Council in deciding to authorise the use of force in Libya, as well as the dominant attitude towards the crises in Greece and Kosovo clearly shows the wish of Germany to pursue a more independent foreign policy. In spite of all these efforts and its huge economic power, Germany has failed to become a global political power. Moreover, in order to protect and develop its trade interests Germany must remain within the frameworks of the EU and the NATO. For a long time, Germany has been one of Serbia's most important economic and political partners. Since it is realistic to expect that Germany will be more oriented towards developing its economic ties with the new world economic powers, the Western Balkans and Serbia will not be in the focus of its foreign and economic policies. Therefore, for Serbia, it will be useful to concentrate on the cooperation with the mighty German provinces that have their interests in developing this cooperation. In the future, the Kosovo issues will remain the main obstacle to it.
This paper will assess the results of transition in the Yugoslav successor states using objective and subjective criteria. Four objective criteria related to economic growth will be used to compare economic performance in Yugoslavia and its successor states; 1. Speed of recovery after war/change in system, 2. Absolute growth rates, 3. Relative growth rates, 4. Place in world development. This will be supplemented by a survey of public opinion conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.All the four objective criteria show that the Yugoslav economy performed much better than the economies of its successor states. The survey shows that only 20 percent of population are happy with the results of transition in South Eastern European countries, while 64 percent are unhappy and 16 percent are undecided. In the former Yugoslavia much less than 20 percent of population are happy with the changes brought by the transition.
